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Abstract 
Distributed transactions are playing, and will continue to play, an increasingly 
important role in all forms of electronic business. A key ingredient of a distributed 
transaction is a commit protocol. We present a novel modelling technique for 
commit protocols and the environments in which they execute. We devise a 
new commit protocol X3PC using this modelling technique. We demonstrate 
that our modelling technique is flexible and formal enough to support automatic 
verification of behavioural properties of commit protocols, using tools such as 
model checking as well as more traditional proof techniques. It is possible to 
verify many different properties of commit protocols by expressing properties in 
temporal logics and then performing model checking to verify them. In order to 
carry out model checking a labeled transition system must first be generated from 
our models. We will describe different techniques that allow us to automatically 
generate transition systems. 
The role of commit protocols in providing transaction isolation for distributed 
transactions is studied. We present novel definitions for the four different levels of 
transaction isolation first proposed by the ANSI community. By first modelling a 
system of multiple concurrent distributed transactions, using our new technique, 
we show how to verify that a particular level of isolation is attained within the 
system. This, once again, demonstrates the applicability and flexibility of our 
modelling technique. 
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Computers and computing systems are becoming connected in ways that will 
change the way people interact dramatically. Advances in computer networks [79] 
will provide huge bandwidth communication channels between every corner of the 
globe, connecting billions of autonomous computing devices into large distributed 
systems. In the future, for example, embedded processors in electrical appliances 
might communicate their usage patterns, via the Internet, to electricity providers 
allowing them to better plan production. 
Important building blocks of these distributed computing environments are 
communication protocols that involve multiple (three or more) computing agents. 
In these protocols groups of autonomous computing agents exchange information 
to solve a common task. Examples are leadership election [29], atomic broad-
cast [49], and commit protocols [9]. In this thesis we will focus on commit proto-
cols. Commit protocols are designed to execute in a wide variety of environments. 
For example, special variants of commit protocols exist for e-commerce when the 
agents involved do not trust one another [81]. 
Almost as soon as a new problem or novel environment arises a commit pro-
tocol is devised that is claimed to solve that problem. These solutions are pro-
viding the foundations of new and exciting applications in environments such as 
Intranets, wireless broadcast environments and high speed LANs. 
It is important to fully understand a proposed protocol and to be confident 
that the behaviour of systems of processes executing the protocol is as intended. 
One way of achieving this is to formally verify properties of these systems. For 
example, one might want to ensure that a client purchasing a book over the 
Internet is only charged once the book is guaranteed to be delivered by some 
third party delivery company, even in the event of message loss. 
As in many other areas of computer science the high demand and rewards for 
developing a rapid solution often leads to ad hoc implementations. Although these 
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solutions often do behave as intended (although many have reached production 
and later have failed), initially only informal arguments are proposed to support 
their correctness. In fact, proving the correctness of complex distributed systems 
is notoriously difficult. In this thesis we present a novel technique for modelling 
commit protocols. We demonstrate its applicability and show how it can be used 
to understand the role of a wide range of commit protocols as they interact with 
their environments and with each other. 
1.1 Transactions 
In almost all electronic business processes the unit of work can be thought of 
as a transaction [34]. A transaction is a group of actions that are executed 
(often by a transaction processing system) in a way that imparts certain guar-
antees on their behaviour. These guarantees are often referred to as the ACID 
properties of transactions. 'A'tomicity guarantees that either all the actions of 
a transaction take place or none take place. Transactions can also guarantee 
'C'onsistency properties. For example in an e-commerce transaction electronic 
money is neither created nor destroyed by e-transactions. Consistency is slightly 
different from the other ACID properties in that it is the transaction itself not 
the transaction processing system that provides the property. A system can im-
part different 'I'solation guarantees on its transactions. This limits the extent 
to which interference is permitted between concurrently executing transactions. 
Finally 'D'urability guarantees are often imparted upon a transaction by the sys-
tem in which it executes to ensure that if a transaction makes a change, then that 
change will survive a level of system failure . 
Transactions perform actions on data objects. The data objects represent 
values of real world entities. For example, the wealth of a person is captured 
by the data object recording her bank account balance in a database. For the 
purposes of this thesis, we assume that the actions of a transaction fall into two 
categories, read and write. Although, traditionally these actions represented the 
actions carried out on data objects in a relational database, in this thesis, we will 
take a much broader view [80]. A write action changes the state of a system. 
This might be for example starting a robot welder in a car factory. Whereas a 
read access gathers a value from an external environment. For example reading 
a temperature gauge of a steel furnace. 
In many transactions, it is often the case that the data objects of a transac- 
'Obviously no system can protect against total destruction. 
tion are distributed. For example, the transaction that represents the sale of an 
online book requires actions to be performed for billing, delivery and inventory. 
These actions are distributed across many different computers. For our purpose 
a transaction can be distributed even if all the processes in the transaction reside 
on the same computer system. We define a process as a thread of computing con-
trol that is autonomous and has the ability to fail without failing the system as a 
whole. We therefore include single processor machines running multiple processes 
or threads as distributed systems. 
Although the theory of transactions was founded in early databases sys-
tems [28, 9], and extended to distributed systems with the advent of distributed 
file systems and distributed databases [25], the same theory has found applica-
tions in many different new areas. See [80] for a survey. 
The birth and exponential growth of the Internet and wireless communication 
devices has meant that many millions of computing devices from vending ma-
chines to personal organisers have, or will soon have, the ability to communicate 
with one another. It will not be long before large amounts of electronic business 
is carried out by these connected autonomous processes 2 , as they participate in 
distributed transactions. 
There are three important properties that these new distributed computing 
environments exhibit. Firstly, the numbers of processes involved in a transaction 
can be very large. Secondly, the processes communicate by asynchronous message 
passing. In asynchronous message passing systems, the delay a message is subject 
to is not known by the processes in the system. Lastly, the reliability of the 
message passing medium that connects the processes, the network, may be very 
dubious. The processes themselves may also be unreliable. This means many 
different types of failure are possible in the system. 
1.2 Message Passing Protocols 
The distributed systems that we are interested in, in this thesis, are often referred 
to as asynchronous message passing systems [52]. In these systems processes 
communicate by sending messages to one another. Each process resides on some 
hardware platform and there is some kind of message passing medium which 
connects the hardware. In this way the processes exchange messages to achieve a 
common goal. In asynchronous systems the delay a message undergoes in order to 
propagate from one process to another is unknown by any process in the system. It 
2 \Ve use the term process to mean an autonomous thread of execution. 
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failure. 
is this property that makes the system asynchronous. In synchronous systems this 
delay is bounded and the bound is known to the processes in the system. Another 
category, partially synchronous also exists. Since asynchrony of message passing 
is the weakest assumption it provides the most applicable modelling framework. 
In some work, for example [27] the the asynchronous nature of message passing is 
exploited fully. In reality of course there is some bound in which a message will 
arrive if not lost. In the systems we model in this thesis we take this more practical 
approach and do not use derive results exploiting total asynchrony. Figure 1.1 
sets the scene. 
Figure 1.1: A simple message passing system in which three processes exchange 
messages in order to complete a common task. 
We will also be interested in systems where messages are lost and systems 
where processes fail and then perhaps recover. Different assumptions have been 
made when modelling message and process failure. We will describe them in 
more detail in chapter 3. In summary, we are mostly interested in the case that 
messages are completely lost, sometimes referred to as omission failure, rather 
than corrupted or interfered with. In the case of process failure we will study the 
case that a process crashes and then perhaps recovers rather than models that 
capture process misbehaviour. 
The actions that processes are permitted or required to take while exchanging 
messages and responding to failure constitute a protocol. Each process has some 
internal state. When it receives a message it performs an action based on this 
state and the content of the message it received. An action consists of changing 
state and sending messages. The aggregated behaviour of all the processes as 
they perform actions is a protocol execution. 
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1.3 Model Checking 
Model checking [19] is an automatic technique for verifying properties of con-
current systems. The method has been very successful in verifying properties of 
complex sequential circuit designs and more recently it has been useful for verify-
ing properties of communication protocols. Various methods have been employed 
to model check these systems, but in order to do so, one must first construct a 
formal model that describes the behaviour of the system. This often takes the 
form of a labelled transition system. A point in the labelled transition system 
describes the global state of the distributed system. A transition from one point 
to another represents an action occurring within the system, for example a mes-
sage arriving at a process. The transitions are often labelled with the name of 
the action. 
The need for model checking is clear. As distributed systems become more 
and more integrated in applications such as telephone switching networks, air 
traffic control systems etc. we become more and more reliant on them. In order 
to gain confidence in their correctness it is important to fully understand their 
behaviour. By providing formal modelling techniques, and methods whereby 
properties of these models can be formally verified, we make progress towards 
being confident that the systems we model behave as intended. 
1.4 Commit Protocols 
Processes carrying out distributed transactions make use of commit protocols 
to provide the atomicity and isolation guarantees of transactions. A commit 
protocol is executed by processes in a system in order to provide these guarantees. 
Commit protocols have been studied and developed for many years by academics 
and practitioners alike [50, 9, 68]. 
In order to study the behaviour of a commit protocol, the protocol and the en-
vironment in which it executes are first modelled. The behaviour of these models 
can be studied and, if the model is a true reflection of a potential implementation, 
the model will reflect the behaviour of the commit protocol when implemented. It 
is the modelling and verification of the behavioural properties of commit protocols 
that is central to this thesis. 
The changing and diverse environments in which distributed transactions now 
execute give rise to a diverse set of modelling assumptions. In fact it is often 
more important to accurately describe the way a commit protocol interacts with 
its environment (for example how it reacts to failure within the system) than the 
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way the processes exchange messages while carrying out the protocol. 
In this thesis we will provide a modelling technique that can be used to cap-
ture the behaviour of many different commit protocols and the environments in 
which they execute. We will demonstrate that this modelling technique is for-
mal enough to support rigorous arguments about the behavioural properties of 
commit protocols. We will show it is flexible enough to model a wide variety of 
commit protocols and distributed computing environments. It is scalable in the 
sense that the arguments constructed using the model can be applied to arbitrary 
numbers of processes. This is important since the number of processes involved 
in transactions can be very large. We will also demonstrate that our modelling 
technique is highly amenable to automatic verification using model checking. 
1.5 Thesis Contribution 
In this thesis we derive a novel modelling technique which is particularly appropri-
ate for modelling commit protocols and the environments in which they execute. 
The main novelty of this technique is its use of views to abstract details of message 
passing and communication failure. Our model uses rules to describe the actions 
processes take in a protocol. Each rule has a pre-condition and a post-action. 
If the pre-condition is satisfied at a process then the post-action may happen. 
Rather than modelling message passing explicitly we prefer to maintain, within 
the local state of a process, that process's view of other processes' local state. 
This approach affords an intuitive and highly scalable and flexible framework in 
which to describe commit protocols. 
Using our technique we demonstrate its effectiveness by formally modelling 
many existing commit protocols and environments. Our models of these protocols 
are "modular" in the sense that a more complex protocol can be derived from 
a simple protocol by extending the model of the simple protocol. Using our 
technique we show first how to model simple protocols and environments and then 
show, by modifying and extending the rules of our models, how more complex 
protocols can be derived. We formally verify properties of commit protocols using 
these models. For example we show how they provide transaction atomicity. 
A new protocol, X3PC is presented. This was devised by first modelling an 
existing protocol using our modelling technique and then extending this model 
in a very natural way. In this new model we derive interesting properties and 
formally verify them. 
We show how to generate a labelled transition system from our views based 
model that accurately captures all the possible execution behaviours of the proto-
col being modelled. In order to formally verify properties of commit protocols we 
must formally specify properties. We do this by describing properties using tem-
poral logic in our case CTL [16]. Once a property has been described using CTL 
we show how it can be automatically verified by model checking the transition 
systems we previously generated. 
Transactions can attain different levels of isolation depending on the type 
of concurrency control methods they use to restrict how one transaction might 
interfere with another. It is interesting to study how commit protocols are used to 
provide transaction isolation. In order to verify that a commit protocol provides a 
particular level of isolation we must first carefully define isolation levels. Recently, 
the ANSI community provided a specification [3] of different levels of isolation. 
This specification was criticised by Berenson et al. in [6] who gave a more complete 
and rigorous definition. Unfortunately, this criticism had some shortcomings. By 
building on the work of Berenson et al. we formally define the four isolation levels 
first proposed by the ANSI community in a way that allows more transaction 
concurrency than previous definitions. 
By extending our definitions of isolation to distributed transactions we ex-
amine the role commit protocols play in providing transaction isolation. To do 
this we use our views based model to describe the behaviour of a very simple 
transaction processing environment. In this model multiple transactions perform 
read and write accesses on multiple data objects before carrying out a commit 
protocol. A subtle change to the model describes two different ways in which the 
commit protocol can be invoked to provide two different levels of isolation. We 
formally prove the level of isolation attained for each type of invocation. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
In the next chapter we provide a survey of commit protocols and the environ-
ments in which they execute. This survey first looks at core literature on the 
subject. The topic of blocking, an undesirable feature of many commit protocols, 
is surveyed here. This leads to a discussion of protocols that provide resilience to 
blocking (defined and discussed later), so called non-blocking protocols. Commit 
protocols have been highly optimised over the years and we survey some of these 
optimisations. As previously mentioned we are just as interested in modelling the 
environments in which protocols execute as the protocols themselves. In the next 
chapter we survey many different types of failure models that have been used 
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when describing commit protocol behaviour. Finally in this chapter we discuss 
some of the newer application areas of commit protocols. 
In chapter 3 we discuss existing modelling techniques that have been used 
to model the behaviour of commit protocols. We discuss three main general 
techniques that have been used; I/O automata, a knowledge theoretic approach 
and the calculus for communicating systems. We compare these techniques before 
introducing our views based model. We round off chapter 3 by using this views 
based model to model a very simple commit protocol, two-phase commit. 
In chapter 4 we extend the simple two-phase commit model by enriching the 
environment in which it executes to include communication failure. We study 
some properties of the behaviour of the protocol in this enriched model and show 
how it can be made more resilient to failure. A model of three-phase commit 
is derived from two-phase commit that is used to introduce the main topic of 
this chapter, quorum based three phase commit protocols. Using our modelling 
technique we describe progressively more complex protocols leading to the devel-
opment of a new protocol X3PC. 
In chapter 5 we study the simple two-phase commit model introduced in chap-
ter 3. We describe two ways to automatically generate a labelled transition system 
from views based models. These transition systems capture all possible behaviour 
of protocol executions. We define properties of protocols using CTL [16], a tem-
poral logic, and verify these properties using the games based model checking 
technique proposed in [76]. This technique employs a game between two players, 
the verifier who tries to show that the CTL formula is true and the refuter who 
attempts to disprove it. Players take turns by making moves on the transition 
system or by performing operations on the formula to be proved. This approach 
is very intuitive. The runtime of this approach, as for most model checking algo-
rithms, depends on the size of the transition system generated. It soon becomes 
apparent that the transition systems even for very simple commit protocols can be 
very large. This chapter examines a technique to reduce the size of the transition 
system while still capturing protocol behaviour. 
In Chapter 6 we consider the isolation properties of transactions. In this 
chapter we produce novel definitions of isolation that formally describe the levels 
proposed by the ANSI community. The motivation for our definitions comes 
from the desire to study the role commit protocols play in providing transaction 
isolation. 
In chapter 7 we generalise the definitions of the previous chapter to encom-
pass distributed transactions. We then set about using our modelling technique 
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to model a very simple distributed transactions system. Using this model we 
formally show the role a commit protocol plays in providing different levels of 
transaction isolation. Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to the thesis and discusses 





Atomic commit protocols have been widely studied, both by academics and prac-
titioners. Although the problem of atomic commit is fairly well defined, literature 
relating to the subject is diverse. This diversity, is in the main part, due to four 
interacting factors. 
Firstly, modelling assumptions about the environment in which proposed 
atomic commit solutions execute vary. Different modelling parameters, for ex-
ample asynchronous versus synchronous message passing assumptions, give rise 
to different distributed system models and thus different commit protocol solu-
tions. Perhaps the most important modelling assumptions relate to the extent to 
which communication and site failure is allowed in the model. For example, the 
correctness of some proposed atomic commit protocols depends on the assumption 
that once a message is sent it is guaranteed to be delivered [4]. 
Secondly, different protocol solutions to the atomic commit problem address 
different design concerns or optimise the "cost" of execution of a protocol in 
different ways. Examples include protocols that minimise logging to non-volatile 
storage or reduce a protocol's vulnerability to certain types of failure. Although 
we are particularly interested in behavioural properties, rather than performance 
issues, many of the optimisations surveyed in this chapter were derived from 
observations about protocol behaviour. 
Thirdly, the generality of the atomic commit problem has meant that, over 
the years, it has found applications in many different areas. Each area has posed 
different research questions which have been answered in different ways. These 
vary from the role of atomic commit in transaction processing monitors to inter-
operability issues and commit style transaction processing in e-commerce. 
Lastly, literature tends to be divided between work that presents new atomic 
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commit protocols and work that produces negative results (e.g. non-existence 
proofs). In the latter case authors need to reason about "the set of all commit 
protocols". Their task is usually made simpler if they can define what constitutes 
a commit protocol in such a way as to exclude obviously useless protocols (e.g. 
a protocol that always aborts). This change of focus leads to different modelling 
assumptions. For instance, in the former case, a new protocol might be presented 
and then shown to be behaviourally correct assuming a known bound on message 
delay. By contrast, when a non-existence proof is derived, no such restriction 
needs to be placed on the model (in fact often the proof depends on restrictions 
like bounds on message delay not being in place). This unfortunately leads to sets 
of results that at first sight seem contradictory. However upon closer inspection 
of the models presented we see that the correctness of a protocol that seems to 
provide a counter example to a non-existence proof relies on assumptions that 
are not found in the environment of the model where the non-existence proof was 
derived. For example, it is well known that if sites can crash no two-phase commit 
protocol can be non-blocking [72] 1 . This seems to contradict a non-blocking 
two-phase commit protocol presented in [4]. In reality, no such contradiction 
exists because in the latter text a communication service is assumed whereby 
a broadcast message is guaranteed to be delivered by all or no recipients. A 
method for implementing such a service is given, but in the worst case it makes 
the protocol non two-phased. 
It is perhaps then not surprising that within this diverse field of literature there 
are few generally applicable modelling approaches in which the behavioural prop-
erties of commit protocols and their environments can be analysed. Furthermore, 
well founded precise models of atomic commit protocols and the environments in 
which they execute seem lacking for systems with more than a very low level of 
complexity. Descriptions of more complex commit protocols tend to be less formal 
and therefore only informal arguments are given to justify their correctness. 
In this chapter we first focus on some fundamental work on the atomic commit 
problem. We then broaden our discussion in order to survey the more general 
field. Throughout the survey, the emphasis will be on the important behavioural 
aspects of commit protocols and the environments in which they execute. This 
will motivate the next chapter where a modelling technique for commit protocols, 
used throughout the dissertation, will be presented. A large part of the disser -
tation is concerned with modelling and model checking. This chapter does not 
contain a literature survey of general modelling techniques. This can be found at 
'We will discuss blocking in much greater detail later in section 2.3. 
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the start of the next chapter before our model is presented. The focus of this the-
sis is on modelling and verification techniques of commit protocols and their role 
within transaction processing. For this reason an in depth discussion of practical 
transaction processing systems is inappropriate. 
2.2 Core Atomic Commit Literature 
Atomic commit protocols are best known in the field of distributed transaction 
processing (TP) [34]. Bernstein et al. [9] provide an excellent account of the role 
of commit protocols in this area. They provide a definition of the problem of 
atomic commit which has been adopted extensively. Their distributed system 
consists of a set of sites which communicate by sending messages to one another. 
At the outset the sites are required to vote either yes or no in order to start 
the process whereby they might terminate, that is, reach a "commit" or "abort" 
decision. A definition of the atomic commit problem is given by means of a set of 
axioms found in figure 2.1. A protocol that satisfies these criteria is said to solve 
the atomic commit problem. Although these axioms have often been referred to 
as a problem definition they do not provide a complete definition. For example, 
although they make reference to failure they say nothing about the nature of 
failure itself. 
• AC1 No two sites that decide, do so differently. 
• AC2 A site cannot reverse its decision once it has reached one. 
• AC3 If any site decides commit then all sites voted yes. 
• AC4 If all participants vote yes and no failures occur, then the decision 
will be commit. 
• AC5 At any point in the execution of the protocol, if all existing failures 
are repaired and no new failures occur for sufficiently long then all sites will 
reach a decision. 
Figure 2.1: Axioms that capture the correctness of a commit protocol 
The autonomous sites referred to model data managers (DMs) involved in a 
particular distributed transaction. Each site will vote yes if it is able to commit 
its part of a transaction or vote no if for some reason (for instance an integrity 
constraint is violated) it cannot. An ACP is deemed correct if it fulfills axioms 
AC1-5. Arguably these definitions seem to capture several different aspects of 
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correctness. AC1 is also sometimes referred to as atomicity. AC2 is often im-
plicitly assumed. AC3 is an important axiom of commit, without which commit 
reduces to the problem of consensus [27]. AC4 and AC5 are slightly different in 
that they put performance rather than behavioural restrictions on what consti-
tutes a commit protocol. Another important difference is that their reference to 
failures suggests that both the protocol and the environment in which it executes 
are important when one wishes to determine correctness. We will return to this 
point later when we see that in order to give a complete account of commit pro-
tocol behaviour we often must include the behaviour of the environment in which 
it executes. 
The above definition of atomic commit seems to capture the problem at hand 
although perhaps it is a little informal. It still leaves open questions like "What 
is the meaning of sufficiently long in ACV", "What constitutes a failure (real 
or just suspected) and how it is detected in ACV". Also under this definition 
if a permanent failure is experienced then the participating sites need not reach 
a decision. We will see that it is possible for some commit protocols to allow 
non-failed sites to reach a decision in many situations where only partial failure 
occurs. 
As well as offering a definition of the atomic commit problem Bernstein et 
al. discuss solutions. In the centralised two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [32], a 
coordinator collects votes on whether or not participants can commit a transaction 
and broadcasts whether or not there is unanimity for commit. 
Problems arise with 2PC when site and/or network failures occur. Some work-
ing sites may become blocked: they want to commit the transaction, but they are 
unable to proceed until one or more failures at other sites have been repaired. 
The blocked site must hold locks on resources on behalf of the stalled transaction, 
preventing other transactions from proceeding. In figure 2.2 a coordinator and 
two participants attempt to carry out centralised 2PC. The coordinator sends a 
prepare message to each participant who both respond with yes votes. Suppose 
the coordinator receives these votes and then crashes. This leaves both partici-
pants blocked 2 . They cannot commit or abort without first contacting other sites. 
After voting yes they are said to be in their uncertainty phase. 
Despite its potential for blocking, the family of 2PC protocols, which include 
centralised 2PC, decentralised 2PC [70], linear or nested 2PC [32] and so on, form 
cornerstone solutions for the atomic commit problem. Centralised 2PC has been 
2 0f course the participants might be able to contact one another and resolve the outcome 
of the transaction, but in our simple example we insist that they rely on the coordinator to 
determine an outcome. 
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Participant 1 	Coordinator 	Participant 2 
epw 	 Prepa re  
yes 
CRASH 
Blocked 	 Blocked 
Figure 2.2: Particpants in two-phase commit become blocked after voting yes due 
to a failure at their coordinator. 
the subject of a great deal of research and for reasons discussed later it has been 
adopted widely as a commercial solution. 
Skeen and Stonebraker [69, 72] provide one of the first formal models of commit 
protocols. Within this model several results are derived. In their model finite 
state automata (FSA) are used to describe the behaviour of sites participating 
in a commit protocol. Sites communicate by passing messages and take atomic 
steps from one state to another based on incoming messages and their current 
state. A step may cause messages to be sent. 
In this model messages are assumed to propagate within a known time, from 
one operational site to another. Because the message propagation time is bounded, 
site failure or message loss can be reliably detected using timecuts (if a site does 
not receive a message it is expecting, it can assume that the sender has crashed or 
the message is lost). Sites incorporate timeout transitions intc their finite state 
control to model the behaviour of "timing out" when waiting for a message. 
Skeen introduces the concept of a termination protocol which is executed by 
operational sites when a failure is detected in order to terminate a. commit protocol 
(i.e. reach a commit or abort decision). He also introduces the concept of a 
recovery protocol. After a site fails it might recover at which point it then executes 
a recovery protocol. A protocol is said to have the independent recovery property 
if a recovering site can reach a commit or abort decision without requiring further 
communication. Clearly, independent recovery is potentially a desirable property 
of a protocol since it allows sites to terminate transactions aitonomously. If a 
protocol does not have this property, upon recovery, a site will have to contact 
other sites to reach a decision. If, due to a failure, communication with other 
sites is not possible the site cannot proceed and is thus blocked. If however 
independent recovery is paid for (e.g. with extra messages) during normal failure 
free execution (as it is in the three-phase commit protocol discussed later), this 
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overhead may be unacceptable if failures are uncommon. 
To reason about protocol executions, Skeen describes the global state of the 
distributed system he models as a vector of local site states together with a 
message buffer containing any undelivered messages still propagating through 
the network. A protocol step is then a transition in the global state brought 
about by one of the sites taking a step. A step may also change the outstanding 







Yes.Yes 	 _N2_. 
Commit b:rt 
Figure 2.3: Skeen's FSA for 2PC. The local states are initial (i), wait (w), commit 
(c) and abort (a). Transitions are labeled r,, msg to represent the sending and 
receipt of messages. 
Figure 2.3 shows the FSA for 2PC. In Skeen's model the labels on the tran-
sitions represent a request/ response dialogue between the coordinator and its 
participants. For example if a participant receives a prepare message in state i 
it might then reply with a no vote and move to the a state. 
Skeen developed the idea of concurrency sets. Two local states x and y are 
said to be potentially concurrent if there exists a reachable global state where 
two participants in the global state are in x and y respectively. Thus for at least 
one possible execution of the protocol, state x is occupied by one site at the same 
time that y is occupied by another site. In figure 2.3 the concurrency set for w 
is {w, c, a). Thus, for example, in some execution one site might be in state w 
at the same point at which a second site is in either w, c or a. 
Skeen shows that if a protocol has a local state with both c and a in its 
concurrency set then in some execution, if failure occurs at a site, then that site 
cannot independently recover without potentially violating atomicity. This is 
because the recovering site can't safely move to a since some other site might be 
in c and similarly it can't move to c since another state might be in a. Since the 
concurrency set of the local state w contains both c and a we can conclude that 
a process may not be able to recover independently if it were to fail, in this state. 
By adding a buffer state called pre-commit (pc), to the 2PC FSA the three-
phase commit (3PC) protocol is derived, see figure 2.4. 3PC does have the in-
dependent recovery property in the face of single site failure. In a committing 
run of 3PC after voting a site receives a pre-commit message, moves to the pc 
state and sends an acknowledgment to this message to its coordinator. Once the 
coordinator has collected acknowledgements from all sites it broadcasts the com-
mit outcome. 3PC is non-blocking for single site failure', but it is not resilient 
to blocking if message loss is possible. In this restricted model where only single 
site failure is possible, once a failure has been detected a site can always make a 
safe transition to a final state, without having to contact other sites. This has the 
advantage that, provided only single site failures are possible, a recovery protocol 
exists such that any recovering site can terminate a transaction and any locks on 
resources held on behalf of that transaction can be released without having to 
wait for a failure to be repaired. For example, let participant p be in its pc state. 
If p times out, waiting for a message from its coordinator, it can safely move 
to abort. This is because the timeout signifies that the coordinator has crashed 
and that all the other participants, which are either in wait or pre-commit will 
also timeout and move to abort. Figure 2.4 shows all the timeout and failure 
transitions. If we allow double failure then we see this scheme has a major short-
coming. Suppose one participant is in state pc and its coordinator is also in state 
pc. Now suppose both sites crash. The crashes happen so close together that 
the participant (who is waiting for a commit message) does not get a chance to 
timeout. By studying figure 2.4 we can see that upon recovery the participant 
will move to state c, the failure transition. The coordinator upon recovery will 
move to state a, the failure transition, and so an inconsistent global state will be 
reached violating atomicity. 
Although 3PC is non-blocking for single site failure, this extra resilience is of 
little practical use because in practice the type of failures that might occur (e.g. 
double failure) cannot be restricted. Furthermore, this extra resilience comes 
at the cost of an extra round of messages, even during failure-free execution of 
the protocol. These two facts have meant that 3PC has not been adopted in 
commercial systems. 
'Single site failure means that when a site crashes it is guaranteed to have detected the 
possible crash failure of all other sites. Double failure occurs when one site fails before it 
detects the failure of another failed site. 3PC does not provide resilience to blocking in the 
latter case of double failure. 
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I Commit 	 Ack .... Ack 
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Failure 	- 
- 	Timeout 	-- - - 
C 	 ci  
Figure 2.4: Skeen's FSA for 3PC. The local states are i (initial), w (wait), pc 
(pre-commit), c commit and a abort. 
Skeen also models a type of communication failure called network partition-
ing. In this model sites can become partitioned into groups. When this happens 
messages in transit between sites are lost, and subsequently communication is 
only possible between sites in each component of the partition. It is shown that, 
in this richer model, no commit protocol can be non-blocking. We discuss an 
improvement to 3PC later which circumvents blocking for certain types of parti-
tioning. 
The formal model proposed by Skeen provides a structure in which to derive 
some fundamental results. The main focus of this work provides sufficient condi-
tions which allow non-blocking solutions to the atomic commit problem. Perhaps 
quite pessimistically, it is shown that the simple 2PC protocol does not have the 
independent recovery property, thus upon recovery a site typically has to contact 
other sites in order to resolve the outcome of a transaction. By adding a buffer 
state the (3PC) protocol can protect against blocking in the presence of single 
site failure. If message loss, site partitioning or double failure are possible, Skeen 
shows no recovery protocol allows sites to independently recover, and so they 
might block. 
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2.3 Non-blocking Protocols 
The fundamental observation [72] that no protocol can solve the non-blocking 
atomic commit problem in the presence of message loss motivated researchers to 
devise protocols that partially solve the non-blocking problem. The non-blocking 
result states that in the presence of message loss or network partitioning it is not 
possible to devise a protocol that is non-blocking for all sites. This does however 
admit the possibility of protocols that allow some of the sites to remain unblocked 
for certain types of failure. 
In [71] Skeen extends his 3PC protocol to provide a protocol, called Q3PC, 
that is non-blocking for certain classes of communication failure. In this model 
communication failure isolates sites by partitioning them into connected groups 
or components. When a failure occurs the sites in each component execute a 
termination protocol. An election [29] takes place to elect a new coordinator 
within the group. This coordinator collects the states of the sites within that 
group. If any site has committed or aborted the decision is passed on to the 
non-decided sites in the component by the coordinator. 
Some of the commit protocols we study in this thesis make use of quorums, 
which have the desirable property that a common site exists in any two quorate 
subsets of a set of sites. A quorum is a predicate Q over subsets of P which has 
the following property. 
VX, Y c P, if Q(X) A Q(Y) then X fl Y 0 
The simplest quorum scheme is "Q(X) if X is a majority of sites" [63]. We assume 
a majority quorum scheme is used in our examples, although any quorum scheme 
with the above property is sufficient. 
In a quorum based 3PC, if a quorum of sites exists in a component such that 
at least one of these sites is in state pc and the others have voted yes or are 
themselves in pc the coordinator of the new component can send a pre-commit 
message and after receiving a quorum of acknowledgements sends a commit mes-
sage. Note, no other site outside of the connected component can abort or could 
have aborted. 
If the coordinator determines that a quorum of sites exists within the com-
ponent that have either voted yes, (if it determines that a site has voted no 
and aborted then it can immediately abort itself and inform the other sites to 
abort) or are in the pre-abort (pa) state', the coordinator sends a pre-abort 
4 The pa state is introduced in the quorum based 3PC. It is a symmetrical buffer state to 
PC. 
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message to the sites. On receipt of the pre-abort message the sites enter their 
pa state and acknowledge the message. Once a quorum of acknowledgements to 
the pre-abort message have been received an abort message is sent to the sites. 
If any quorate partition persists for sufficiently long, the termination protocol 
described will allow all sites in that quorum to terminate and thus these sites will 
not block. 
Kiedar and Dolev [41] show that it is possible for Q3PC to block even when 
a quorum of sites form. In order to exhibit this pathological behaviour a com-
munication failure must happen during the termination protocol of Q3PC. They 
call this repeated failure cascading failure. In this type of failure there are several 
successive partial network failures, and possibly some repairs too, but the net-
work is not totally failure free at any time during the failure period. There may 
be times of calm where some progress is made but more disruption soon follows. 
If a network undergoes cascading failure after which sites again become con-
nected in a quorum, then the termination protocol of Q3PC can be insufficient 
to prevent these sites from becoming blocked. Kiedar and Dolev introduce two 
counters, namely last elected (le) and last attempt (la). The counters are updated 
to ensure that if a network event disrupts a quorum of sites A and later a quorum 
of sites B forms then the sites in A will have a strictly smaller la counter than 
the those in B. In the new protocol proposed, called E3PC, if two sites are in the 
pa or pc state, by using the la counter, E3PC can determine which site moved 
to that state most recently. This extra knowledge can be used to ensure a con-
nected quorum does not block even in the event of cascading failure. In Kempster 
et al. [43] we model the Q3PC and E3PC protocols in order to provide a more 
precise account of their behaviour. Although E3PC does solve the problem of 
blocking under cascaded failure it will tend to terminate transactions by aborting 
them in many cases where it could have committed. By adding extra rules to our 
model we enhance the termination protocol of E3PC (to derive X3PC) so that 
a commit outcome is reached in many cases where an abort is reached in E3PC. 
We will return to this topic in greater deatail in Chapter 4. 
Cheung and Kameda [12] analyse the set of different possible termination 
protocol executions of 3PC. They assign a probability to each possible different 
partitioning of sites that might result from a network failure. For example, if 
three sites are executing 3PC and failure takes place when one is in c and the 
other two are in pc respectively, a possible partition is that two sites are grouped 
in states c and pc, and another is separated in state pc. 
Given a probability distribution over the set of possible partitions they define 
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the efficiency of a termination protocol as the expected number of sites which 
are not terminated by that protocol. Termination protocols are grouped into 
classes. A termination protocol is said to be site optimal within a class if it has 
the minimum expected number of blocked sites among all termination protocols 
of that class. Two classes of termination protocols are defined and site optimal 
termination protocols are derived within each class. 
2.4 Two-Phase Commit Optimisations 
So far our review has focused on literature that analysed the problem of commit 
in a rather isolated way. This analysis tended to focus on the subject of blocking. 
In many commercial environments where sites are highly reliable, and message 
loss only happens with a very low probability, and high transaction throughput 
is required, a different focus is then more appropriate. 
It was shown in [74] that the commit part of transaction processing typically 
represents about one third of the total transaction duration. In a tightly coupled 
or centralised system the cost of logging dominates commit time, whereas in a 
geographically distributed system, the message latency becomes a more significant 
factor. This suggests that the commit time for such distributed systems will 
represent an even higher proportion of the total transaction time. This fact has 
motivated researchers to develop optimised versions of commit protocols. A faster 
commit protocol increases transaction throughput by not only reducing the time 
each transaction takes to execute but also reducing the time transactions hold 
locks, thereby increasing transaction concurrency in the system. 
The simple models presented earlier do not take account of, amongst other 
things, the read and write operations transactions perform before entering their 
commit phase, how a group of concurrently executing transactions interact, and 
how commit protocols interact with transaction logs. In order to analyse the 
behaviour of these optimised commit protocols therefore, researchers developed 
richer models that included these features. 
An excellent survey of a host of commercial two-phase commit optimisations 
was given by Chrysanthis et al. [14]. All the optimisations work in one of two 
ways. Either the number of messages (or message rounds) is reduced so that the 
overall commit process is faster or the number of forced log writes is reduced. 
A forced log write requires the commit process to wait until the write has been 
flushed to stable storage. This represents a significant overhead since writing 
to non-volatile storage is usually several orders of magnitude slower than writes 
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to volatile storage. Currently, minimum volatile memory cycle times are as low 
as 50 nanoseconds (DRAM) compared with minimum disk access of about 10 
milliseconds. 
To enable centralised 2PC to recover from site crashes it is necessary for both 
coordinator and participant sites to record, usually in the transaction log, their 
current state in the commit protocol as they proceed. If a site crashes, upon 
recovery it can then determine the correct course to take in order to terminate 
the transaction. In the most extreme case a site could force write a log record, 
whenever it changed state. Upon recovery it would be guaranteed to be in the 
state it was in before the crash and so could resume execution exactly at the 
point it crashed. Writing log records to stable storage before every state change 
is very expensive. For this reason researchers sought to minimise the number of 
log writes required. 
In the presumed abort (PA) [57] 2PC variant, if a transaction coordinator or 
participant crashes, upon recovery, the absence of a log record for a transac-
tion implies that a transaction should be aborted. If no trace of the transaction 
remains then no action need be taken, but in some cases partial effects of the 
transaction may need to be undone. Given this presumption sites must force 
write records when entering states where, upon recovery, the abort presumption 
might lead to incorrect behaviour (i.e. a violation of transaction atomicity Ad). 
Conversely, sites need not perform any writes to the log when the abort presump -
tion leads to correct behaviour. For instance, when a coordinator decides commit 
it must force write this to its log. If it did not, and then subsequently crashed, 
upon recovery it would find no record of the transaction and if interrogated by a 
recovering participant as to the transaction outcome it would reply abort. The 
coordinator might have already sent commit messages to other participants who 
could have committed and thus this would violate atomicity. 
The presumed commit (PC) 2PC variant [57] is similar to PA but the appro-
priate logging is designed to safeguard against violation of atomicity in the event 
of an erroneous commit presumption. For example, before sending a prepare mes-
sage to participants a coordinator must force write a log record to logically erase 
the implicit commit presumption. Suppose prepare messages were sent before 
writing this record. One participant could receive the prepare message and reply 
yes and enter prepare, while another could reply no and enter its abort state. 
Meanwhile if the coordinator was to crash and recover it would interpret the lack 
of log entries for the transaction as commit. If the prepared participant times 
out waiting for a response from the coordinator and makes a further request it 
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will receive a commit message and move to c. Clearly, this violates atomicity. 
Figure 2.5 describes the logging activity required by a committing or aborting 
transaction using either PC or PA. 
PRESUMED ABORT (ABORT CASE) 
	
PRESUMED COMMIT (COMMIT CASE) 
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Figure 2.5: Logging required for PC and PA. We denote a forced log write, 
*prepare * and a non-forced write end. 
At first sight it might be tempting to think that the PA protocol requires more 
messages and log writes than the PC protocol since most transactions commit 
and its presumption is to abort. Indeed for a committing update transaction PC 
requires one less forced log write at each participant and one less message to be 
sent from each participant. There are however other factors to consider. 
Since many transactions involve sites that participate only as read-only sites [68], 
and furthermore many transactions are completely read-only at all sites, these 
sites need not be involved in the last round of the two-phase commit. The read-
only optimisation allows sites to vote read-only, and then behave as if they voted 
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no and release their shared locks'. Coordinators interpret a read-only vote as a 
yes vote, but need not inform sites that voted read-only of the final decision. 
Although the read-only optimisation can be used with PC, shared locks cannot 
be released as soon as they are if it is combined with PA. If a transaction is read-
only at all sites, and presumed-abort with the read-only optimisation is used, 
no forced logging and only one message per participant is required. PC, on the 
other hand, requires the coordinator to force write an initiation record, to prevent 
erroneous commit presumptions, before asking sites to vote regardless of whether 
or not the transaction is read-only. Of course if the transaction coordinator knows 
before starting the transaction that all the actions of the transaction will be read-
only then it need not force write a record. 
If carefully analysed, for transaction mixes containing read-only operations, 
presumed-abort is usually more efficient in terms of messages and log write over-
heads. This observation has meant that PA with the read-only optimisation 
has been adopted in almost all distributed database and transaction processing 
products. These include Tandem's TMF [30], DEC's VMS [7], BEA systems' 
TUXEDO [40] and more recently Microsoft's DTC [20]. The 2PC protocol com-
bined with PA is now part of the ISO/OSI and X/Open distributed transaction 
processing standards. 
Attempts have been made to eliminate the requirement of the coordinator to 
force write an initiation record, when using PC. The new presumed commit 2PC 
variant [46] achieves this by maintaining two sets of transactions: the set of recent 
transactions, and the set of potentially initiated transaction. We omit the details 
here but by using these sets, after a crash, upon recovery a coordinator can safely 
presume a transaction has committed if it is not potentially initiated. 
Yet another strategy, used this time to eliminate the voting phase, gives rise 
to the unsolicited update vote (UUV) 2PC variant [78]. In this protocol when a 
participant site acknowledges its last transaction operation it also votes. After 
receiving all the vote/ acknowledgments the coordinator can go straight to the 
second phase and sends the sites the commit or abort decision. Unfortunately, 
this strategy has the shortcoming that a participant must know when it has 
finished all its operations for a particular transaction or as we will see in the early 
prepare protocol it must act as though each action was its last. The early-prepare 
protocol [75] works in a similar way. This time a site force writes a prepare record 
every time it sends an acknowledgement of a read or write operation. If this is the 
'Transactions often lock data objects to provide different levels of isolation. A shared lock 
prevents other write accesses to a data object, while still allowing reads. 
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last action the coordinator can proceed to the last phase and send the outcome 
to the participant sites. If the coordinator sends another operation request to a 
site the transaction again becomes active at that site. Because sites must force 
write a record with every operation acknowledgement the early-prepare protocol 
requires an environment where the cost of writing to stable storage is low. 
The coordinator log (CL) protocol and the implicit yes vote (IYV) protocols 
work in a similar fashion to early-prepare but improve upon early prepare by elim-
inating the need for participants to force write log records with each acknowledg-
ment. In the coordinator log protocol this is accomplished by participants sending 
log records with their vote. In this way logging is centralised at the coordinator. 
The IYV protocol works in a similar way, while each participant still maintains 
a transaction log, it eliminates the requirement for each participant to log a pre-
pare record by replicating the redo part of its log at the coordinator. Many 
of these variants (e.g. IYV and UUV) can be combined with PC to remove the 
requirement for PC to force write an initiation record when transactions are read-
only. The argument against PC and in favour of PA when read-only transactions 
are present then swings more in favour of PC. There are many other two-phase 
commit optimisations for instance last agent [68] and group-commit [31]. 
We have discussed 2PC protocol optimisations where the structure of the 
commit protocol is flat. That is to say we analysed the situation where one 
coordinator manages several child participants. Hierarchical variants of 2PC are 
also common in transaction processing systems. In these variants coordinators, 
both coordinate, and are themselves participants. This gives rise to a transaction 
tree structure as found in IBM's LU 6.2 [23]. 
In this section we have surveyed several commit optimisations of the popular 
2PC protocol. The emphasis has shifted away from analysing the behaviour of a 
single commit protocol and towards the interaction of many concurrent transac-
tions and the way they interact in a distributed transaction processing environ-
ment. In so doing, the environment in which the protocols are studied has become 
much richer. Locking and logging are introduced. Different types of transactions 
such as read-only are considered and their impact on the optimisation of commit 
protocols was examined. This extra complexity required modelling, not only the 
commit protocol, but also the preceding read and write operations a transaction 
performs during its execution. Modelling this richer environment is much harder 
since not only are the components of the systems more complex but there may 
be arbitrary numbers of transactions executing concurrently. 
The models that describe these richer systems are particularly useful for be- 
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havioural analysis. They tend to describe the different local states of processes 
in the system and also describe what kinds of messages are exchanged and when 
they are exchanged. If one is interested in measuring the performance of a pro-
tocol, often expressed as the number of messages sent or log writes performed, 
these types of models are often not appropriate. The reason for this is that in real 
distributed transaction processing systems many optimisations are employed. For 
example, messages are usually piggybacked to reduce the load on a network or 
log writes are batched and then performed together. When analysing the role of 
commit protocols from a performance perspective therefore other modelling tech-
niques are often more appropriate. To date techniques for analysing performance 
have fallen into three broad categories. Prototype systems such as ARIES and 
R* [57] are built and different techniques are tested. Discrete event simulation 
models are constructed and performance is evaluated by executing these mod-
els with different modelling parameters [65]. Lastly, stochastic process algebra 
models such as PEPA [15] or GSPNs [67] can be used. 
2.5 Failure models 
Current literature relating to commit protocols makes different assumptions about 
failure. In general, failure is classified into two different categories site failure and 
communication failure. A model may assume that neither, one of, or both of 
these types of failure are possible. 
2.5.1 Site Failure 
Site failure is usually modelled by allowing sites in the system to crash. Some 
models allow them to recover from a crash failure and some do not. The concept 
of non-volatile state, often in the form of a transaction log, is often included in 
models that consider recovery. Upon recovery, sites lose their pre-crash state 
unless it was written to non-volatile storage before the crash. Lampson and 
Sturgis [47] discuss physical devices and their failure modes, and how to build 
stable storage and transactions on top of them. Many different models of crash 
failure exist. 
Another model of failure is so called Byzantine failure [45] in which a faulty or 
rogue site may misbehave and produce spurious messages to disrupt a protocol. 
Some interesting bounds are derived on the number of rogue processes that are 
allowed in a protocol that solves the so called byzantine agreement problem before 
it is disrupted to such an extent that the protocol fails. A comparison of Byzantine 
agreement and atomic commit is given in by Gray in [33]. 
2.5.2 Communication Failure 
Communication failure is usually modelled in one of three different ways. The 
first assumes the sending and receipt of messages is unreliable. A message might 
be lost after sending and thus never received. This type of failure assumption 
can be found in the "best effort datagram" model on which the Internet Protocol 
(IP) is based [64]. Basu et al. [5] classify two types of unreliable link 6 , known 
as eventually reliable, and fair lossy links. A fair lossy link guarantees that if an 
infinite number of messages are sent, then an infinite subset of these messages 
are received. Clearly such a link can lose an infinite number of messages. With 
an eventually reliable link, there is a time (not necessarily known) after which 
all messages sent are eventually received. Messages sent before that time may 
be lost. Any link that is eventually reliable is also fair lossy. From a practical 
perspective, the eventually reliable and fair lossy links seem to capture message 
passing behaviour in networks that might fail but at some point recover. 
To see why the fair lossy assumption is useful consider two processes, a sender 
s and a receiver r connected by a bidirectional channel over which they pass 
messages. Process s wishes to send a message m to r. If we put no restriction 
on message loss it is obviously impossible to ensure that r receives rn. If however 
the link is fair lossy one can adopt the following strategy. s can send copies of m 
forever, and r is guaranteed to eventually receive m. We still have the problem 
that s never stops sending messages. To fix this r can send an ack(m) on every 
receipt of ri-i and once s receives the ack(m) it stops sending. This in turn means 
that r will stop sending ack(m). Note the protocol is quiescent: eventually no 
process sends or receives messages. 
If we now also allow processes to crash the situation changes. The simple 
protocol above still works but, if for instance r crashes before sending an ack(m) 
s will send messages forever. The protocol is no longer quiescent. It turns out 
that there is no quiescent protocol that ensures that even if s and r do not 
crash then r eventually receives m. This would appear to suggest that quiescent 
reliable communication channels cannot be built on top of unreliable channels in 
asynchronous message passing systems. The problem centres around the inability 
to detect whether a site has failed or if it is just slow in responding. In fact this 
is the crux of the well known impossibility of consensus result of [27]. 
A failure detector [11] is an oracle that a process can query. It produces a list of 
6 An unreliable link contrasts with a reliable link which never loses a message. 
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processes that it suspects may have crashed. The list provided is unreliable in the 
sense that it might at any time make errors of omission and errors of commission in 
compiling its list of crashed processes. The eventually perfect failure detector OP 
has the following properties: (1) if a process crashes there is a time after which it 
is permanently suspected, and (2) if a process does not crash for sufficiently long 
then there is a time after which it is never suspected. Using OP we can modify 
our simple protocol to provide quiescence. If s has not received an ack(m) from r 
it periodically consults OP to see if r is suspected. If it is not suspected s sends 
a copy of m to r. Clearly, the protocol is now quiescent. It turns out OP is the 
weakest failure detector that can be used to provide quiescent communication [2]. 
Unfortunately, OP is not implementable in asynchronous systems so it would 
seem we are no nearer to solving the problem of quiescent communication over 
lossy links with process crashes. The goal posts have shifted but the problem still 
remains. However, Aguilera and Toueg [1] introduce a heartbeat failure detector 
7-15 that is not limited to just producing lists of suspects. Essentially each process 
sends a keep alive messages to all others. At p, ?-W(q) outputs the number of keep 
alive messages p has received from q. Using 9W, quiescent reliable communication 
is possible. Obviously, the fl8 mechanism itself is not quiescent (because of the 
keep alive messages) but it can be implemented as an operating system service. 
Although of theoretical interest the theory of failure detectors does not seem 
to reflect message passing systems in a practical sense. For instance the TCP/IP 
protocol [22] has been used for many years to send billions of messages over 
the Internet (which does not provide reliable links) reliably. In essence  TCP 
implements a protocol where s sends m until it receives an ack(m). If no ack(m) 
is received it will retry but there is a bound on how long it will continue to retry, 
likewise r will not try to ack(m) forever. Once this bound is reached TCP reports 
that the link or connection has been lost and gives up. In a practical sense this 
protocol provides reliable communication over links that may lose messages. 
A second interpretation of communication failure is the partition model, al-
ready seen in our discussion of Skeen's quorum based protocol. In fact, the two 
models are related. If messages between one group of sites and another are lost 
for a period of time (perhaps because a router or bridge between those sites has 
failed) we could conclude that the sites are partitioned. Other relationships exist 
between site failure and communication failure. If a site is relied upon as a third 
party to forward messages (for instance using IP forwarding), and that site fails 
7 A complex sliding window is implemented with backoff and resend parameters for increased 
efficiency. 
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this causes communication failure. Furthermore, the distinction between site and 
communication failure is not always helpful since many protocols guarantee reli-
able communication between two sites as long as they both remain operational 
for "long enough". They do this by means of acknowledgements and re-sends. 
Ricciardi et al. [66] discuss the relationship between the partitioning model and 
the lossy link model. Once again there is a great diversity in the different types 
of failure assumptions made within commit protocol models. This often leads to 
a lack of clarity in their specification and analysis. 
Figure 2.6: Relationship of different failure assumptions in protocol models. 
Some message failure models allow for messages to be corrupted or maliciously 
altered while in transit. From a practical perspective corrupted messages are 
of little interest as algorithms exist which can detect, with very high accuracy, 
corrupted messages and either rectify the corruption in the case of Hamming 
Codes [39], or detect the corruption and discard the message, in the case of 
cyclic redundancy checks [26]. More interesting is the case where messages are 
deliberately altered. For instance, an attack on TIP, an Internet transaction 
commit protocol is possible by maliciously altering messages [44]. Again from a 
practical perspective, using crytography [79] messages can be securely signed and 
encrypted to prevent this type of malicious attack. Figure 2.6 summarises the 
domain of different failure assumptions that can be made in protocol models. 
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2.6 Casting the Net Wider 
Atomic commit protocols have been adopted in many different areas. They are 
used for example in IBM's reliable message queue, MQSeries [56] to provide trans-
actional semantics in messaging. Kempster et al. [42] discuss how to extend 
network management protocols with atomic commit protocols to provide trans-
actional properties to network reconfiguration. Luan and Gligor [49] use them 
to implement a novel atomic broadcast and Li et al. [48] propose a commit style 
protocol to facilitate connection setup in telecom switches. Tygar [81] discusses 
commit style protocols and outlines some open research questions in the growing 
area of e-commerce. Thanisch [80] provides a survey of the role of atomic commit 
protocols in many of these less traditional environments. 
The extent to which computing devices are becoming connected is staggering. 
The advent of wireless communication means that almost any device mobile or 
static can be connected to a network. Economies of scale are reducing the cost of 
sending messages over these networks dramatically. For example, it is now usually 
more expensive to produce and send a domestic customer's phone bill than it is 
to physically route their calls. As this trend continues more and more challenges 
will face protocol designers that want to provide new applications which exploit 
these new opportunities. 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have reviewed the role of commit protocols in many different 
areas from transaction processing to e-commerce. Of particular interest was the 
way atomic commit protocols behave in isolation, particularly with respect to 
blocking, and also how they interact when they take part in more complex trans-
action processing systems. Although many different models have been proposed, 
no one model or modelling technique seems to be generally applicable. Further-
more, assumptions about the distributed environment in which the atomic commit 
protocols are studied varies widely. This is particularly true of assumptions made 
about site and communication failure. For these reasons it is difficult to mould 
the various models of commit into a hierarchy. Some models are non-comparable 
and thus a unified notation for all models is very difficult. 
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Chapter 3 
Modelling Atomic Commit 
Protocols 
3.1 Introduction 
Although in the majority of literature on commit protocols pseudo-code and ad 
hoc arguments and notation are used, attempts have been made to use general 
modelling techniques. In this chapter we will examine three such modelling tech-
niques for distributed systems: the I/O automata model [51, 52], a knowledge 
based model proposed by Hadzilacos [36] and the calculus for communicating 
systems [55]. We discuss the merits of each and examine how they have been 
used to provide a formal basis for analysing various aspects of commit protocol 
behaviour. After summarising the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches 
we introduce our views based modelling technique and compare it to the other 
modelling techniques presented. 
3.2 I/O Automata 
I/O automata provide a general modelling framework for describing a wide variety 
of distributed message passing systems. An I/O automaton models a component 
in a distributed system. Essentially it is a state machine with transitions that are 
associated with actions. These actions are one of three types: input, output, or 
internal. Input and output actions are used to communicate with other automata 
whereas internal actions are invisible outside of the automata. An example of a 
simple I/O automaton model of one bit latch is given in figure 3.1. A latch 
has an output action, out and an input action in whose purpose is to store a 
single bit of information. To describe distributed systems using I/O automata 





3.1: A Simple single bit latch I/O Automaton. 
automaton with outputs of others with the same name. 
Formally an I/O automaton, A, consists of five components: 
• sig(A), a signature consisting of three disjoint sets of actions. The internal 
actions int(A), the output actions out(A), and the input actions in(A). We 
denote all the actions of A, acts(A). 
• states(A) a (possibly infinite) set of states. 
• start(A) a non-empty set of initial states for A. 
• trans (A) a (possibly infinite) state transition relation. trans (A) c states (A) x 
acts(A) x states(A), for every state s e states(A) and every input action 
ir e in(A) there is a transition (s, ir, s') e traris(A). The transition relation 
is often specified as a set of pre-conditions and post-actions see Table 3.1. 
The pre-condition restricts the set of states in which an action may take 
place and the post-action produces a new state from the state in which the 
action was applied. The set of pre-conditions, taken together, must ensure 
that for each input action and state there is a transition. 
• tasks(A), a partition of the set of external actions used to define what it 
means for the automaton to have fair executions. 
The transition relation of I/O automata is usually given in a pre-condition, post-
action or effect style. If a pre-condition is true then an action may happen. The 
action or effect is an indivisible event that takes a state s satisfying the pre-
condition to a post state s'. For example the one bit latch I/O automaton is 
shown in Table 3.1. 
An execution fragment of an I/O automaton is a finite sequence, 
711 	 71,. 
	infinite 
	 711 	 71,.  
S0 	" S . . . Sr-1 	,' Sr, or sequence 	,' s . . . , s_ 	' Sr 	" ... of 
alternating states and actions of A such that (Sk, 7k+1, Sk+i) E trans(A) for every 
k > 1. An execution fragment beginning with a start state is called an execution. 
The set of executions is denoted exec(A). It is often useful to discuss just the 
external behaviour of A. We call this a trace of A, denoted trace(A) which is the 
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Signature 
Input: in 	 Output: out 
States 
boolean b; initially false 
Transitions 
in 	 out 
precondition: 	 precondition: b 
b:=tt 	 b:=ff 
Tasks 
{{out}, {in}} 
Table 3.1: An I/O automaton for simple one bit latch 
subsequence of an execution restricted to just the external actions. For example 
a trace of the one bit latch automaton is in out in out. 
The I/O automata model has an implicit notion of fairness. It is argued that 
the most interesting executions are those that are fair'. In other words if the task 
classes represent independent threads of execution within each automaton each 
thread should not be starved within any execution. More formally an execution 
fragment a of A is said to be fair if the following condition holds for each class 
C of tasks(A): 
. If a is finite, then C is not enabled  in the final state of a. 
• If a is infinite, then a contains either infinitely many events from C or 
infinitely many occurrences of states in which C is not enabled. This is 
sometimes referred to as strong fairness [59] 
A key property of I/O Automata is the ability to compose multiple automata 
into larger systems. When two  automata A and B are composed, denoted A I I B, 
the composition operator identifies actions with the same name, say 7t, from A 
and B. In the composed automaton when a component takes a step involving 
it both A and B take a step involving it. Several restrictions are imposed: 1) A 
and B must have disjoint sets of internal actions because internal actions should 
not be seen outside of the automata, and so should not take part in communi-
cation. 2) A and B should have disjoint output actions, this ensures that only 
1[ is also interesting to see what are the consequences for a system which does not guarantee 
fairness. 
2 A class C is said to be enabled in state s when some action in C can happen from s. 
3 We consider the case for two, but the case for many is similar. 
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one output can control inputs of other automata. There is no restriction on the 
number of inputs a single output action may control. The transitions of the com-
posed automata are obtained by allowing all the component automata that have 
a particular action it to participate simultaneously in steps involving it, while all 
Other component automata do nothing. The task partition of the composition is 
formed by taking the union of the component's task partitions. A hiding operator 
\ is also defined so that output actions can be internalised preventing them from 
being used for communication. For example the latch automaton, L, of figure 3.1 
could be restricted so that it could only produce output using such an operator 
thus L\{out}. A renaming operator is also introduced. L{out/synch} is the I/O 
automata L with its out action renamed synch. Figure 3.2 shows how two single 
bit latch automata can be composed into a two bit buffer. 
in synch 	 synch 	out 
Ll 	 11 L2 
in C:: out 
(LI II L2)\synch 
Figure 3.2: Composing two one bit latches. 
We have discussed how I/O automata can be used to model distributed sys-
tems but it is useful to see how, once modelled, properties of these systems can 
be proved. Because the set of all execution traces captures all possible behaviour, 
safety properties over these traces can be expressed, by asserting that in every  
trace (or fair trace) of an automaton some undesirable action never happens. 
Similarly, liveness properties can be expressed by stating that in every trace (or 
fair trace) a desirable action eventually happens. 
The I/O automata model lends itself to compositional reasoning. Suppose 
automaton A is constructed by composing a set of automata {A : i e I}. 
Suppose also that A i satisfies some trace property P and each property P belongs 
to a special class of trace properties that are preserved under composition. We 
can then deduce that the composed I/O automaton A will satisfy the composed 
trace property P. We will return to this subject later in chapter 5 when we 
carefully define these types of properties for our views based model. 
4 This is sometimes referred to as a strong safety property as opposed to a weak safety 
property where at least one trace must have the property. 
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Compositional reasoning is very useful as it facilitates the proof of properties 
of larger systems by proving properties of their constituent parts. A technique 
known as simulation is also commonly used in I/O automata to show that a 
higher level abstraction, say automaton A, is equivalent to (exhibits the same 
external behaviour as) a lower level automaton say B. A formal account of what 
it means for A to simulate B can be given. This technique has been used to 
give hierarchical proofs of properties [53] of distributed systems. It can also be 
automated to some extent with the aid of theorem provers. Nipkow [60] uses the 
Isabelle theorem prover and Søgaard-Andersen et al. [73] use the Larch theorem 
prover to this end. 
Das and Fekete [21] use I/O automata to model a transaction processing 
system. The components of the system are transaction automata which model 
the operations of a transaction, local manager automata that model a distributed 
commit protocol and crashing object automata that model resources that are 
accessed by the operations of transactions. Requirements are given for each of 
the automata that constitute the overall system. It is then shown that if all these 
requirements are met the composed system is correct. A particular instance of 
a commit protocol (2PC) automaton is given and it is shown that it meets their 
requirement specification. Perhaps the most interesting part of this work is its 
compositional approach. 
I/O automata provide a framework that is both general and formal in which to 
specify, model and verify properties of distributed systems. Unfortunately, due to 
its generality, when modelling asynchronous message-passing systems, message-
passing is modelled explicitly. Furthermore, to model systems with arbitrary 
numbers of processes I/O automata and their message passing connectives are 
usually parameterised. This means that automating proofs of properties modelled 
in this way becomes difficult. Our model presented later in this chapter addresses 
these problems by introducing views. Using views means that message passing 
need not be made explicit within the model. 
As we have seen a notion of fairness is implicit in the I/O automata model. In 
our views based model we make no restrictions on executions but instead prefer to 
include this as part of the property being checked. This reduces the complexity of 
the model and furthermore accommodates different definitions of fairness such as 
those found in [59]. As we shall see later, in some cases, our modelling technique 
allows us to reason about systems with arbitrary numbers of processes. In so 
doing we will examine classes of properties that are preserved by compositional 
operators similar to the techniques used in I/O automata. 
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3.3 A Knowledge Theoretic Approach 
A different approach to modelling and analysing commit protocols is rooted in 
knowledge theory [38]. The I/O automata technique provides an operational 
semantics, where the details and contents of messages and the state of each process 
and its communication medium are modelled explicitly. There are also fairness 
constraints placed on the actions of the automata. In contrast the knowledge 
based approach constructs arguments based on the information that must be 
present, at a particular site, or within a group of sites, in order, for example, 
that that site may commit or abort a transaction. In so doing it uses a very 
general model of distributed computation and then constructs arguments about 
the amount of information which a site must acquire, if for example blocking is 
to be avoided in the presence of site failure 5 . 
3.3.1 Modelling Distributed Systems 
Hadzilacos [36] constructs a model of a distributed system that consists of a set 
of sites H = {p, q,. . . } and a message buffer M. Sites in H communicate by 
exchanging messages through the message buffer M. A site p can execute one of 
three types of actions, where m is the value of some message. 
• SEND(m, q) process p sends a message m to process q; 
• RCV(m, q) process p receives a message m from q, a null message ) is intro-
duced to model the case where p tries to receive a message from q but there 
is no message in M for it to receive. 
• LOCAL this models a process taking some internal step. A special LOCAL 
action FAIL exists to model crash failure. Once a process executes this 
action it can take no more actions. 
Hadzilacos models an execution of a distributed system as a run. Informally 
we imagine that there is an omnipresent observer that samples the states of the 
processes and the message buffer at discrete real time instances 0, 1, 2. . .. The 
state of a process, at a point in a run, is the (finite) sequence of actions it has 
executed up to that point in the run. The state of a message buffer is the set 
of messages (messages can be assumed to be unique by tagging each one with a 
unique identifier) that have been sent but have been neither delivered nor lost. 
We can think of the sampling instants as the ticks of a perfect clock available 
5 A later result introduces the possibility of message loss. 
to the observer; this clock is a fictional device - in particular, we assume that 
processes do not have access to it. 
We will now introduce some notation on sequences. Let x, y be sequences 
of actions. We write e E x to denote that action e is in x. x o e denotes the 
sequence resulting by appending e to x. x < y (x <y) denotes that x is a prefix 
(proper prefix) of y; in that case we write y \ x to indicate the sequence whose 
concatenation to x equals y. We denote the length of sequence x, 11 x 11. We 
adopt the convention that the letters p, q denote processes from H and i, j, k, I 
denote natural numbers. 
Formally a run is a function r mapping each pair (p, i) to a sequence of actions 
(the actions executed by p up to and including time i) and the pair (M, i) to a 
set of triples of the form (q, m, p) where m is a non-null message (the contents of 
the message buffer just before the actions at time i + 1 are performed). (q, m, p) 
indicates that q sent message m to p. A run r must satisfy the following properties: 
• r(p, 0) is the empty sequence and r(p, i) < r(p, Z'+  1) - initially, each process 
starts having executed no actions and the sequence of actions taken by a 
process can only be extended or remain unchanged with each clock tick. 
• 11 r(p, i + 1) \ r(p, i) 11 < 1 - for each i, the clock ticks sufficiently often so 
that no process performs more than one action between successive ticks. 
• If FAIL e r(p, i), no event may follow FAIL in r(p, i). 
• If RCV(m,q) = r(p,i + 1)\ r(p,i) and m =A A then (q,m,p) e r(M,i) - a 
non-null message can be received only if it was in the message buffer in the 
previous time instant. 
• r(M,0) = 0 and, for all i > 0, r(M,i + 1) c r(M,i) U {(q,m,p) 
SEND(m, p) = r(q, i+ 1) \ r(q, i)} \ {(q, m, p) : RCV(m, q) = r(p, i + 1) \ r(p, i)} 
- the message buffer contains only messages that were sent but not yet re-
ceived. If SEND(m,q) e r(p,i), RCV(m,p) V r(p,i), we say m is a lost 
message. 
Using this structure we can model a distributed system as the set of all possible 
behaviours of its constituent components, i.e. of the processes and the message 
buffer. Thus the distributed system is defined as a set of runs. Not all runs are 
valid and so we require some closure properties to capture the idea that processes 
can only effect each others behaviour through communication actions. We can 
informally state these as follows. 
Wei 
Si The ability of a process to perform a LOCAL or SEND action is determined 
by its own behaviour, not the behaviour of other processes. 
S2 The ability of a process to attempt to receive a message from some other 
process is determined by its own behaviour; the message it actually receives 
(possibly null) depends on other processes. 
S3 The behaviour of a process after it sends a message cannot determine the 
recipient's ability to receive that message. 
S4 Process q can prevent p from performing RCV), q) only by sending messages 
top. 
At this point it is useful to define some further notation and terminology. 
A point is a pair (r, i) where r is a run and i is a natural number. We say a 
run s extends point (r,i) if for every j < i and every p, s(p,j) = r(p,j), and 
s(M,j) = r(M,j) i.e., up to time i, all processes and the message buffer behave 
identically in r and s. 
For any process p a relation , is defined between points as follows: (r, i) 
(s, j) iffr(p,i) = s(p,i). Informally this says that (r,i) and (s,j) look the same to 
p. The relation can be extended to sets of processes as follows: (r, i) p  (s, j) if 
r(p, i) = s(p, i) for every p e P. 
3.3.2 A Knowledge Logic 
Hadzilacos makes use of a knowledge logic introduced by Halpern and Moses [37] 
in order to state precisely and succinctly various properties of distributed com-
putations. 
For a fixed set of processes fl and primitive propositions F, including the prim-
itive propositions true and false, the set of formulae can be defined inductively, 
where P c H, as follows: 
• Every primitive proposition is a formula. 
• If 1i  and '12  are formulae, so are ', 	V 	, D, 	, K1 
We write (r, i) 1= 1 to express that 1 is true at point (r, i). Truth of a formula 
at a point is defined by structural induction on the syntax of I as follows. 
• If 1' is a primitive proposition then its truth is defined by an interpretation 
function I() that specifies at which points a primitive proposition holds. 
• (r, i) = -4 if it is not the case that (r, i) = I. 
Rol 
• (r,i) = i V cI if (r,i) = 	or (r,i) = 
• (r, i) = 01' if for every run s extending (r, i) there is some j ~! i, (s, j) = 
- i.e. 1 is true now or will eventually become true at some point, in any 
possible future. 
• If 4D = D, (r, i) = 1 if for every run s extending (r, i) and every j > i, 
(s, j) = 4D - i.e. 'I is true now and will remain so in any possible future. 
• (r,i) 1= KT' if for every (s, j) such that (s, j) p  (r, 0, (s, j) = 1 i.e.,'I' 
is true at every point which, from P's (collective) point of view, are indis-
tinguishable from the present point. 
The definition of 	is known as the total view interpretation of logic; other 
definitions are proposed in [37]. The following facts follow from these definitions. 
• If (r, i) = 	then (r, i) = 	i.e. only truths are known. 
• If (r, i) 1= 	and P c Q then (r, i) j= KQ. 
• If (r,i) 	and (s, j) p (r,i) then (s,j) 
In order to model a commit protocol some primitive propositions are intro-
duced namely; YES which is true at a point if p has voted yes (similarly no), 
COMMIT which is true if a process has committed (similarly aborted). The propo-
sition FAILED is also introduced. A formula c1 is local to a set of processes 
P if the truth or falsity of 1 is always known to P. That is, for all (r, 
(r,i) 
Using this knowledge logic Hadzilacos defines the problem of Atomic Commit-
ment by restricting possible runs. For example, initially a process has not cast 
its vote and, until it does, it can vote either way. This can be stated formally as 
follows: 
for all points (r, i) and for all p E H, (r, 0)1= — (YES V NO R ) 
To express the property of AC2 that the decision to commit is reached only if 
all process' votes are yes we write 
for all points (r, i) and for all p e H, (r, i) 1= COMMIT 	A YES, 
qEH 
Within this knowledge model Hadzilacos also defines what he calls 2PC level 
of knowledge. A protocol has this property if, for all runs, a site commits if and 
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only if it is known by that site that all sites have voted yes. 
for all points (r, i) and for all p E H, (r, i) 	COMMIT if (r, i) 	K A YESq. 
qEll 
It is then shown that any protocol that solves the AC problem must exhibit 
this property. Suppose not. Thus, for some point (r, i) and p E H, (r, i) = 
COMMIT but (r,i) = 'Kp A q11 YES q . Therefore there must exist some (s,j) 
(r,i) such that (s, j) 	Aqll 'ES q . Since COMMIT is local top, (r,i) = COMMIT 
and (s, j) 	(r,i), it follows that (s, j) = COMMIT. But then (s, j) contradicts 
AC2. 
A 3PC level of knowledge is also defined. It is shown that for a protocol to 
be non-blocking (when site but not communication failures may happen) a site 
commits if and only if it knows every non-failed site knows all sites voted yes. 
Using these techniques two interesting results are derived. Firstly, a non-existence 
proof for a non-blocking atomic commit protocol in the presence of communication 
failure is constructed. This supports Skeen's alternative proof. Secondly, a lower 
bound of 2(n - 1) on the number of messages required by a protocol to solve the 
atomic commit problem in this model is given. In fact, linear 2PC [32] achieves 
this bound. Hazilacos makes no attempt to model recovery. When a site crashes 
perhaps unrealistically it never recovers. 
The modelling approach used is general, formal and concise. It focuses on 
what is known and what must be known in a system to solve the atomic commit 
problem. The declarative style means that protocol descriptions are divorced from 
implementation details. One of its major strengths is that because it focuses on 
what level of knowledge is acquired by sites, it is not burdened by having to model 
message passing explicitly. This important observation motivates our views based 
model where we incorporate a site's knowledge of other sites state explicitly within 
that site's state. This abstracts the details of message passing while at the same 
time maintaining some of the desirable properties of an operational modelling 
approach. 
3.4 The Calculus for Communicating Systems 
Many process algebras have been proposed for modelling distributed systems. 
CCS [55] provides a framework in which to describe communicating processes or 
agents. Agents have state and perform actions which are either input, output 
or so called silent or r actions'. After performing an action an agent changes 
'The r action is similar to the internal actions of I/O Automata. 
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state. Operators are defined allowing, amongst other things, the composition of 
agents. In a composed agent, communication can take place between two agents 
when one agent has an output action with the same name as another agents input 
action. In this case both actions can happen (sometimes called a handshake) to 
form a silent T action. We can model a FIFO buffer below as: 
del 
FIFO() 	 = send(m). FIFO (m) 
def 
FIFO(mi ,. . . ,m) = 	ëY(m). FIFO (m i ,. . . ,m_ i ) 
+send(m). FIFO (m, m 1 ,.. . , Mn) 
A transition semantics is given for CCS in which agents exhibit behaviour as 









FIFO(mi ,. ..,m_ 1 ) 
FIFO(m, m 1 , . . . , m_) 
Equivalence of agents can be defined using bisimulation. This is similar to the 
simulation techniques used in I/O automata. For example, consider the two CCS 
agents that model a ticking clock below. 




C1 1 is bisimulation equivalent to C12 because any action C1 1 performs can be 
matched by C12 and furthermore the resulting agents reached after this action 
are themselves bisimilar. 
Using the transition semantics one can unfold a CCS agent into a transition 
system. For example the transition system of C1 1 and C12 are given in figure 3.3. 
Behavioural properties of agents can be verified using model checking techniques 
r/ c1l tick.tick.C1 I 
OC12 
Figure 3.3: Transition systems generated from two simple of a simple CCS agents. 
All transitions are tick transitions. 
on the resulting transition systems. For example the games-based model checking 
techniques of Stirling [77] are used to check modal i-calculus properties of CCS 
agents. An implementation of these techniques exists in the Edinburgh Concur -
rency Workbench [58]. 
To model a commit protocol, for example Centralised 2PC, using CCS we 
define a set of participant processes P as CCS agents. We also define a co-
ordinator agent C. A protocol system is then the composition of these agents 
P1 P2 ... PTI C. Each process communicates with the coordinator by means of 
handshakes. Often we wish to model failure or message passing delay. In this 
case we must introduce some kind of environment like a message buffer. Agents 
now communicate through the message buffer. When modelling commit proto-
cols using I/O Automata a similar strategy is used. Simple I/O Automata are 
defined to model components in the commit protocol and then they are composed 
to model the whole system. 
CCS provides a very general modelling technique. Unfortunately this gener-
ality means that when used to model message passing systems such as commit 
protocols the state space of the resulting transition systems is very large even 
for very simple commit protocols. This state explosion problem, in the case of 
centralised commit protocols, seems to be due to two factors. Firstly if messages 
are modelled explicitly a coordinator must keep a state to reflect which out of 
the n participant agents have voted yes. There are 2" different states between 
nobody voting yes and the state where everyone has voted yes. Although differ-
ent techniques exist for reducing the number of states, the problem seems rooted 
in the requirement to explicitly model message passing with agent handshakes. 
Secondly, a naive approach to modelling arbitrary numbers of sites gives rise to 
infinite state spaces as we describe later in chapter 5. 
The state space explosion problem aside, in basic CCS there is no mechanism 
for specifying the behaviour of individual agents using the pre-conditions and 
post-actions method, as there is in I/O Automata. This means it can be very 
difficult to write down succinctly the behaviour of complex protocols. Perhaps 
for these reason CCS has not been widely adopted as a modelling technique for 
commit protocols. 
3.5 Comparing Techniques 
Each of the models we describe has some similarities. When protocols are mod-
elled using these techniques the behaviour of the sites taking part in a protocol 
are described by the possible steps or actions they might take. By composing 
groups of sites (often within an environment) we can generate runs or executions 
as sequences of actions taken by the sites. The set of all possible runs captures 
the behaviour of the entire system. A property of the protocol being modelled 
therefore is defined as a proposition (often formalised in temporal logic) over 
these runs. For example, a property might be that in every run eventually the 
coordinator decides commit or abort. 
Ideally, a good modelling technique for commit protocols should be: intuitive 
enough so that protocol designers can easily model their protocols; expressive 
enough to facilitate the modelling of a wide and rich variety of commit proto-
cols and environments; precise enough to accurately describe the behaviour of 
the protocol being modelled; and designed in a way that allows support for auto-
mated reasoning techniques, such as model checking. The techniques we surveyed 
fulfil some but not all of these requirements. For example CCS provides a very 
well structured and precise account of communicating systems which has a for-
mal transition semantics that can easily be used to generate transitions systems 
thus supporting automatic verification through model checking. Unfortunately, 
its generality means that it quickly becomes cumbersome and difficult to use for 
anything other than the simplest commit protocols. I/O automata allow more 
complex protocols to be modelled easily but the resulting state space and transi-
tion systems that express their behaviour can be very large. This is largely due 
to the fact that message passing behaviour must be made explicit. Knowledge 
based protocol analysis abstracts message passing but because the knowledge is 
not made part of the site's state it is more difficult to generate a transition se-
mantics for the protocols being modelled. Table 3.2 describes these differences, 
including a comparison with the views based model developed as part of this 
thesis and described in the next section. 
3.6 The Views Model 
The I/O automata and CCS modelling techniques are highly operational in their 
semantics. This has the advantage that transition systems can easily be generated 
from the models to reflect behaviour. Unfortunately, when modelling message 
passing systems, because messages are usually modelled explicitly, very large and 
intractable state spaces often result. The knowledge based modelling approach, 
on the other hand, abstracts many of the details of message passing preferring to 
construct arguments based on the level of knowledge acquired by processes in the 
system. Unfortunately, the resulting knowledge based models lack the desirable 
operational qualities of CCS and I/O automata models. It seems that, for the 
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modelling atomic commit  
medium medium poor good 
Generality high medium high low 
Generation of transition system  
Ease of transition 
system generation  
medium medium easy easy 
Size of resulting 
state space  
large/oo medium large/oo small 
Easily scalable to 
arbitrary size  
no yes no yes 
Support for automated proof techniques  
Amenable to 
model checking  
yes medium yes yes 
Amenable to 
theorem proving  
yes yes yes yes 
Messages communication structures  





Ease of composition good reasonble good yes 
Table 3.2: Comparing the I/O automata, Knowledge based (KB), CCS and views 
based approaches to modelling commit protocols. We have not made clear how a 
transition system could be generated from a KB model. A process's state in a KB 
model consists of all the actions that process has taken up to that point and so 
this could provide method for producing a transition system for model checking. 
case of commit protocols at least, a hybrid modelling technique, that captures 
the desirable abstractions of knowledge based models together with operational 
approach of CCS and I/O automata might be more suitable. This observation 
motivates our views based model which will be used throughout this thesis for 
modelling commit protocols. 
We first describe the components of our model and then discuss how they can 
be used to model commit protocols. Finally, by way of a simple example, we 
model a 2PC protocol. 
we 
3.6.1 Processes, local state and views 
We model a commit protocol as a system of processes'. Processes communicate 
by means of message passing'. Each process belongs to a particular class of 
processes, corresponding to the role it plays in the protocol. Processes have a 
set of local state variables, together these variables constitute a process's internal 
state. Unless otherwise stated the internal state variables of each process, within 
• particular class, are usually initialised with the same values. Each class has 
• set of rules that determine the behaviour of all processes that belong to that 
class. 
Let p be a process from class P. We denote p's local state variable s as p.s. 
Each variable has a value. If p's variable s has value x we say p.s = x holds (at 
p). 
Together with its local state variables a process may have a view of the internal 
state variables of other processes. This view is constructed from information it 
receives from these processes in the form of messages. We say, 
©p(q.s = x) 
holds at process p if the most up-to-date view p has of q.s is x. That is p has 
received a message from q9 informing p that q's variable s had the value x. It is 
important to note that if at some point, q.s has value x then this does not imply 
that, ©p(q.s = x) holds. This is because the message reporting q's state change 
may not have arrived at p. Depending on assumptions about the message passing 
environment the message may never arrive. Similarly, if ©p(q.s = x), this does 
not imply that q's variable s still has value x, merely that at some point in the 
past, q's variable s had value x. A process always has an up-to-date view of its 
own state so, P.S = x implies ©p(p.s = x). 
We often wish to express the fact that our view of at least one (some) pro-
cess(es) within a particular class, P, has (have) reached a particular state x, and 
so we introduce quantifiers for instance ©p(q e P, q.s = x) or ©p(Vq E P, q.s = 
X). 
7 1n the literature the word site or agent is often used instead of process.. In our context, each 
different term describes an entity with its own internal state, thread of control and message 
passing capabilities. 
8 1n fact the particular mechanism used for communication is not relevant. It could equally 
well be shared memory. The important feature is that the communication may be asynchronous. 
9p need not receive this message directly from q. In principle the information about q could 
be received from a third party. 
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3.6.2 Protocol rules 
The behaviour of each process within a particular class is defined by a set of 
protocol rules. Each rule consists of a pre-condition and a post-action. Let R 
be a rule for a class of processes P, and p be a process from that class. The 
pre-condition of R makes assertions over p's local state variables together with 
p's view of remote process variables. If the pre-condition of rule R holds at p, we 
say R is applicable at p and then R's post-action may happen changing the local 
state at p. When p's local state is updated in the post-action of a rule, messages 
are sent' 0 to any process that maintains a view of p's state, enabling them to 
update their view of p, if and when these messages arrive. For example, suppose 
we have a system consisting of a process p from class P and a set of processes 
from class Q. To express the behaviour that p may move to state y from initial 
state x, if it believes some process from class Q to be in state z, we write the 
following rule. 
Q (p) s = x A ©p(q e , R 	
q.s =z) 
The pre-condition of this rule is a conjunct of two clauses. The first clause 
state that the process executing the rule, p, has state variable s set to x. The 
second clause states that p views some other process q in the Q class with its 
internal state variable set to z. If this is the case p can execute the post-action 
and assign y to its internal state variable p.s. 
In general a post-action may contain more than one assignment. It is assumed 
that all the assignments in the post-action are performed atomically (i.e. as one 
atom) and are ordered from left to right. 
3.6.3 Environment rules 
Let a process p have a view of variable s at a remote process q. When q assigns" 
a value x, by executing an assignment in the post-action of a rule, a message is 
sent to p informing p that q.s was updated. 
At the point the message arrives and is delivered 12  at p, p's view of q.s is 
updated. That is ©p(q.s = x) now holds at p. Again we model this behaviour 
using rules. We call these rules environment rules rather than protocol rules. 
Although the rule can be thought of as taking place at the process where the 
'°Messages are only sent to processes that are interested in that particular update. 
"Sometimes a message is sent even if the assignment does not change the value of a variable 
but more normally only changes cause messages to be sent. 
12 The term "delivered" is often used to mean that the incoming message is processed rather 
than just residing in a buffer on the input device. 
S:= y 
message arrives, say p, the pre-condition of the rule often makes reference to state 
that is not local to p. The post-action of the rule updates p's view of some remote 
state variable. If process p updates its view of q.s to be x we write ©p(q.s := x) 
in the post-action of p's environment rule. A typical rule for updating p's view 
of a process q is as follows. 
UV1(p) 
qeQAq.s=yA©p(q.sy) 
©p(q.s := y) 
It is not always possible to update a process's view based solely on the current 
global state of variables within the system. This is because a process may change 
a state variable causing a message to be sent and then make a further assignment 
to the same variable causing a second message to be sent before the first message 
is delivered. We can still model this situation using rules. Suppose q changes 
state from x to y and then again from y to z then the following rule might be 
appropriate. 
UV2(p) 
q E Q A (q.s = y V q.s = z) A ©p(q.s y) A @p(q.s z) 
©p(q.s := y) 
In any exucution as the protocol progresses protocol rules are applied, envi-
ronment rules however need not necessarily be applied. For example, to model 
message loss we say that rules such as UV1 might be applied (representing a 
message arriving) or that they might not (representing the message being lost). 
If message loss is possible, when the system reaches a configuration (defined later) 
where only environment rules are applicable, since they need not always be ap-
plied, we can assume we might have reached the end of an execution. We can use 
this technique when modelling commit protocols to show that they might block. 
3.6.4 Global state and executions 
If we restrict our model to a fixed number of processes (we will investigate tech-
niques to relax this condition later), a protocol configuration C can be modelled 
as a vector of internal states and views, with an entry for each process. We denote 
this (s i ,. . . ,s,), where each si is the internal state and view of a process. 
The system takes a step whenever a process within the composition takes 
a step by executing a protocol rule. Thus if process p i is in state si and rule 
R(p2 ) 	 R(p) 
R(p) happens which we can write as s, -+ s, then C -+ C' where C' = 
(s i ,. . . , s, . . . , sj 13 . A process (and therefore the system) can also take a step 
when its view is updated through the application of an environment rule. 
"Sometimes we omit the name of the process that the rule is applied to. 
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An execution p, of a protocol therefore is a possibly infinite evolution of system 
configurations. 
R1 
CO 	 ,' C1 1'
2 
where Co is the initial configuration obtained by composing processes in their 
initial states. 
Sometimes the pre-condition of more than one rule might hold for a process 
allowing more than one rule to be applied at that process. In some cases we allow 
both rules to be applied leading to two new system states (for example when 
a participant can choose to vote yes or no) and in other situations we define a 
precedence over the rules. If rule Ri has higher precedence than rule R2, R2 
can only be applied once Ri can no longer be applied. 
3.6.5 Modelling centralised two-phase commit 
A very simple 14  2PC protocol consists of a transaction coordinator and some 
number of participants. When the operations of a transaction have completed 
the commit protocol is invoked. The coordinator asks each participant to vote on 
the feasibility of the transaction. If all participants vote yes then the coordinator 
can decide to commit the transaction and thus sends a commit message to each 
participant. On receipt of this commit message a participant enters its commit 
state. If any participant votes no it enters its abort state and sends an abort 
message to its coordinator. When the coordinator receives this message it sends 
an abort message to each remaining participant. On receiving an abort message 
each participant enters its abort state. 
To model this protocol we create two classes of processes, a coordinator class 
C and a participant class P. There is a single instance of the coordinator class 
c and we let p, q, range over elements of the participant class P. Both types 
of process have a single state variable s. In the case of the coordinator, c, this 
variable may take values i (initial), c (commit) or a (abort). In addition to these 
states participant processes, p, have a further state w (wait). In the centralised 
2PC we model, all communication is between a participant and the coordinator. 
For this reason each participant maintains a view of its coordinator's state and 
the coordinator maintains a view of the state of each of the participants it is 
coordinating. Table 3.3 summarises this. 
We now give the rules for both classes. The participant processes have four 
rules: the first two rules, PVY and PVN, allow a participants, p, to vote yes 
and enter their w state or vote no and enter their a state respectively. It should 
"This is a restricted version which does not model either site failure or messages loss. 
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Participant P Coordinator C 
State Values i, w, a, c 1, a, c 
Number Many processes Single Process 
Views View of coordinator Views of participants 
Table 3.3: Modelling centralised two-phase commit 








The structure of these rules is the pre-condition post-action style. In PVY if any 
process p is in a state such that p.s = i then the rule can be applied. This means 
that the post-action is applied to p changing p.s to w. 
The next two rules, PC and PA, allow participants to enter either the c or a 
state if they view the coordinator in the c or a state respectively. 
PC(p) 
s = w A ©p(c.s = c) 
PA(p) 
 s E {w, i} A ©p(c.s = a) 
s:=c 	 s:=a 
The coordinator class C has only two rules. The first allows it to enter the c 
state if its view of all of its participants shows that they have all entered their w 
state (i.e. they have all voted yes). The second rule allows a coordinator to enter 
the a state if its view of any of its participants shows that one has entered the a 
state (i.e. one of the participants has voted no). In this particular model of 2PC 
we do not allow the coordinator to vote. 
CC(c) 
S = i A ©c(Vp e P, P.S = 
w) CA(c) 
5 = i A ©c(p e F, p.s = a) 
	
s:=c 	 s:=a 
In this simple example we will assume message delivery is reliable, messages 
are never lost and sites never crash. Later we will see how to model protocols 
with arbitrary numbers of participants but for now let us assume we have a 
single coordinator and two participants. The environment rules to update views 
therefore are very simple. If the view of a process's state is out of date, that is, 
the actual value at the remote process has changed then the view can be updated. 
We denote updating a view of q.s at p to value x, ©p(q.s := x). 
The environment rules for the coordinator and participant processes respec-
tively are given below. 
p.s = x A ©c(p.s = i) 
x E {w, a} CUV(c) 	
©c(p.s := x) 
c.s = x A ©p(c.s = i) 
PUV(p) 	 xe{c,a} 
©p(c.s := x) 
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Figure 3.4: Execution fragment of a simple 2PC protocol 
In some rules in order to simplify their presentation, we let x range over the values 
that a variable might take. For example the rule PUV(p) is shorthand for the 
two very similar rules 
c.s = c A ©p(c.s = i) c.s= a A ©p(c.s = 1) 
©p(c.s := c) 
	
©p(c.s := a) 
Let us represent the system state as a triple where the first entry is the state 
of the coordinator and the second and third entries are the states of the two 
participants. We write the views as superscripts. So (''i)  denotes the state of a 
coordinator with c.s = i and with views such that ©c(p 1 = w A P2 = i) for the 
participants Pi  and P2•  Figure 3.4 shows some of the possible executions of our 
simple protocol. In the diagram we drop the index p i on a rule since it can be 
ascertained from the transition. 
Given our rules it is possible to generate a transition system that represents 
all the possible executions of the protocol. Using the transition system we can 
verify properties of our system. One such property is "if the coordinator knows 
(has views) that both participants are in w then eventually those participants 
commit by reaching C. For the simple protocol above this property does hold. 
We will return to the subject of verifying properties at length when we introduce 
games-based model checking in chapter 5. 
3.7 Summary 
We have discussed some general modelling techniques that have been used for 
modelling commit protocols and the environments in which they execute. A re- 
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quirement emerged from our survey of three general modelling techniques that 
seemed to suggest that a technique that captured the desirable operational fea-
tures of CCS, the declarative style of knowledge based reasoning, and the pre-
condition post-action specification technique of I/O automata would be most 
appropriate. This motivated the development of our views based model. Using 




A More Committed Three Phase 
Commit Protocol 
4.1 Introduction 
To recapitulate in the centralised 2PC protocol, a coordinator collects votes on 
whether or not participants can commit a transaction and broadcasts whether or 
not there is unanimity for commit. Problems arise with 2PC when site and/or 
network failures occur. Some working sites may become "blocked", they want 
to commit the transaction but they are unable to proceed, neither commit nor 
abort, until an external failure has been repaired. 3PC was developed which pro-
vides some protection against blocking under a restricted failure model. Skeen [71] 
recognised that 3PC could only protect against blocking for this restricted class of 
failure and developed a quorum-based three-phase commit protocol which we shall 
call Q3PC. If a network failure occurs preventing some processes from commu-
nicating but still allowing a quorum of processes to communicate, Q3PC ensures 
this quorum will not block. 
Kiedar and Dolev [41] describe a cascading network failure. Such a failure 
occurs when there are several successive partial network failures, and possibly 
some repairs too, but the network is not totally failure free at any time during 
the failure period. There may be times of calm where some progress is made 
but more disruption soon follows. In Q3PC, it is possible that, after cascading 
network failures, a quorum of sites may form, yet those sites remain blocked. 
However the Enhanced 3PC Protocol (E3PC) [41] extends Q3PC in a way that 
ensures that a quorum never blocks. 
We now proceed to use the views based modelling technique to describe, and 
reason about the behaviour of, these protocols. We first extend the simple 2PC 
protocol of the last chapter to include communication failure. We show in this 
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enriched model that 2PC might block. By adding some extra rules we show how 
2PC can provide protection against blocking but for some communication failures 
it still cannot protect against blocking completely. We then go on to briefly model 
the basic 3PC by way of introduction to modelling complex quorum based 3PC 
protocols that will be central to this chapter. By enhancing 3PC with a recovery 
protocol (by the addition of more protocol rules) we can derive Skeen's Q3PC 
from 3PC which is the basis for our investigation into quorum based commit 
protocols. By enriching the internal state held at the participants of Q3PC we 
can derive a model of Kiedar and Dolev's E3PC [41] protocol that enhances 
Q3PC by protecting against cascading network failure. Once more by extending 
the protocol rules of E3PC we then derive an improved version of E3PC called 
X3PC in which a coordinator can use the distributed knowledge within a quorum 
to detect situations where it is possible to make progress towards committing a 
transaction. Like E3PC, in X3PC a connected quorum of sites never blocks, but 
X3PC will decide commit more often than E3PC and in no more attempts'. We 
will see that E3PC, Q3PC and X3PC have similar message-passing behaviour, 
but differ in the amount of state information that is exchanged in a message. 
A pattern is starting to emerge. As the environment in which the processes 
interact becomes richer, with for example the possibility of communication failure 
the local states of the processes involved and the number and complexity of the 
protocol rules increases. With this increased richness comes the ability to reason 
about more complicated behaviour such as blocking. Figure 4.1 depicts this. 
X3PC with comms failure 
E3PC with comms failure 
Q3PC with comms failure 
3PC with comms failure 
2PC with comms failure and help me 
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Figure 4.1: The increased complexity of a protocols environment is mirrored by 
the increased complexity of rules and the ability to reason about more complicated 
behaviour. 
'An attempt is started when a coordinator updates it's last attempt counter. 
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4.2 Adding failure to 2PC 
In the models of commit protocols we study we model communication failure 
by allowing processes to become disconnected from one another and partitioned 
into groups or components. All messages in transit at the time of the failure are 
assumed to be lost and it is assumed that processes can no longer communicate 
unless they are in the same component. 
We model a communication network, which may fail and divide the set of all 
processes P (now and in the following we use the set P for all processes including 
the coordinator) arbitrarily, using a partition Par so that the following holds. 
• Par (p) = {q E P I q can communicate with p} 
• Vp e P, p e Par(p) 
• Vp e P, if p E Par(q) then Par(p) = Par(q) 
It follows from this definition that if p ' Par(q) then Par(p) fl Par(q) = 0. 
Sometimes we write Par as a set of disjoint subsets or components of P whose 
union is P. For example, let P = { p1,p2,p3} and Par(pi) = {pl,p2}, Par(p2 ) = 
{p1,p2} and Par (P3) = {p}, then we write Par = {{pl,p2}, {p3}}. Using this 
representation we write X e Par to mean X is one of the components in the 
partition Par, thus p's component is Par (p). In our example {p1,p2}  E Par. To 
model communication failure and repair Par may change Par —* Par'. Extending 
our example, suppose P2  loses communication with Pi  and gains communication 
with p3 , can write this as follows. 
{{pl,p2},{p3}} —+ {{pl},{p2,p3}} 
or more generally as the environment rule: 
NET 
Far —+ Far' 
Since the pre-condition of NET is empty Par may change at any time, allowing 
communication failure at any point in a protocol execution. Initially Par = {P}. 
To enhance the simple 2PC protocol of section 3.6.5 we need only extend the 
environment rules CUV and PUV that update the views of participants and 
coordinators. We simply add the extra clause p e Par(c) to both pre-conditions 
to reflect the fact that a coordinator (participant) can only update its view of 
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Figure 4.2: Part of the execution diagram of 2PC in the presence of network 
partitioning. NET  events in these executions result in the protocol blocking. In 
the diagram P = {{c,p 1 ,p2 }}, P' = {{c}, {p1,p211  and F" = {{c,p i }, {p211. 
a participant (coordinator) if it is in the same component. Our rules are thus 
changed as follows. 
CUV(c) 	
= X A c(p.s = i) A p E Par(c) x e {w, a} 
©c(p.s := x) 
c.s = x A ©p(c.s = i) A p E Par(c) 
PUV(p) 	 x e 1c, al 
©p(c.s := x) 
4.2.1 2PC blocks 
With the addition of network partitioning to the simple 2PC we see that our 
simple protocol might now block. Consider the following execution involving two 
participants and a coordinator. We use a similar notation for a configuration 
as in figure 3.4 by appending the current value of Par to form a configuration. 
Figure 4.2 shows several executions of 2PC. Network events in these executions 
result in the protocol blocking. 
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The leftmost execution can be written as follows. 
pvY2 ... 	 cUv2 (jii 1i i1 ){{c,p 1 , P2}}  -* (i", w 1 , 'w1){{c,pi, P2}} —4 
cc 	 NET (jWW w1 , w'){{c,pi,p2}} 	(WW, W I , w 1 ){{c,p1,p2}} -* 
(c"',w 1 ,w1 ){{c}, {p1,p211 74 
The only rule applicable to the last configuration, in this execution is the environ-
ment rule NET. In other words no process can make progress towards reaching 
a commit or abort decision until the network is repaired and so they are deemed 
blocked. 
4.2.2 Help-Me messages 
In the last example, the leftmost branch in figure 4.2 the protocol blocked even 
though there was enough knowledge within the participants' component to com-
mit because both participants voted yes. Unfortunately, for the simple 2PC 
described participants rely on their coordinator for communication. Once the 
coordinator is isolated in a different component all communications break down. 
One solution to this problem is that once a participant discovers that it has be-
come disconnected from its coordinator it can send out a help-me message to 
other participants. If another participant in the same partition receives such a 
message, and has itself decided, it can help the undecided participant reach a 
decision. Furthermore, if a participant receives help-me messages from all other 
participants it is safe to deduce that all other sites have voted yes and thus itself 
commit. Many implementations of 2PC include help-me messages as a way of 
reducing blocking. 
We can model help-me messages using views. In RHQ below, when a partic-
ipant detects that it has become isolated from its coordinator it enters a help-me 
state, h. In PH any decided participant that views another participant in state 
h provides help by moving to either Ch or ah depending on its decision. 
RHQ(p) 




s := Xh 
X E 1c, a) 
If a participant views all other participants in the help-me state, h, then it can 
safely deduce that all sites voted yes and move to c. This is modelled by the rule 
PDC below. Similarly, if it views a participant as having helped, states Ch or ah, 
it can commit or abort accordingly. This is modelled by the rule PRH below. 
PDC(p) 
s=hA©p(Vq e P, q.s=h) 
S := Ch 
PRH(p) 
s=hA©p(qE P, q.S=Xh) 
s:= x 
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X e {c, a} 
Once again we must provide environment rules for propagating help-me messages 
within a component which we call PHUV and help responses which we call 
[i4SA!i 
PRUV(p) 
S = h A q.s = Xh A @p(q.s :A  x) A p e Par(q) 
©p(q.s := Xh) 	
x e {c, a} 
s =X A q.s = h A ©p(q.s 0 h) A p E Par(q) 
PHUV(p) 	 x E {c, a, h} 
©p(q.s := h) 
Consider again the execution where 2PC blocked in section 4.2.1. The last 
system configuration in the execution was (C%rW,  w 1 , w){{c}, {pl,p2}}. Using our 
help-me rules we see that RHQ can be applied by each participant to request 
help. After this each participant can apply environment rule PHUV to update 
its view of its cohort to be h. Finally PDC can be applied at both participants 
because each participant can deduce that, because all participants are in state h, 
they must all have voted yes, and so it is safe to commit. 
In this enriched model a participant must maintain a view, not only of its co-
ordinator, but also of the other participants. We therefore extend the participant 
state so that a participant's view is a pair of states (as it is in the coordinator) 
the first denotes its view of its coordinator and the second its view of the other 
participant. Using this notation we can extend the previous execution as follows. 
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And so we see that in this example blocking is prevented. Unfortunately, although 
help-me messages relieve the problem they do not entirely eliminate it. For 
example suppose that the NET event results in the more disruptive partition 
{ {c,p}, {p21}, after Pi  has committed but before P2  receives a commit message 
then, although P2  can issue a help-me message this will not help it reach a decision 




'){{}, {pi}, {p2}} —+
Q2 (CWW,  h, h"){{c}, {pi}, {p211 74 
Finally, for completeness sake, we should note that if a participant becomes 
blocked because it is isolated from its coordinator, and then a NET event hap- 
pens, rejoining that participant and its coordinator, then the coordinator should 
interpret a view of sate h as state w, similarly Ch and ah states should be inter-
preted as c and a states. This requires some small changes to our existing rules 
but we omit the details. 
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4.3 Modelling 3PC 
As we have seen in section 2.2 by adding a buffer state (pc) to the simple 2PC 
(without help-me rules) we can derive, 3PC, a protocol that is slightly more 
resilient to blocking than the basic 2PC. We can simply describe this protocol 
by introducing the new state pc, making changes to the rules PC, CC and 
introducing two new rules PPC and CPC as follows. 
PPC(p) 
s = w A ©p(c.s = pc) 
S PC 
PC(p) s 






S = C A ©c(Vp E P, p.s = pc) 
S := C 
The addition of this state does provide some tolerance to blocking in the rather 
unrealistic case where failure is restricted to single site failure only. By adding 
timeout and crash actions to the rules of 3PC above, it is possible to model this 
particular environment and show that for this restricted case of failure 3PC is 
non-blocking. Since in practice it is impossible to restrict the types of failures 
that might occur, we will not proceed in this direction. Instead, we will investigate 
more realistic quorum based 3PC protocols that provide blocking tolerance for a 
more general class of failure. 
4.4 Modelling quorum based commit protocols 
In this section we provide a views based model for two existing quorum based three 
phase commit protocols namely Q3PC and E3PC. Since E3PC is an extension 
of Q3PC they share many of the same protocol rules. Both of these protocols 
have a similar structure. In their so called initial phase, before any failures, each 
protocol carries out a basic 3PC 2 . If a failure occurs then the protocols enter their 
termination phase. It is in their termination phase that Q3PC and E3PC differ. 
During this phase each protocol, where possible, attempts to reach a commit 
(abort) decision, by first moving processes to pre-commit (pre-abort) and then to 
commit (abort). We first model E3PC and then show how to simplify its protocol 
rules to derive Q3PC. 
4.4.1 Views and process state 
Unlike the commit protocol models we considered earlier all processes in our 
model are from a single class of processes P. In the protocols we consider any 
2 1f no failures occur during the initial phase the executions of Q3PC and E3PC are identical 
to 3PC. 
process p can assume the role of a coordinator. The identity of a processes's 
coordinator is stored in the internal state variable p.c. Thus if p.c = q then q is a 
coordinating participant. Another important internal state variable of processes 
is p.r, which if true means p has detected a communication failure and is executing 
its termination phase. 
Fig. 4.1 describes the state variables at each process p E P. As before we 
include the internal state variable s, e.g. p.s = c means p is committed. In the 
case of E3PC we add the two counters p.le and p.la of [41]: p.le = m means 
that p's last-elected counter is m. We will discuss how these counters are used to 
derive E3PC from Q3PC in detail later. 
Later when we further extend E3PC we will employ an internal state object p.h 
which records a history of attempts that process made to move to the pre-abort 
(pa) state during the termination phase: its details are discussed later. As in 
our previous example, processes have views about the states of other processes. 
For p, ©p(q.s = pc) means that p knows q was at some time  in pc. For p, 
©p(q.la = rn) means that p knows q's last attempt counter was at some time 
equal to m. 
We say ©p(q.s x) if ©p(q.s = x) A ©p(q.le = p.le) A ©p(q.c = p.c) holds. 
Similarly we write ©p(q.s x) holds at p if ©p(q.s x) A ©p(q.la = p.la) 
holds. We use the notation =, and to denote stronger and stronger versions 
of equality. ©p(q.s x) means not only ©p(q.s = x) but also that ©p(q.le = 
p.le) A ©p(q.c = p-c), i.e. the state was reached during the last election and p 
believes q has the same coordinator. Stronger still ©p(q.s x) adds the further 
condition that p believes q is in the same attempt as p. 
A new' feature of this model allows a view to be updated by a process locally 
in the post-action of a protocol rule in the same way as local state is updated. 
Updating a view allows a process to change its belief of what a remote processes's 
state might be. When views are updated the change does not produce messages; 
this disallows views of views. 
When modelling quorum based commit protocols we will again adopt the 
partition based model of communication failure. This means we include in a 
configuration the partition Par and the environment rule NET that can disrupt 
the network at any time. All processes affected by a network disruption detect it 
and new coordinators are elected [29] in each new component of the new partition. 
During the election a coordinator in a group, X, can compute the maximum 
may possibly still be in state pc. 
'Previously, views were updated only in environment rules. 
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P.S e {pa, PC, 1, w, a, c} state of a process 
p.c E P 	 p's coordinator 
p.le 	 p's last elected counter 
p.la p's last attempt counter 
p.r E {tt, f } 	 p has entered the recovery phase 
p.! e {tt, ff} coordinator is collecting participant's state 
p.h 	 history of attempts to move to pa 
Table 4.1: a, C, represent the abort and commit decision states. i is the initial 
state before a process has voted, w is entered after a yes vote. pc and pa are 
entered during attempts to commit and abort respectively. During termination a 
proces must record when a coordinator is collecting participant states and behave 
accordingly. This is reflected in the value of the variable p.r. 
last elected counter me(X) = max qx {q.1e} 5 , within the component. When a 
participant adopts a new coordinator it updates its last elected counter to be 
me + 1 and begins the termination phase of the protocol. We model this change 
with NET(c) as follows where me = maxqx {q.1e}, c is a process chosen from X 
during an election. 
Par —+ Par' A X e Par' A X Par 
UPDATE (c, X) 
where 
UPDATE(c, X) I Aqx ( q .c := c A q.r := tt A q.le := me + 1 A 	(1) 
©c(q.s := q.$) A ©c(q.le := q.le) A ©c(q.la := q.la) (2) 
©q(c.f := tt)) 	 (3) 
The UPDATE macro is a little complicated and so requires some explanation. 
For each process q in X there are three parts to the update. The first part, line 
(1), sets process q's coordinator variable q.c to be c, sets q.r to tt and also sets 
q.le to be me + 1. The next part, line (2), sets the elected coordinator, c's view 
of q.s, q.le and q.la to be the actual values of q.s, q.le and q.la. Finally, in line 
(3), q's view of c.f is set to be tt. 
We can assume the post-action is atomic because if it is interrupted by another 
network event, Par' —+ Par", the leadership election can be restarted [29] and 
any partial changes ignored. 
It should be noted that this is the first example of a rule that we have seen 
where, in the post-action, a view is updated at more than one process, in this case 
at c and at p. Clearly if these non-local actions are to be assumed to be atomic 
5 A coordinator need not store me(X) as part of its state it need only calculate it during an 
election. 
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we require further justification. Although we will not elaborate on the details it 
is possible to achieve these updates atomically during a leadership election. An 
example application of the NET rule can be seen in figure 4.3 where it is applied 
twice to the fourth state in the diagram. 
4.4.2 Updating views 
Views are updated in a way which is similar to, but slightly different from, the 
way they were in the simple 2PC example presented earlier in section 3.6.3. If 
a process p has a view that is out of date with respect to the current state of 
another process within the same component of its partition (i.e. within Par(p)), 
that view may be updated. Notice this models the situation where messages 
within a component eventually arrive, provided the component does not change, 
but still allows message loss if a network event occurs re-partitioning the system 
and changing the component. The rules for updating the view of a coordinator 
and a participant process are given below. Notice a participant p does not update 
its view of a coordinator c if it views c.f to hold, this models the situation where 
a coordinator is collecting state after a network event during an election. 
c=pAq E Par (p) Aq. = A©p(q. 
UCV(p) 	 =(s,la, le, c) 
©p(q.z := tr) 
UPV(p) 	 - . 	
- (s, a, e, f, c) 
©  
4.4.3 Protocol rules for E3PC 
Initially all processes p start in the i state with -'p.f and their last attempt and 
last elected counters set to 0 and 1 respectively. All processes are connected and 
there exists a process which is the coordinator for all processes. More formally 
(Vp E P, p.s = i A p.la = 0 A p.le = 1 A -p.f A p.r A Par(p) = P)A 
(aqEP, VpEP,p.c=q) 
The protocol rules are divided into four groups. One group for the initial phase 
where -'r holds at all processes and another for the termination phase where r 
holds. The rules are further divided between participant rules, where c = p and 
coordinator rules, where p c. Rules for coordinator processes begin with C and 
those for participants begin with P. Rules for the initial phase end with I and for 
the termination phase end with T. 
A step is applicable to a process if the pre-condition for that step is satisfied 
at that process. The initial phase of E3PC is described by the following rules. 
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The first group of rules describe the behaviour of participants not executing their 
termination protocol. We therefore omit - A (c =~ p) from the pre-conditions for 
the sake of brevity. 
PVYI(p) s = v  : 	PVNI(p) := • s: a 
s  
PPCI(p) 	
pc A ©p(c.s = pc) 
S := PC 
PCI(p) 
s C A©p(c.s = c) 	
PAI(p) 
S a A©p(c.s = a) 
In the rules PVYI and PVNI participants vote yes and no respectively moving 
to either wait (w) or abort (a). The rule PPCI allows a participant to enter pre-
commit (pc) and the rules PCI and PAT allow a participants to decide commit 
(c) or abort (a). We now give the rules for coordinators not executing their 




p(VqpEP,q.s=w) 	 s=i 
s:=pcAla:=le 	 s:=a 
CCI(p) 
S = PC A ©p(Vq 0 p E P, q.s = pc) 
s := C 
CAI(p) 
s=iA©p(qpEP,q.sa) 
S := a 
CVNI allows a coordinator to vote no from its initial state i, CPCI moves 
a coordinator to pc while CCI and CAT allow a coordinator to move to c or a 
respectively. 
In some cases more that one pre-condition may be true for a process. For 
example suppose a coordinator, p, is in state i with a view that all other processes 
have voted yes, or more formally ©p(Vq p e P, q.s = w) holds, either CNVI 
or CPCI might happen. This reflects the fact that a coordinator (because it is 
also a participant in its own right) may itself abort a transaction even though all 
other processes voted yes. We do not, in this case but will sometimes, restrict 
this type of choice by providing a precedence on the rules. 
We also make use of the predicate isMaxAttemptCommittable (defined in [41] 
which we rename IMAC(X)) over X c P. IMAC(X) is true at coordinator p 
where ma = max{m I @p(q E X, q.la m)} if 
Vq e X, @p(q.la ma) = @p(q.s pc) 
I.e., p believes no member of X with the greatest last attempt counter, within 
X, is in a state other than pc. We now present the rules of the termination 
protocol. We first give rules for participants this time omitting r A (c 0 p) from 
each pre-condition. 
la le A ©p(c.s pc A -'c.f) 
	
PPCT(p) 	
Ia le A s := pc 
la le A ©p(c.s = pa A -c-f)
PPAT(p) 	
la := le A s := pa 
PCT(p) s 
C A ©p(c.s = C) 
PAT(p) 
s a A ©p(c.s = a) 
s:=C 	 s:=a 
In PPCT (PPAT) a participant moves to pc (pa). In PCT (PAT) a par-
ticipant commits (aborts) when it views the coordinator as having committed 
(aborted). Finally we can give rules for the coordinator's behaviour during the 
termination phase of the protocol, this time we omit r A (c = p) from each pre-
condition. In CPCT we make reference to the quorum predicate Q(Par(p)), 
this was defined in section 2.3. One can think of a quorum as a majority for the 
purposes of this chapter. 
CC1T(p) 
f  ©p(q E Par(p), q.s = c) 
C Al := ff 
f A ©p(q E Par(p), q.s a) 
CA1T(p) 	
if s := aA f :=  
f A Q(Par(p)) A IMAC(Par(p)) CPCT(p) la 
:= le A s := pc A f := ff 
CPAT(p) f A 
Q (Par (p)) A -iIMAC (Par (p)) 
la := IeAs :=paAf :=ff 
CC2T(p) 
-if A 3X C Par(p), (Q(X) A (gp(Vq E X, q.s PC)) 
S 	C 
CA2T(p) -
f A 3X C Par(p), (Q(X) A ©p(Vq e X, q.s pa)) 
S := a 
If a process exists in the coordinator's component in a C or a state, then 
the coordinator propagates the value using rules CC1T and CA1T, which have 
highest precedence. If a quorum of pc states exist and IMAC holds, the rule 
CPCT is used to move participants to the pc state. Likewise, CPAR is used to 
advance processes to the pa state. If enough processes are in pc the coordinator 
decides commit with CC2T or if enough are in pa it moves to status a with rule 
CA2T. 
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4.4.4 Q3PC: Skeen's Quorum-based 3PC 
Using this notation for modelling E3PC as a starting point, we can obtain a model 
of Q3PC by changing the pre-condition of CPCT and CPAT as follows. 
CPCT'(p) f A ©p(q, q.s = pc) A Q({r e Par(p) I ©p(r.s = pc V r.s = w)}) 
CPAT'(p) f A Q({r e Par(p) I @p(r.s = pa V r.s = w)}) 
The post-actions of the rules remain the same. Using these modified pre-conditions, 
if cascading network partitioning is possible this introduces the possibility of 
blocking. We will examine this further in the example in section 4.5. 
4.4.5 Configurations and executions 
As before a configuration C is a collection of processes with their internal state 
and views together with Par. 
C = (s1 ,. . . , s,), Par 
An execution of a protocol is a sequence of configurations Ci, . .. , Cm,.. . where 
C 1 is derived from Ci by a protocol step, for example applying the rule CA2T, 
a network event NET, or an update of a view, for example UPV. A decided 
process is one in state c or a. A deciding configuration is one which has a 
quorum of decided processes and a deciding execution is one which contains a 
decided configuration. 
4.5 E3PC's advantage over Q3PC 
Example 1 See [41], three processes, Pi, P2 and P3,  initially all connected, carry 
out E3PC. All processes vote yes and the first coordinator, Pi,  moves to pc. A 
network partition causes P2  and p3  to become isolated. They are both in state 
w, and form a quorum. The second coordinator P2 moves to pa, (rule CPAT) 
updating its last attempt counter. Another network event occurs and now P2 
rejoins p. Q3PC would now block, but E3PC can abort. See figure 4.3 towards 
the end of this chapter for a diagram of this execution. 
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We are now in a position to express the previous example 1 using our views 
based model. Figure 4.3 shows an execution sequence for the previous example 
up to the point where a coordinator decides a. 
We 
Interestingly, by replacing CPCT and CPAT with CPCT' and CPAT' re-
spectively, thus deriving Q3PC from E3PC we see that in the seventh configu-
ration represented in figure 4.3 neither CPCT' nor CPAT' apply. In fact no 
protocol rule applies to the seventh state and so even though Pi  and P2  form a 
quorum they cannot make progress until a network event happens and so they 
are deemed blocked. 
By examining the pre-conditions of CC1T, CA1T, CPCT and CPAT we 
can see that at least one of them must hold within a quorate component. This 
means that, unlike Q3PC, in E3PC a coordinator can make progress towards 
terminating a transaction within every quorate component. 
4.6 Constructing X3PC from E3PC 
We note that it would have been safe to commit rather than abort in example 1 
of this chapter, because there is enough information for the coordinator in the 
last attempt to know the second attempt was unsuccessful and so view p2's pa 
state as its previous state w. This motivates the development of our new protocol 
X3PC. 
We now show how to derive X3PC from E3PC. To do this we change the rules 
CPAT and PPAT and add two extra protocol rules, CUV1T and CUV2T 
which change a coordinator's view during the termination phase of the protocol. 
The update view rule allows a coordinator, p, to determine if a participant's earlier 
attempt to abort did not result in any process moving to a. The coordinator might 
be able to reach this conclusion in two ways. 
CASE 1: Let q be a participant in state pc in coordinator p's component Par(p) 
and let q.la = i. If the coordinator of attempt i is also in Par(p) and that 
coordinator's status is not a, then p can safely assume no process reached a in 
attempt i where q moved to pa. Accordingly, p may adjust its view of q.s. 
CASE 2: If the coordinator of attempt i is not present in Par(p) but enough 
processes are present in Par(p) that were also involved in attempt i, but did not 
move to pa during that attempt then the coordinator can deduce whether or not 
a quorum of processes moved to pa in attempt i. If not then the coordinator for 
attempt i could not have moved to a. Accordingly, p may safely adjust its view 
of q.s. 
For processes to reason in these ways they must exchange extra information. 
Each process therefore keeps a history h. A process updates h when it enters 
the pa state. The history is indexed by last attempt number, i. If a process 
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moved to pa in attempt i, then it contains all of the processes involved in the 
i'th attempt denoted h[i].involved, the coordinator of the attempt h[i].c, and the 
process' previous state and last attempt counter before moving to pa are denoted 
respectively by h[i].Sprev and h[i].laprev. Initially, at all processes p, Vi, p.h[i] = 0. 
During an election a coordinator updates its view of all the histories of processes 
within its component. To reflect this in our rules we must extend the vector in the 
NET rule to include h so it becomes = (s, la, le, h). Finally we must change 
the post-action of the rules CPAT, and PPAT by replacing the post-action of 
CPAT with 
SH(p) A p.Ia := p.le A P.S := pa 
and the post-action of PPAT with 
SH(p) A p.Ia := p.le A p.S := pa 
where 
SH(p) Ih[le].involved = Par(p) A h[le].c = P.0 A 
h[le].sprev = p.s A h[le}.laprev = p.la 
We are now in a position to define two new rules for coordinator p. Let 
del 
M = max{t I 3r E Par(p), ©p(r.Ia t A r.s pa)} 
be the highest non pa attempt in a coordinator p's component. The rules attempt 
to change p's view of a participant q, if p's view of q's last attempt counter is 
greater than or equal to m, and p's view of q's state is pa. In both rules we 
omit p.c = p A p.f from the pre-conditions for the sake of brevity. The first rule 
CUVT1 corresponds to CASE 1 above. 
©p(q.s = pa A q.la > m A q.h[q.Ia].c = C' A c'.s 0 a) A c' e Par(p) 
CUVT1(p) 
©p(q.s := q.h[q.la].sprev A q.la := q.h[q.la].laprev ) 
In the second rule CUVT2 corresponding to CASE 2 above, let 
L(q) I ©p(q.h[q.la].involved) be coordinator p's view of q's involved set at at- 
, 	del 
tempt q.Ia and L (q) {r E Par(p) I ©p(r.h[q.la].zrivolved = 0)} be p  s view 
of those processes in the current partition that were not involved in attempt q.la. 
CUVT2 (p) 
q G Par(p) A ©p(q.s = pa A q.Ia > m) A -Q(L(q) - L(q')) 
©p(q.s := q.h[q.la].sprev A q.la 	q.h[q.Ia].Iaprev ) 
The rules "roll back" the view of q's pa state when there is enough infor-
mation within the component of the current attempt to be sure that the earlier 
attempt, q.Ia did not result in any process moving to state a. The pre-condition 
of CUVT1 ensures that the coordinator of attempt q.la is in the current at-
tempt with state not equal to a. The pre-condition of CUVT2 ensures that the 
coordinator of attempt q.la could not have moved to state a because a quorum 
of processes did not move to pa in that attempt. The rules consider processes 
with attempt numbers greater than or equal to the highest non pre-abort at-
tempt. CUVT1 has higher precedence than CUVT2 so the precedence of all 
protocol rules for coordinators in the termination phase of X3PC is then (CC 1T, 
CA1T)-<(CUVT1, CUVT2)-< (CPCT, CPAT, CC2T, CA2T). 
These update rules are by no means optimal. When initiating an attempt 
a coordinator could pass on all the attempt histories it collected to each of the 
participating processes which would put them in a better position to provide in-
formation to a future coordinator about the possible success of an abort attempt. 
We do not consider these further optimisations here. 
In Example 1, it was the coordinator of the second attempt which returned 
to form a quorum with the first processes. At this point Pi  applies CUVT1 to 
its view of p2 updating this view so that ©pl(p2.s = w) and ©pi (p2 .la = 0). Now 
rule CPCT allows P1  to enter pc, rather than pa. If no more network events 
interrupt this component a commit decision is eventually reached. Figure 4.4 
depicts these events. 
4.7 X3PC Solves Atomic Commitment 
In this section we appeal to the rules of our model to prove that executions 
of X3PC solve the atomic commit problem. We use the problem definition of 
Bernstein et al. [9] which can be found in figure 2.1 as a starting point. We will 
see that we can make more precise statements of what it means for our protocol 
to be correct than those made in this definition. In particular, since we have a 
more precise idea of what it means for communication to fail, we can give a more 
precise account of how resilient our protocol is to different types of failure. 
We can divide any execution p of X3PC into attempts. The ith attempt is 
started within a component when the coordinator, p, of that component updates 
its last attempt counter to i. This happens in the rule CPAT in the case of an 
abort attempt or in the rule CPCT in the case of a commit attempt. We call 
the first attempt before the invocation of the termination phase attempt 0. 
Lemma 1 If a coordinator process decides c (a) during attempt i > 0 in an 
execution p then no process will decide a (c) during any attempt j > i. 
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Proof Let attempt i be the first time any coordinator process, p, decides c (a). 
First consider the case p decides a. This must be in rule CA1T, CAI, CVNI 
or CA2T. Consider each case in turn. 
• CA1T: By the pre-condition of CA1T p must have a view of some process 
q e Par(p) in state a, i.e. ©p(q.s = a) holds. For this to happen p's 
view must have been updated earlier in p by the rule NET or UCV. In 
either case for some q, q.s = a must have held earlier in p. q cannot be a 
coordinator, in this earlier attempt, since this contradicts our assumption 
that p was the first coordinator to decide so it must be a participant. This 
means q must decide in attempt 0 since no participant may decide in the 
termination phase before its coordinator. Clearly, if any participant decides 
a at attempt 0 then no process can reach pc and so even if subsequent 
NET events happen no process can decide c. 
• CAI or CVNI: If a coordinator decides a during the initial phase (attempt 
0) then by the pre-condition of PPCI and PCI and the new rules UCV 
and UPV no process exists up to this point in state pc or c. After this point 
either no NET event happens and so c is never reached or NET happens. 
After a NET event CPCT will never hold since IMAC will always fail since 
no process reached pc before leaving the initial phase and therefore c will 
not be reached by any process. 
• Suppose at attempt i > 0, p  decides a during rule CA2T. So by the pre-
condition of CA2T, 3X c Par(p), Q(X) A ©p(Vq e X, q.s pa). Thus in 
attempt i a quorum of processes are in pa this change was conveyed to p 
with rule UVC. This took place during attempt i since ©p(q.s pa) holds 
at p only if p views q to have the same last attempt counter as itself. For the 
processes q e X to have moved to pa during attempt i their coordinator p 
must have moved to pa, earlier in p, during attempt i with the rule CPAT. 
Let us consider two cases from this point in p. 
- No further NET events happen. So within the component Par(p) 
CPCT can never happen because its pre-condition cannot hold once 
the pre-condition of CPAT holds. So no process will reach pc during 
attempt i and so no process will reach c. Furthermore, since Q(Par(p)) 
for any component Y outside of Par(p), Q(Y) fails. This means in 
Y neither CPAT nor CPCT will be applicable and since -'p.f will 
hold for the new coordinator of Y, CC2T, CA2T will not apply and 
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CC1T CA1T will not apply by the assumption that p is the first 
coordinator to decide. Similarly, PPCT, PPAT, PCT and PAT are 
not applicable in Y. 
- A further NET event happens. Consider any new component Y 
formed after this event. There are two cases to consider. 
* Y does not contain any process from X. It cannot therefore be 
quorate. Only rules CC1T or CA1T are applicable but this 
would mean some process must have decided before p did during 
attempt i violating our assumption. 
* Y does include a process q from X. q must have the highest 
last attempt in the component. To see this note that the NET 
rule ensures all processes from quorate components formed in p 
have monotonically increasing last elected counters. We now show 
that neither CUV1T nor CUV2T are applicable. If p E Y then 
clearly at the coordinator, p', for this attempt ©p'(p.s a) and so 
CUV1T will not apply. Furthermore, L(q) = X and L(q) cannot 
contain any q e X i.e. L(q) fl L'(q) = 0 therefore L(q) - L'(q) = 
L(q) and thus Q(L(q)—L'(q)) holds making CUV2T inapplicable. 
An exactly similar argument but slightly easier applies if in attempt i a process 
decides commit. An intersecting site in any subsequent quorate component will 
be in state pc, with a maximal last attempt counter, and so IMAC will hold, 
without the need for any applications of CUV1T or CUV2T. 
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Theorem 1 X3PC satisfies AC1. 
Proof: Any decision must be the result of a successful attempt during the ter-
mination phase of the protocol or during the initial phase. It is clear that if any 
process decides a in the initial phase no process could reach state pc and thus all 
subsequent attempts will never result in c. Also if any process was to decide c in 
the initial phase all processes must be in state pc so in all subsequent attempts 
IMAC will hold preventing any process from deciding a. 
In the termination phase a coordinator can only move to a (c) if the component 
of the attempt is quorate. Of course a coordinator may propagate a (c) decisions 
within a non-quorate group using rules CC1T and CA1T but the decision will 
remain consistent. In any execution p no two quorate attempts may be interleaved 
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so by lemma 1 after one successful attempt a decision value is locked for all future 
attempts 
Lemma 2 X3PC satisfies A C2. 
Proof: Follows from lemma 1. 
Lemma 3 X3PC satisfies ACS 
Proof: Let p be a process that decides c in an execution p of X3PC. There are 
two cases. Either it is a coordinator or it is not. If it is not, then it can decide 
commit as the consequence of one of the rules PCI or PCT. In either case the 
pre-condition ©p(c.s = c) must hold. So there must have been an earlier point 
in the execution when at p's c.s = c. Thus some coordinator decided c, either 
during an earlier attempt or during the initial phase. If that coordinator decided 
c during the initial phase then all processes must have voted yes when applying 
rule PVYI therefore we may restrict our attention to earlier attempts in the 
termination phase. 
Consider the first time a coordinator, p changes state to pc in the termination 
phase. Such an event must occur (if not then no process could reach a c decision). 
When p entered pc it must have been because of rule CPCT a pre-condition 
of which is IMAC(X) A Q(X) for some subset X of Par(p). For IMAC(X) to 
hold we know that the coordinator p must have constructed a view of some q E X 
where ©p(q.s = pc), so q entered pc in an earlier attempt. By assumption this 
is the first such attempt in the termination phase where a coordinator p moves 
to pc, thus some process must have been in pc in the initial phase. By the pre-
condition of rule CPCI and the UCV rule if some process was in state pc in the 
initial phase all processes must have voted yes. 
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Lemma 4 XSPC satisfies AC. 
Proof: If no NET rules occur then X3PC does not enter its termination phase 




Lemma 5 X3PC satisfies AG5. 
Proof If even only a quorate group X becomes connected for sufficiently long 
they will reach a decision and if any process becomes connected to a decided 
process it too will decide. This follows from the fact that the pre-condition of at 
least one protocol rule holds until a decision is reached. 
Theorem 2 If using the rules of E3PC a commit decision is reached during the 
termination phase where no more than two quorums have formed then using the 
rules of Q3PC will also lead to a commit decision. 
Proof: In a committing run of E3PC there exists a configuration in the initial 
phase before the first network failure of the form 
n-rn 	 m 
'WW pc ... pc p 
where m > 0. This follows from the proof of Lemma 3. Consider the first 
time a quorate component X forms after a NET event. X must either consist 
of processes all in state w, or processes in pc and w, in the latter case, for 
both E3PC and Q3PC, the newly elected leader of X, will apply rules CPCT 
and participant processes will attempt to move to pc. In the former case both 
E3PC and Q3PC will carry out rule CPAT to attempt to move processes to pa. 
Let L be the set of processes that move to pa during this attempt. From this 
point another network event must occur, if not this quorum would decide abort. 
Consider the next quorum. By assumption this must be the last quorum to form 
and must result in a commit decision. So we know rule CPCT must be applicable 
in E3PC. Clearly no process from L could be present in this quorum as it would 
have a maximum attempt counter and then IMAC would not hold invalidating 
the pre-condition of CPCT so the quorum can only consist of processes in pc and 
w and at least one process must be in PC. We see then that Q3PC can also apply 
rule CPCR and behave in an identical way to E3PC producing a committing 
execution. 
IMI 
4.8 Performance Comparison 
To compare the three protocols we considered runs from the point that all partic- 
ipants had voted yes and entered their w state and the coordinator had collected 
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these votes and changed state to pc. This is the most interesting initial condition 
because if any process votes no, or if all vote yes but the coordinator does not 
change to pc, before entering the recovery phase then all protocols will abort the 
transaction. 
Each protocol was compared by examining random runs. Between each pro-
tocol step a network event could occur with uniform probability 'y, causing the 
network to partition. We only considered network events which resulted in quo-
rums being formed. The same failure pattern was applied to all protocols during 
each run. Where there was a choice of steps to apply (i.e. more than one process 
could take a step) one was picked at random. The protocol was deemed to have 
decided once a quorum of processes decided, or in the case of Q3PC blocked if no 
process could take a step. The results of 500 runs for seven processes and seven 
values of 'y are presented in Fig 4.5. 
The behaviour of E3PC and Q3PC is similar in executions when the outcome 
is commit. E3PC will often abort a transaction if it would block in Q3PC for 
an identical failure pattern. This is not generally true but by theorem 2 holds in 
the case where failures are followed by the formation of less than two quorums. 
E3PC is far superior to the Q3PC at avoiding blocking, especially when network 
disruption is high. In our experiments a run of Q3PC was deemed blocked if 
it could not take a step. The equivalent E3PC run would continue but might 
have undergone several more network partitions before reaching a decision. In-
terestingly if Q3PC was allowed to run for as long (i.e. allowing further network 
partitioning) as E3PC took to reach a decision it would still block in many cases. 
X3PC will commit in all runs that E3PC commits. Especially under high net-
work disruption, X3PC will commit many of the transactions that E3PC aborted. 
When network disruption is very high both E3PC and X3PC take many attempts 
to reach a decision. X3PC is more likely to decide to commit under high, rather 
than medium, disruption. This is because under high levels of random disrup-
tion more information can be exchanged between processes about unsuccessful 
attempts to abort. When a period of calm returns X3PC is then in a good posi-
tion to move towards commit, whereas in E3PC there is a much greater chance 
that pre-abort attempts dominate. 
4.9 Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
It is possible to further optimise X3PC. Processes could store not only their 
own histories of attempt to pre-abort but also the histories of other processes. 
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Coordinators, after gathering this information, could distribute this information 
to all participants. This process could go on even in a non-quorate components. 
This would further improve the likelihood that pre-abort attempt could be rolled 
back using an update view rule. 
Up to this point we have assumed that all processes have perfect knowledge of 
which other processes are in their own component. This is equivalent to having 
a perfect failure detector [11]. The protocol is also correct if processes only have 
access to an unreliable account of which other processes are in their component, 
as long as this knowledge is eventually reliable. For example, a process p may 
suspect that it has lost communication with another process q provided that 
eventually 1) all real lost connections are eventually suspected and 2) no process 
that is really connected is suspected indefinitely. If we assume this weaker model 
we must change AC4 in the problem definition to: 
If all processes voted yes, and no process is ever suspected then the decision 
will be to commit. 
Like E3PC, X3PC solves this weaker version, of the problem, called the Non-
blocking Atomic Commit [35], using only an eventually perfect-failure detector 
[24, 11]. As in E3PC, X3PC will terminate once a quorum of processes become 
connected and no failures or suspicions occur for sufficiently long. 
In a mobile computing or Internet environment where network disruption is 
common E3PC gives a greater availability of service than Q3PC. As applications 
use transaction semantics in increasingly varied ways it may become more difficult 
to restart transactions frequently. X3PC provides a protocol which combines the 
high availability of E3PC with a greater chance of committing a transaction even 
when network disruption is high. 
Recently IBM and Microsoft have cooperated on a new protocol called SOAP. 
SOAP provides remote procedure calls over the Internet using HTTP. Because 
the HTTP protocol is stateless (each HTTP request appears as a new connection) 
X3PC would be a perfect protocol to build on top of SOAP as the basis of an 
Internet transaction processing system. 
We have shown that our views based model is sufficient to model the execution 
of complex protocols within a rich environment that includes a notion of failure. 
The rules define precisely the actions of processes within a protocol and also the 
types of environment changes that might take place. By interleaving these rules 
we can generate a set of possible protocol executions and by appealing to the 
rules we can show properties over the set of all protocol executions. 
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Figure 4.3: One execution of example 1 for three processes P1,P2 and p3 . The 
fifth configuration in the execution represents Par = {{Pi}, {p2,p3}}, p 1 .c = 
p 1 .s = pc, p 1 .1a = 1, p 1 .le = 2, pi.f = tt etc. Views are also represented for 
example in the fifth state at @p2 (p 1 .s 	i) holds and, ©p 1 (p2 .s w A p3 .8 w) 
holds. Since a process' view of itself is alwa ys up-to-date it is omitted. When 
a rule changes the value of a variable we italicise the change in the next state, 
for instance at Pi, p 1 .1a = 0 —* p 1 .1a = 1 between the third and fourth states 
represented. Here, and in the rest of the thesis, when a rule R is applied n-times 
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Chapter 5 
Model Checking Two-Phase 
Commit 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will present methods by which a transition system can be 
automatically generated from a views based model of a commit protocol. Each 
state in the resulting transition system will represent a configuration in a protocol 
execution. A transition from one state to another reflects the evolution of the 
system during a protocol execution. The entire transition system therefore models 
the possible behaviour that can occur during any protocol executions that were 
included in the views based model. 
Temporal logics such as CTL [16] have been used extensively to formally 
express properties and capabilities of transition systems. Using these logics we 
can express properties of protocol executions. For example, that a path exists 
in a commit protocol's transition system to a state which has no successors and 
yet no commit or abort decision has been reached. This example captures the 
property that the protocol might block. It lacks the capability of taking a step 
from some reachable undecided state. 
Many algorithms exist which take as input a labelled transition system' and 
a property expressed in a logic such as CTL and outputs whether or not' the 
property holds or fails for the transition system supplied. This technique is known 
as model checking [19]. 
Our strategy therefore, is to first generate transition systems from views based 
models that capture the behaviour of commit protocols and then verify properties 
of the resulting transition systems using model checking. We will see in this 
'The entire transition system need not be supplied in every case. 
'Some algorithms have the desirable property that if a property fails for a particular tran-
sition system, an explanation of why the property failed is given. 
chapter that we can formally express many useful properties of commit protocols 
using CTL. A good example is atomicity, that is the safety property that in no 
protocol execution one participant can abort and another commit. 
Model checking facilitates an iterative design process whereby a protocol can 
be modelled, a transition system automatically generated and then properties 
of that system model checked. If a desirable property fails due to a bug in the 
protocol (or model) this can be rectified and the process repeated. Of course this 
design process is only as good as the extent to which the model reflects the real 
system being modelled and the property reflects the designer's intended property. 
In this chapter we present a model checking algorithm based on games [76] 
and use it to model check properties, expressed using a sub-logic of CTL, of the 
simple 2PC protocol presented in chapter 3. 
Although model checking is a very useful and powerful technique it suffers 
from a major drawback. For complex protocols (exactly those that benefit from 
the support of automated verification) the size of transition systems generated 
are often very large or even infinite. This is known as the state space explosion 
problem [17]. For many properties the time and space required to check a property 
depend on the size of the transition system being checked. To circumvent this 
problem abstraction techniques [18] have been devised to reduce the size of the 
resulting transition systems. We will see in this chapter that our views based 
modelling technique accommodates a very natural abstraction technique that 
allows us, to some extent, to alleviate the state space explosion problem. 
5.2 Modelling Two-Phase Commit 
Recall the simple model of 2PC from section 3.6.5. We restate the rules of this 
simple protocol. 
s=i 	 = 
PVY(p) 	 PVN(p) 
s i 
8 	 s  
PC(p) 
s = w A © 	
PA(p) 





c(VpEP,p.s=w) 	 s=iA ©c(peP,p.s=a) 






c.s = x A ©p(c.s = i) 
©p(c.s := x) 
x e {w, a} 
x  {c,a} 
In this model there are two classes of processes, the coordinator class C, and 
the participant class P. Processes from each class have a single state variable S. 
In the case of the coordinator this variable may take values i (initial), c (commit) 
or abort a (abort). In addition to these states participants have a further state 
w (wait). Table 3.3 of section 3.6.5 summarises this. We will use the notation 
xy to denote a participant (coordinator) that is in state x with a view that its 
coordinator (participants) is (are) in state(s) y. For example in the case of a 
participant in state w with a view that its coordinator is in state i we write w 1 . 
In this case the view is of a single state but this is not always the case. For example 
the coordinator keeps a view of the states of all the processes it is coordinating. 
For example, if the coordinator, in state i, has a view of three participants that 
are in states i, w, i respectively, we might write j(1,W)  It will always be clear 
from the context when we use the notation xy whether we are describing the 
state of a participant or a coordinator. When representing multiple states we will 
sometimes use vectors as in this example and sometimes sets or multi-sets. 
5.3 Generating Transition Systems from Rules 
For the commit protocols in which we are interested, the number of processes 
within the participant class P may be large. We would like to construct arguments 
about protocol executions involving n participant processes, which are valid for 
all n > 0. In order to generate a transition system from our set of rules we 
must find a way to represent the state of all n processes within a particular 
class. In this section we discuss two approaches to this problem, the second more 
abstract than the first. The first approach is the most concrete but it results in 
very large transition systems, whereas the second approach is the most abstract 
representation. By means of an argument based on simulation we will show that 
for particular classes of properties it is sufficient to show that if properties hold 
(fail) in the abstract system then they also hold (fail) in the concrete system. 
5.3.1 A Concrete approach 
A simple approach to representing the states of n processes in a system uses a 
vector of length n. We have already used this approach in section 3.6.5 where a 
system configuration C was represented by the composition of a fixed number of 
process states together with a coordinator, (Si, . .. , s,-), t, where si is the state of 
pi and t is the state of c. We call this representation CON. For example we can 
represent four processes P1,P2,P3,P4 and a coordinator, c, where P1,P2,P3  are in 
state w', p4 is in state j1 and the coordinator c is in state i with an up-to-date 
view of its participants as 
(v1 , 'wi , 'wj, ji)j(WWWi) 
Not all combinations of state vectors are valid in CON. In order to restrict 
configurations to just those that are valid, we define a partial order on the states 
a process may take. This order is 
i < w < c, a 
A CON configuration 
(Xzl  i , . . , x 	
) y ( U1 . ... Un) 
is valid if u, < x, and zi < y, 1 < i < ii. An example of a configuration that is 
not valid is 
(ii, i 1i i)j(W,W,W,i) 
From this point onwards in the thesis we restrict our attention to valid CON 
configurations only. One can see that the validity condition we place on CON 
configurations is preserved by our rules for 2PC. 
When a rule is applied to a process in the vector a new vector is produced. 
Thus if rule R happens at a process p i in the vector (Si, . . . , S i , . . . , s,) which we 
can write as si -* s, then we have the following transition in our representation 
(\R 	 ( 
(Si,.. . ,5,. . ., sn ), t 	' ', (s 1 ,. . . , s, . . . , sn ), t 
In fact we can allow any type of rule that produces valid future configurations. 
Generating a transition system in this way is straightforward. The applicabil-
ity of a rule, PVY, PVN, PC or PA, is tested by evaluating its pre-condition for 
each participant process in the vector. If the pre-condition holds, a post-action 
can be applied to that process resulting in a new vector. In order to update a 
view at a participant, we apply the rule PUV by checking if the coordinator state 
is different from the participant's view, if so we update the view. The coordinator 
rules are similar. The pre-conditions of the rules CC and CA can be determined 
by examining the view vector of the coordinator, and an appropriate change made 
to the coordinator's state, if a rule is applicable. Finally CUV is applicable if in 
the view vector of the coordinator, the view of a participant, is out of date; we 
give an example of this below. 
cUv 
'w 'w i)1(wwii) 	(,1 .i 	1i)j(WWWi) 
CON has a major drawback. Suppose we use it to represent ri participant 
processes and a coordinator and now consider all the possible executions that 
result from the simple 2PC protocol where each participant votes yes up until 
the point that all participants have voted. Figure 5.1 (a) depicts this. This gives 
rise to greater than n! transitions. To see this note the number of transitions is the 
solution to the recurrence relation S = n(Sn_i + 1) and n(S_i + 1) > rt(S_i). 
In fact matters are worse if we allow participants to vote no or include transitions 
whereby a coordinator updates its view. 
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Figure 5.1: In (a) the state space explosion that results from using the CON 
representation. The MULTI representation in (b) reduces this. 
CON produces unmanageable state spaces for even small fixed numbers of 
participant processes. 
5.3.2 Multi-set representation 
We can represent a set of n processes as a multi-set. To do this we list, in any 
order, each different state together with the number of times it occurs. Following 
on from the previous example, the four processes, three in w 1 , and one in j 1 , 
together with a coordinator can be represented as follows. 
1w 1 3, i': 
l}j{W:3i:1} 
We call this representation scheme MULTI. The size of a MULTI configuration 
is the number of participants represented in the participant multi-set. In the 
example above therefore the size is 4. 
It is useful to be able to map between CON and MULTI representations. To do 
this we define a function f CON -+ MULTI and a relation G C MULTI x CON. 
To simplify their definition we first define auxiliary functions a and a' that map 
an n length vectors of states to a multi set of states as follows. 
	
a((si , . . . , s,) 	= {s : ci I si occurs ci times in (s i ,. . . , s,)} 
s)) = {s : 	occurs c times in (st',... 
We now define function f and its inverse relation G using a and a'. 
f(.,t) 4i 
GI f-i 
We use the symbol . to denote the state of a group of n processes using one 
of the representations (either a vector or a multi-set), t denotes the state of the 
coordinator and 5 the coordinator's view, again using one of our representations. 
Although the notation is a little heavyweight the transformations are really very 
simple. Consider the examples below. 
(w', 'W i , 'wi, j1), 1(w,w,i,i)  E G({vr 1 3, P: 11, j{w:2i:2}) 
I ((ji, %V 1 , 	 i'), j(W,i,1,w)) = {w' : 2, j : 2}, j{w:2,i:2} 
Again not all possible combinations of multi-sets constitute valid MULTI repre-
sentations. We say a MULTI representation . is valid if there exists a valid CON 
representation ' such that ' e G(). Again we restrict our attention to MULTI 
representations that are valid from this point on. 
Later when we come to show how to model check properties of protocols 
we will be particularly interested in classes of statements where the truth or 
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falsity is preserved by these transformations. These will form atomic sentences 
in the temporal logics we use to express properties. For example the property 
"all participants are in state w 1 " is preserved by our function f and relation 
G whereas the statement p4 is in state i1 " is not preserved because the MULTI 
representation does not retain which participant processes are in which states. We 
will show that there is a simulation relationship between the MULTI and CON. 
We now address an important question, when can a protocol rule be applied 
to a MULTI representation and what effect does it have on that representation? 
A rule can be applied to a MULTI representation if there exists a corresponding 
CON representation where the same rule can be applied. Suppose a participant 
process, p, in state si moves to state s then in our multi-set representation we 
decrease the counter associated with si and increase the counter 3 associated with 
s. In our example if the participant process in state j  moves to w 1 during rule 
PVY we have the following transition in a MULTI representation. 
{ v' : 3, 1': 
i}j{W:3i:1} '.!I1 {.i : 4}j{w:3i:1} 
The rules PVN, PC, PA are similar. The rule PUV is applicable to a partic-
ipant process when its view of the coordinator is out of date. The CC rule is 
applicable when the coordinator views all participants in state w so in the MULTI 
representation this means the view consists of the multi-set {w : n}. Similarly, 
the CA rule is applicable if the coordinator views any participant in state a. 
This corresponds to a being in the coordinator's view multi-set with any positive 
count. CUV is applicable when the the coordinator's view multi-set is out of 
date, i.e. the count of participants viewed to be in a state x e {a, w} is less than 
the count of processes in that state'. This is exemplified below. 
{ w' : 3, i': 
1 }j{W:2,I:2} 	{...i : 3, i': 1}j{W:3i:1} 
Fact 1: The sum of the counters in any MULTI configuration is preserved by the 
application of any of the protocol rules. This follows from the observation that 
participants and coordinators are neither created nor destroyed by the rules. 
Proposition 1 If a rule R is applicable to a CON representation 9 1 , t' to reach 
2, t 2 then R is applicable to f(1, t), a MULTI representation, to derive a state 
tV4 and 2,t 2 E G(. 4 , t 4 ). This is depicted below, strictly speaking the arrow 
labeled G should be broken but typographical restrictions prevented this. 
3 1f a counter is decreased to 0 that element is removed. If no element for s exists it is added 
with counter value 1. 





f( 1 ,t') 
R 	 - 
-----p t' 
MULTI 
Proof: First consider the case where a participant process applies R. Let S i be 
the state in the CON representation 9 1 that changes to s after R is applied. Let 
us also assume that the pre-condition of R is determined only by the state 5, this 
is true for rules PVY, PVN, PC and PA. Let 1, m be the number of si and s 
states in . respectively. R is applicable to the MULTI representation f(.i, t1) by 
definition. Furthermore, after application 1 is decreased by one and m is increased 
by one so 2, t 2 E G(94, t 4 ) as required. 
If PUV is applicable to some pi in state si within . it will also be applicable 
to f(i, t 1 ) by definition. Clearly after the application 92, t 2 E G(. 4 , t) as 
required. 
If CC is applicable then '3 = (w, . . . , w) and after CC is applied t2 = c and 
so CC will also be applicable to f(i, t) by definition. The multi-set viewb 3  will 
be {w : n}. After the application t4 = c assuring 92, t 2 e G( 4 , t 4 ) as required. 2 	9 4 
If CA is applicable then 0 will contain some a and so CA will be applicable 
to f(, tr) because the multi-set view will contain some a. After the application 
t4 = a as required. 
Finally if CUV is applicable then some Pi  exists with value x e {c, a} in 
. such that the coordinator's view of Pi  in i is not x. By definition CUV is 
applicable to f(i, t1). The count of processes in the coordinator's view that are 
in state x will be less than the number of processes in state x in s3. Therefore after 
the applicationwill have the required property that 
R1 	R2 	R_j 
Corollary 1 If in CON C1 —p C2 —*... —* C —f ... then in MULTI 
	
C2 	 it 
Cl —3 C2 	C 
I 	 t 
f G 	 G 
- 	 I 
R1 	R2 	 i 	R 
f(C 1 ) —* C2, 	
Rn_ C —* 
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such that Ci E G(C) for 2 < i < n. 
U 
Proposition 2 If a rule R is applicable to a MULTI representation .i,  t to reach 
92 , t 2 then R is applicable to all CON representations in G(. 1 , t 1 ). Moreover for 
any s4 , t that results from the application of R f(, t) = s2 , t 2 . This is 











Proof: Again consider the case where a participant process applies R. Let si be 
the state in the MULTI representation 9 1 that changes to s after R is applied. 
Let us also assume that the pre-condition of R is determined only by the state 
s, this is true for rules PVY, PVN, PC and PA. Clearly some process is in 
state s i in all possible 53 so R is applicable as it only depends on the state S i . 
Furthermore, after R is applied to 53, t resulting in .94, t, one less process will 
be in si and one more in s therefore 2,  t2 = f(., 
t14 ) as required. 
If PUV is applicable to some process in state s i within . it will also be 
applicable to all 53, t because applicability depends only on the state s2 which 
will be present in . and the state of the coordinator c3 which is preserved by G. 
Clearly after application 2, t2 = f(., t 4 ) as required. 
If CC is applicable then i5 i 	{w : n} and and after the application of CC 
= c and so CC will be applicable to all 53, t 3 because the resulting view vectors 
for the coordinator, v 3 will be (w,.. . , w). After the application t4 = c assuring 
s2, = f(i, t 4 ) as required. 
If CA is applicable then 3i  will contain some a and so CA will be applicable 
to all 53, t because v 3 will contain a. After the application t 4 = a assuring 
2, 2 = f(i, t 4 ) as required. 
Finally if CUV is applicable then some participant exists with state x e {c, a} 
in .i  with count m and in the coordinator's view 01 the count of participants in 
state x is less than m. This means for all e G(§,, t") a processes in 
state x will be in §3  and the coordinator's view of that process in 33 will be i 
therefore CUV will be applicable resulting in a 04 with the required property 
that = f(. 4 ,t 4 ). 
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R1 ,-, R2 	R_ 	, 
Corollary 2 If in MULTI C 	C -+... then in CON for all 









Ri / —C 2 
)r 2 < Z'< fl 
R2 	R _1 c R -+ C', -+ 
I 
R2 	Ri fIF R -> ... -+ L -+ 
Corollary 1 and 2 are useful as they allow us to infer properties of executions in 
the CON representation by showing that they hold or fail for executions using the 
MULTI representation. Informally, if a property fails for an execution using the 
MULTI representation then by corollary 1 the same execution exists in CON, and 
so that property must also fail in CON. Similarly, if a property holds in MULTI 
no execution in CON provides a counter example because by corollary 2 the same 
counter example would then also exist in the MULTI representation. Of course in 
order for this technique to work we must restrict our atomic sentences to those 
preserved by f and G. A formal proof of this argument is given in theorem 3. 
5.4 Expressing Properties of Protocols 
In the previous sections we have shown how to generate a labelled transition sys-
tems from a views model. We can generate transition systems using various levels 
of abstraction and have proved simulation relationships between the different ab-
stractions, for a particular model 2PC. In this section we show how to verify or 
refute temporal properties of protocols by model checking the resulting transition 
systems. For example, suppose we want to show that a commit protocol has the 
desirable property of atomicity. That is, in any execution, if one participant de-
cides commit (abort) no other participant may decide abort (commit). To show 
this we need to verify that in no execution (traversal of the transition system from 
the initial state) can we reach a state where one participant is in a while another 
is in c. Our views based model has the advantage that we can make "knowledge 
statements". For example we can express that if the coordinator believes (has a 
view) that all participants have voted yes then the decision will be to commit. 
More generally, for any property 4D we say 
C = 
M. 
if property 	holds of a configuration C. Since temporal logic expresses the 
capability of actions over time, we are able to determine properties of protocol 
executions by determining if a temporal property holds of the initial configuration 
Co . For example, in order to express that a commit protocol never aborts we 
express that Co  has the property that in no reachable configurations from Co can 
we reach a state where a process aborts. 
The temporal logic we use to express properties is a subset and slight variant 
of computation tree temporal logic, CTL due to Clarke, Emerson and Sistla [16]. 
We call this subset CTL. In the following let R ranges over rules. 
In this and the next section we define CTL relative to some arbitrary config-
uration scheme C and set of paths, over these configurations, P. The set of paths 
R1 	R2 	R3 	 B.2 	B.3 
P is suffix closed, that is if Co -+ C1 -+ C2 —*e P then C1 -~ C —*e P. 
Later we will "plug in" our configurations schemes CON and MULTI and the paths 
generated from the protocol rules, to show how to apply CTL to prove proper-
ties of our protocol. For now though the discussion of CTL is independent of a 
particular configuration scheme. 
A property in our logic can be expressed as follows. 
tt I X 1 -' 	 I 
A( 1 U 2 ) I  E(1U2) 
The definition of satisfaction between a configuration Co and a formula pro-
ceeds by induction on the formula. 
Co  1= tt 
co = X if X holds of Co with respect to some valuation function 
C0 = -' if C0 &cT 
if C0 = 	and Co =W 
Co 	[R+ ] if VC1 , co C1 , C1 	CD 
Co = A( 	U W) if for all runs Co ---* C 	--* 
there is i > 0 with C = 'I' and 
for all j:0j <i, C3 	=1 
C0 =E(U) if 
R2 R1 
	C, -!% ... forsomerunCo —* 
there is i > 0 with Ci = 'I' and 
for all j:Oj <i, C3 =cI 
We let if abbreviate -itt, (RI abbreviate -i[R]-' and V IJ abbreviate 
-i(-i A -ui),  and so the derived clauses for these abbreviations are 
C0 ff 
C0  1= (R) 	if Co - C1 , C1 = 
C0 =vW if C0 =orCo =P 
MM 
A useful formula is -E(tt U W) this expresses the property that in all runs 'I' 
fails at all points. We can derive a definition for this formula as follows. 
Co = -iE(tt U 'I') if for all runs t ,- —f - 1% 
for all i> 0, C = 
Strong liveness properties are expressed using A( ,1 U ii').  The formula A(tt U 'I') 
means in all paths eventually T. In CTL we often write this as AF(T). 
Strong safety properties are expressed using -'E((D U 'J!). For example if we 
were using the paths generated by our 2PC protocol and X was the sentence "A 
participant is in c and another is in a", then the formula -iE(ttUX), which is 
often abbreviated as -EF(X), expresses the inability in any execution to reach 
a state where X holds i.e. atomicity is ensured. 
The more expressive logic CTL includes an explicit next operator LJ. This 
expresses that 40 will be true in all next states. More formally it is defined as 
follows. 
Co EJ if VR, VC 1 , CO -- C1 C1 
We do not wish to include this operator in our logic because it introduces a form 
of counting. A possible further abstraction of MULTI removes counters from the 
configurations. So as to future proof our logic and safe gaurd its applicability we 
use a logic that does not allow counting properties to be expressed. 
5.5 Games-Based Model Checking 
The "property checking game" G(C, '1), when C is a system configuration and 'J 
is a formula, is played by two players, players R (the refuter) and V (the verifier). 
Player R attempts to show that C fails to have the property whereas player V 
wishes to establish that the property holds of C. 
A play of the game G(CO3 (D o ) is a finite or infinite length sequence of the form 
where each formula 	is a subformula5 of o,  and each C2 is a configuration. 
If part of a play is (CO3  o). . . (C3 , ) then the next move and which player 
makes it depends on the main connective of the formula . We write Cj if 
R, 3C, C3 —* C. All the possibilities are presented below. 
• if (Dj = W 1 A XP2  then player R chooses one of the conjuncts T i , i e 11, 2}: 
the state C 1 is C3 and 	is T i . 
5 A formula is the composition of subformulas using connectives. For example, 4 and W are 
subformulas of the formula A W. 
• if (Di = (Ti V 4J) then player V chooses one of the disjuncts T i , i E 11, 21: 
the state C3+1 is C3 and 1j+1  is Ti. 
• if 	= [R+]I1 then player R chooses any non-zero number of R transitions 
C3 -~ C31 and +i is T. 
• if = (R+)P then player V chooses any non-zero number of R transitions 
C3 -+ C31 and +i is T. 
• if T = -, --iW then C31 is C3 and 	is 'I'. 
• if I = A('I' 1 UW2 ) and not (C3  -4) then 1j+i = I2 and C3+1 = C3 . 
• if 	= A(W 1 UW 2 ) and C3 --3 then player V chooses; 
+i = IJ2 and C31 = C3 or 
allows player R to choose 
'j+1 = Ti and C +i = C3 or 
any rule R and a transition such that C3 -- C3+i and +i = 
• if 	= -A(W 1 U1h2 ) and not(C3 --*) then 	= 'W2 and C31 = C3 . 
• if Dj = -iA("P 1 UW 2 ) and C3 -- then player R chooses; 
j+1 = "41 2 and C3+1 = C3 or 
allows player V to choose 
j+i = I'i and C31 = C3 or 
any rule R and a transition such that C3 -- C31 and j+i 
• if (Dj = E(4' 1 UW 2 ) and not (C3 -0 then ji = 'P2 and C +i = C3 . 
• if 	= E(W 1 U'h' 2 ) and C3 -- then player V chooses; 
 
allows player R to choose 
.,+i = Tiand C31 = C, or 
force player V to choose a transition such that C3 --* C, 1 and 
j+ 1 = :hj. 
• if (Dj = -iE('P 1 UW 2 ) and not(C3 --*) then 	= 'W2 and C, 1 = C3 . 
R • if Dj = -'E('h' 1 UW2 ) and C3 -~ then player R chooses; 
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Player R wins 
The play is (CO , (D) ... (Cs , I) and 
. 	= f  or 
• = (R)'IJ and not SC', C - 	C' or 
• 	= X and X is not true at configuration C. 
The play (CO , 1 o) . . . (Ca , I)... has infinite length and there is an until 
formula A('I 1 UW2 ) or E( 1 UW2 ) which occurs infinitely often. 
Player V wins 
The play is (CO , (D) . .. (Ca , I) and 
• 410, = tt or 
• 	= [R]W and not SC', C - C' or 
• 	= X and X is true at configuration C. 
The play (CO, 	. . (Ca , 'I)... has infinite length and there is a negated 
until formula -A('I' 1 UW 2 ) or -E(W 1 U'IJ2 ) which occurs infinitely often. 
Figure 5.2: Winning conditions 
±i = -iW2 and C31 = C3 or 
allows player V to choose 
+i = -'W 1 and C3i = C3 or 
force player R to choose a transition such that C3 -- C31 and 
j+1 = 
The rules appear to be complicated because of the presence of negation in the 
logic. The refuter chooses the next position when the formula has the form '11 1 A'I' 2 
or [R]W and the verifier chooses when it has the form (W 1 V W 2 ) or (R)W. In 
the case of A('11 1 U'I'2 ) and E(I' 1 UW2 ) an initial choice is made by player V but 
V may choose to defer this choice to R. Likewise in the cases -A(' 1 U'I'2 ) and 
-E(I' 1 U'I' 2 ) player R has an initial choice but may choose to defer this choice 
to player V. As there are no choices in the remaining rules neither player is 
responsible for them. The first of these reduces a double negation. 
Figure 5.2 captures when a player is said to win a play of a game. Player R 
wins if a blatantly false position is reached and player V wins if a blatantly true 
position is reached. Condition 2 identifies which player wins an infinite length 
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play. For any infinite length play of a CTL game there is only one until formula 
or negation of an until formula which occurs infinitely often. It is this formula 
which decides who wins. If it is an until formula then it is the refuter that wins 
and if it is the negation of an until formula then it is the verifier that wins. To 
detect when a formula and configuration can appear infinitely often we need only 
detect repeats. 
A strategy for a player is a family of rules which tell the player how to move. 
It suffices to consider history-free strategies, whose rules do not depend upon 
previous positions in the play. For player R rules have the following form. 
. At position (C, (D j A (T)2)  choose (C, ) where i E {1, 21. 
At position (C, [R]) choose (C', ) where C 	C. 
• At position (C, -'A(T) j UCT 2 )) or (C, -iE(T) i U1)2)) choose one of the two op-
tions discussed earlier possibly deferring a choice to V. 
The verifier rules have a similar form. 
. At position (C, i  V (T)2)  choose (C, CT) where i E 11, 21. 
• At position (C, (R)CT) choose (C', cT)) where C -* t 
. At position (C, A(T) 1 U(D 2 )) or (C, E(4 1 U1) 2 )) choose one of the two options 
discussed earlier possibly deferring a choice to R. 
A player uses the strategy iv in a play if all her moves in the play obey the 
rules in iv. The strategy iv is winning if the player wins every play in which she 
uses iv. The following result provides an alternative account of the satisfaction 
relation between system configurations and formulas. 
Proposition 3 	1. If CT e CTL then C 1= T) if player V has a history-free 
winning strategy for G(C, T)). 
2. If CT E CTL then C 	cJ if player R has a history-free winning strategy 
for G(C,'T)). 
Proof: Follows from [77]. 
U 
92 
5.6 Applying CTL to CON and MULTI 
In this section we set about model checking CTL properties of the 2PC protocol 
using the different representations CON and MULTI. Recall we defined CTL 
with reference to a set of valid configurations and paths over these configurations. 
When checking properties using the CON representation, the configurations are 
those of CON and the paths are those generated by the application of rules in 
CON. Likewise for MULTI configurations we use the MULTI configuration and 
paths generated by applications of the rules in MULTI. 
At this point we will introduce labelled atomic sentences X, Y,.... We restrict 
these sentences to those preserved by the transformation, G and f that we used 
previously to map between CON and MULTI. More formally X is preserved if for 
any MULTI configuration C1 
C1 X if VC2 e C(C1 ), C2 X 
and for any CON representation C1 
C1 =X if f(C 1 ) = X 
Examples of atomic sentences, X, that are preserved include, "the coordinator is 
in state c" or, "all participants are in state a". 
The next theorem expresses the relationship between model checking using 
our two representations. They allow us to model check properties in the more 
abstract and efficient representation of MULTI and then infer properties in the 
more concrete representation of CON. 
Theorem 3 For any configuration C 
C 	in CON if f (C) =in MULTI 
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of ob and makes use of corollar-
ies 1 and 2. 
Base Cases: If 4D = tt trivially true. If 1 = X then if follows because X is 
preserved by f and C. 
Induction: 
case = -"I'. 
C = -iW if C 	'P therefore by the induction hypothesis if f(C) V= 'I' if 
f(Cfl= lb - 
case = IJ1 A W 2 . 
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C = W 1 A W 2 if C = W and C = I2 therefore by the induction hypothesis 
ifff(C) =W 1 and 1(C) 1= IJ 2 and ifff(C) 
case = [R]W. 
=> Assume C [R]%F in CON but f(C) K [R]q/ in MULTI so f(C) - 
C3 and C3 K W in MULTI. By corollary 2 if f(C) -Z C3 in MULTI then 
C -+ C2 in CON with f(C2) = C3 . Applying the induction hypothesis 
C2 	JJ and so C 	[R]W a contradiction. 
= Assume f(C) = [R]W in MULTI but C V= [R]W in CON so C - C2 
in CON and C2 T. By Corollary 1 f(C) -Z G in MULTI and c2 e 
G(C3 ). Applying the induction hypothesis C3 V= 'I' and so f(C) = [R]W 
a contradiction. 
case = A(W 1 UW2 ) or 1 = E(W 1 UW 2 ). We prove the case for = A(W 1 UW 2 ), 
= E(W 1 UW 2 ) being very similar. 
= Assume C 	A( 1 U 2 ) in CON but f(C) 	A( 1 U 2 ) in MULTI. If 
f 	A( 1 U 2 ) then there exists a path f(C) = Co -* C -- ... '- 
C -* ... such that either 1?i fails before 12  holds or '2  never holds. 
Consider the first case the second being similar. So there exists n > 0 such 
that C 	1i and C 	2 and furthermore for each i < n, C = 4'i and 
C 	'2• For each prefix of the path apply Corollary 2 and so for each 
D E G(f(C)) there is a path in CON D0 -* D -- ... ' 	D -* 
such that f(D) = C2 . Applying induction hypothesis D 'T'i and 
D 	and furthermore for each i <ri, D2 = i and D2 	2, therefore 
C K A( 1 U 2 ) a contradiction. 
= Assume f(C) = A(W 1 UW2 ) in MULTI but C A( 1 U 2 ) in CON. If 
C 	A( 1 U 2 ) then there exists a path C = Co  2*  C1 --* ... 
C -+ ... in CON such that either T fails before 42  holds or never 
holds. For each prefix of the path apply corollary 2 and so there exists a path 
f(C) = D0 -* D -+ . .. '- D -* . . . in MULTI such that C2 e G(D2 ). 
Applying induction hypothesis at each point in the MULTI path we have 'LIi 
fails before 2  holds or '12 never holds, therefore f(C) A(4 1 UI2). The 
cases for 1 = E( 1 UcI 2 ) is very similar. 
. 
Theorem 3 allows us to model check properties in the more compact MULTI 
representation and then infer properties in concrete representations. If for exam-
ple a property holds in MULTI we know that property holds in CON. 
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5.7 Checking CTL Properties of Two Phase Com-
mit 
As a simple example let ONE(x) be the set of atomic sentences "there exists a 
participant p with P.S = x", p.s = x means that the participant is in state x 
with any view of the coordinator, and let ALL(x) be the set of atomic formaulas 
"for all participants p, p.s = x, where x E {a, c, w, i}. We can see that both 
ONE(x) and ALL(x) are preserved by the abstraction translations, f and G. 
The safety property -'EF(ONE(c) A ONE(a)) expresses the property that 
in any protocol execution a state is never reached where one participant has 
committed and another has aborted. 
We model checked this property, using an implementation of the games based 
algorithm above, against our simple two-phase commit protocol. As expected the 
verifier V produced a history free winning strategy. If we add the following rule 
to our system 	
PVY(p) ::= 
and check the same property we find that the refuter has a winning strategy. This 
is to be expected because participants are now able to unilaterally commit as well 
as abort. 
A more complicated property makes use of views. Suppose we wish to verify 
that in any run if the coordinator has a view that all participants have voted 
yes then eventually all participants will commit. Let Z be the property that the 
coordinator's view is that all participants are have voted yes. Z is preserved, 
because f and C maintain the validity of the coordinators view of participant's 
state. We are are then required to model check the following formula. 
-EF(Z A -iAF(ALL(c))) 
Since this is an example of aliveness property we can see by figure 5.2 that if a 
negated until formula is repeated then the verifier has a winning strategy. 
In chapter 2 we saw an axiomatic specification for the correctness of a commit 
protocol due to Berstein et al. [9]. We can use our model checker to verify these 
axioms. We have already verified AM which is atomicity. AC2 is implicit in our 
model since a participant can only vote once. AC3 states that "if any participant 
decides c then all participants voted yes". This follows from the property that in 
no run can any participant vote no and then from that point some site eventually 
commit which we express as follows. 
-'EF(ONE(a) A EF(ONE(c))) 
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Since we do not model failure we can interpret AC4 as the statement "If all 
participants vote yes, then the decision will be commit" which we can express as 
follows. 
-'EF(ALL(w) A -'AF(ALL(c))) 
AC5 deals with failure which is not modelled in our simple 2PC but its analogy 
might be that eventually a decision is reached by all participants which we can 
express as follows. 
AF(ALL(c) V ALL(a)) 
Games-based model checking has the advantage of producing a strategy that 
proves or refutes the property being checked. This provides a protocol designer 
with a design cycle. For example, if a safety property were to fail a designer 
can "play" the game and see exactly why the property fails. This then leads to 
modifications of the original protocol and re-verification. Another useful property 
of the games-based approach is that, because the game is played only until a 
winning strategy is found, in many cases the entire transition system need not be 
generated ie. the transition system can be generated on demand. 
5.8 Conclusions 
We have shown how a simple views based model can be used to construct a 
labelled transition system using different abstraction techniques. The most con-
crete approach led to large state spaces. A slightly less concrete approach reduced 
the state space. Using a simulation argument we show that for many properties 
model checking in the abstract system is equivalent to model checking in the 
concrete system. We defined a sub-logic CTL that captured these properties 
and also developed algorithms to automatically generate transition systems from 
views based models, so that our models could support automatic model checking 
of these properties. 
Because our views based model captures a processes belief of another processes 
state explicitly within its own state, we are able to express belief type properties 
within CTL. For example, we can express properties like "If the coordinator 
believes that all participants have voted yes then it will eventually enter its c 
state." 
We will see in following chapters that our technique could be used for more 
complex protocols. Another avenue to explore is to introduce failure for example 
the partitioning network model of the previous chapter, into our models. If we 




We have seen the role a commit protocol plays in guaranteeing the atomicity of 
a set of actions in a transaction. Equally important is the role it plays when 
interacting with concurrency control mechanisms to guarantee a particular level 
of transaction isolation, i.e. the 'I' in the ACID properties of transactions. 
So far, we have only looked at transactions from a single transaction point-
of-view. If only one transaction happens at a time, then each transaction occurs 
serially and does not have to contend with interference from other transactions. 
However, with many transaction execute at the same time, transactions can occur 
simultaneously and each transaction has the potential to interfere with another 
one. Transactions that have the potential of interfering with one another are said 
to be interleaved or parallel transactions. When transactions are interleaved, 
mechanisms often exist to protect them interfering with one another. The level 
to which they are allowed to interfere is the level of transaction isolation that they 
attain. Informally, transactions that run totally isolated from each other are said 
to be serializable, which means that the results of running them simultaneously 
will be the same as the results of running them one right after another (serially). 
In this chapter we will provide a formal definition of some different types of 
transaction isolation. 
The life-cycle of a distributed transaction can be thought of as an operational 
phase, where transactions perform read and write accesses to data objects followed 
by' the invocation of a commit protocol. Up until this point our models focused 
on the commit phase of a single transaction while ignoring the operational phase. 
In order to study the role of commit protocols in transaction isolation we must 
enrich our models in two ways. Firstly, we must include read and write accesses 
'We will see in the next chapter than sometimes these phases can be overlapped. 
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to simple data objects prior to the invocation of a commit protocol, and secondly, 
we must also model the concurrent interaction of many transactions rather than 
just considering the case of a single transaction. 
Before we introduce a views based model of a very simple distributed trans-
action processing environment, that includes these features, we must first define 
what we mean by transaction isolation. Unfortunately, the current literature is 
inconsistent on the subject. Most definitions appeal to specific concurrency con-
trol techniques, in particular lock management schemes such as strict two phase 
locking (S2PL). In response to this, different levels of isolation were defined in 
part of the ANSI SQL 92 standard [3] and many database and transaction pro-
cessing vendors have implemented this facility, or something similar. In order 
to remain neutral to particular concurrency control implementations the ANSI 
community constructed a definition based on "phenomena". In their definition, 
a level of isolation is achieved when a set of phenomena, is prevented from occur-
ring. For example, a basic phenomenon is that one transaction cannot write to 
the same data object as another, until the first transaction has terminated, that 
is committed or aborted. 
In order to simplify our account of transaction isolation we first consider the 
case when our transactions are not distributed. For this centralised case transac-
tions do not require a commit protocol. Although it may seem we have departed 
from the analysis of the behaviour of commit protocols, we will see that the frame-
work we construct in this chapter for centralised transactions can be generalised 
to the distributed case. In the next chapter we will re-introduce commit proto-
cols and study the role they play in providing levels of transaction isolation using 
our views based modelling techniques combined with games-based model check-
ing. Another motivating factor for this aside comes from the realisation that the 
current literature on transaction isolation is rather unclear. To analyse the role 
of commit protocols in transaction isolation we must have a clear idea of what 
attaining a particular isolation level actually means. 
A classical theory of serializability (the highest level of transaction isolation 2), 
and the related theory of recoverability has been in existence for quite some time. 
In the next section 6.2 we will we will briefly survey some relevant literature 
in the field. We base our discussion on the seminal work found in [9] and [34]. 
In section 6.3 we introduce some notation for reasoning about the order of a 
transaction's actions. In section 6.4 we extend the classical theory of conflict seri- 
2 Unfortunately, the ANSI community muddied the waters by calling this level of isolation 
REPEATABLE READ and using the term SERIALIZABLE when predicates (discussed later) 
are included. 
alizability to include the commit or abort outcome of a transaction. Berenson et 
at. [6] criticise the ANSI standard and give a more precise phenomena based def-
inition that corrects some of the deficiencies they discovered. In section 6.5 we 
describe their work and in turn criticise their phenomenon based definitions of 
isolation and construct our own definition that we claim better captures isolation 
levels. In section 6.6 we prove that our new definition coincides with the extended 
definition of conflict serializability we gave in section 6.4. For completeness we 
enrich our model with predicate read and write accesses allowing us to complete 
our discussion by defining the four levels of transaction isolation (see table 6.1), 
discussed in the ANSI standard, using the theory we develop. 
6.2 Classical Recoverability and Serializability 
Theory 
Concurrency control is the activity of coordinating the actions of transactions 
that access shared data objects, and therefore potentially interfere with one an-
other. Recovery is the activity of ensuring that system failures do not corrupt 
data. Concurrency control and recovery problems arise in the design of hardware, 
operating systems, realtime systems, middleware systems, and database systems 
among others. In order to hide many of the details of the particular system we 
are interested in, a transaction is modelled as sequence of four different types of 
actions, sometimes called a schedule'. We write read t (x) to denote a transac-
tion t, reading a data object x and write t (x,v) 4 to denote a write of value v 
to x. Once t has completed all of its read and write accesses it terminates by 
either committing the transaction by performing a commit action, or aborting the 
transaction by performing an abort action. 
6.2.1 Recoverability 
Recoverability guarantees that data objects contain all the effects of committed 
transactions and none of the effects of uncommitted  ones. If transactions never 
abort, recoverability is rather simple to ensure because all transaction eventually 
commit, the access of each transaction can just be carried out as they arrive. To 
understand recovery therefore we must look at the processing of aborts. When 
a transaction aborts all the effects of the transaction must be wiped out. The 
'Strictly speaking a schedule is really a partial order. 
'The actual values read or written are not always important to our discussion of concurrency 
control and recoverability and so they are sometimes omitted. 
'An uncommitted transaction is either aborted or not yet terminated. 
effects of a transaction t are twofold: effects on data objects due to write accesses 
carried out by t; and effects on other transactions, namely, transactions that read 
values written by t. For example, suppose the initial values of data objects x and 
y are' 2, and suppose transactions t 1 and t2 issue accesses that are executed in 
the following order. 
write i (x,3) read2 (x) write 2 (y,3) 
Now suppose t 1  aborts. This means that the write 1 (x, 3) must be undone, restor-
ing x to its initial value 2 and because t 2 read the value of x written by ti it 
must also be aborted. This is sometimes referred to as a cascading abort because 
write 2 (y, 3) must also be undone due to t 1 's abort. 
Because a committed transaction cannot be subsequently aborted it is impor-
tant, given the possibility of cascading aborts, that a transaction is not committed 
when there is a chance it may later be required to be aborted. Therefore, a trans-
action, t, cannot commit until all the transactions that wrote values read by t 
are guaranteed not to abort, that is, are themselves committed. Executions that 
satisfy this condition are called recoverable. More formally we say a transaction 
t3 reads x from transaction t i in an execution, if 
t3 reads x after t 2 has written to it and; 
t, does not abort before t 3 reads x and; 
every transaction (if any) that writes to x between the time t i writes it and 
t3 reads it, aborts before t 3 reads it. 
A transaction t 3 reads from ti if t3 reads any data object from t. An execution 
is recoverable if, for every transaction t that commits, t's commit follows the 
commit of every transaction from which t read. Consider the following example. 
write i (x,2) read2 (x) write 2 (y,3) coimnit 2 
This is not recoverable, because t 2 read x from t 1 and yet the commit of t 2 does 
not follow the commit of t 1 . A problem would arise if t 1 were now to abort. 
Enforcing recoverability does not remove the possibility of cascading aborts. 
Consider the example below. 
write i (x,2) read2 (x) write i (y,3) abort 1 
6 1n all our examples the data objects we consider will be simple integer values but the results 
we derive are valid for any data types. 
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Although this execution is recoverable it requires cascading aborts because t 1 
aborted and so to remain recoverable t 2 must now abort. To ensure that cas-
cading aborts are avoided we must place the following further restriction on the 
order of actions. Every transaction must read only those values that were written 
by committed transactions. Thus, only committed transactions can affect other 
transactions. This means that each read(x) must be delayed until all transac-
tions that have previously issued a write(x, v) have terminated. In so doing 
recoverability is also achieved. From a practical viewpoint, a further restriction 
is required. Consider the following execution sequence, assuming the value of x 
before the execution is 0. 
write i (x, 1) write 2 (x,3) abort 2 abort 1 
Aborting t 2 then t 1  should remove all the effects of both ti and t 2 and thus should 
restore the value of x to be 0. A very natural implementation is to undo a write 
by restoring its previous value. In this case when t 2 aborts it will be restored to 
1 and then when t 1  aborts it will be restored to 0 as required. Consider the case 
where the abort actions are transposed as follows. 
write i (x, 1) write 2 (x,3) abort 1 abort 2 
We see now that simply restoring previous values fails. In order to prevent this 
from happening and ensuring that writes can be undone by restoring previous 
values we must place a further restriction on the order of actions. We must delay 
a write access on x until all transaction that have previously written x are either 
committed or aborted. This is similar to the requirement for avoiding cascading 
aborts. Executions that satisfy both these conditions are called strict [9]. 
From this short discussion we see that in order to implement the semantics of 
commit and abort, executions sequences must be recoverable. Due to practical 
considerations it is often preferable that they are also cascadeless. If in addition 
to this the undo of writes is to be implemented by replacing the value before the 
write took place then executions should also be strict. 
6.2.2 Serializability 
When the accesses of two or more transactions execute concurrently causing their 
actions to be interleaved, the interleaving can cause incorrect behaviour. To 
understand this consider the simple transaction that deposits a sum of money in 
a bank account with balance b in figure 6.1. 
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deposit (amount){ 
t := read(b); 




Figure 6.1: A simple deposit transaction. 
Suppose the account has a balance of £1000 and customer 1 (transaction t 1 ) 
deposits £100 into this account, at the same time that customer 2 (transaction t 2 ) 
deposits £100, 000 into the same account. A possible execution sequence might 
be as follows. 
read i (b) read2 (b) write 2 (b, £101,000) commit 2 write i ( b, £1100) commit 1 
The result is that the balance b contains £1100, although t 2 executed successfully 
its deposit of £100, 000 was lost. Clearly this is incorrect. 
To avoid this and similar behaviour, the kinds of interleaving between transac-
tion accesses must be controlled. One possible way to accomplish this is to insist 
that the actions of transactions are not interleaved. This leads to serial execu-
tions, i.e. all actions of a transaction t j are either strictly before or after those of 
another transaction t2 . Unfortunately, this leads to very poor performance since 
the level of concurrency is severely restricted. A better approach is to only allow 
executions that have the same effect as a serial execution. Such an execution is 
called serializable. There are several different definitions of serializable [9, 10] but 
the most widely accepted is that of conflict serializability. 
Two accesses, from different transaction tj and t, are said to conflict if 
they both operate on the same data item and at least one of them is a write. 
Thus read(x) conflicts with write(x,v), while write(x,v) conflicts with both 
read3 (x) and write 3 (x, v). Using this definition of conflicting accesses execution 
sequences, cr1 and 02 are defined to be equivalent when 
they inlcude the same actions; and 
they order conflicting accesses of non-aborted transactions in the same way; 
that is, for any conflicting access oi and 03 belonging to t j and t3 (respec-
tively) where neither t 2 nor t3 abort, if oi is before 03 in or, then oi is before 
oj in a2 . 
A conflict serializable history is now defined as one which is equivalent to a 
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serial history. In the following example the execution 
read 1 (x) write 2 (x,3) read 1 (y)write2(y,4) commit 2  Commit  
is conflict equivalent to the serial execution 
readi (x) read i (y) commit 1 write 2 (x,3) write 2 (y,4) commit 2 
and is thus serializable whereas 
write2 (x,3) read i (x) read l (y)write2(y,4) commit 2 commit 1 
is not conflict equivalent to any serial schedule and so is not conflict serializable. 
In much of the literature on the classical theory of serializability [9, 34] there 
is an assumption that a mechanism exists to ensure schedules are recoverable, and 
often that they avoid the possibility of cascading aborts'. Under this assumption 
the classical theory need not distinguish between two schedules, say o 1 and 0 ­2 , 
where the only difference is that, in a 1 a transaction, t2 , reads a value for a data 
object that was written by another transaction, t 1 , before t 1 aborted because such 
schedules are disallowed by recoverability constraints. 
a1 : write l (x,3)read2 (x)comrnit2abortl a2 : write i (x,2)abort l read2 (x)commit2 
In the above example a 1  is disallowed by recoverability constraints because t2 
reads x from t 1 before t 1 terminates. 
In the extensions to the classical theory we make in section 6.4 we do not pre-
suppose a technique exists to ensure recoverability and so our account of isolation 
is independent of recoverability assumptions. In order to do this we include in 
the theory of conflicting actions the context of the outcome (i.e. either commit 
or abort) of the transactions in which these actions appear. 
6.3 Modelling simple schedules 
Let t, t3 denote transactions and d, d' denote data objects. It is assumed that 
ti =A t3 , unless otherwise stated, but we do not assume d $ d'. A transaction, t, 
consists of actions. These actions are divided into four categories. The first two 
categories are read and write actions, which we call accesses, and which we denote 
r, w, respectively, or oi to denote either a ri or w. The second category are 
7 1f cascading aborts are required by the concurrency control mechanism in place to ensure 
recoverability a mechanism is assumed to exist to detect when they are required and perform 
the necessary transaction aborts. 
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commit and abort actions which we call terminals and denote c, a1 respectively or 
e2 to denote either c1  or a. When a transaction commits, the changes it has made 
to the data objects are made durable, and the values it has read are returned to 
the user. If a transaction aborts, all write actions are undone leaving any data 
objects with the value that they would have had if the transaction had never 
executed, furthermore no read values are returned. 
Accesses 	11 Terminals 
w[d] I t1 writes d 11 c1  I t2 commits 
I[d] I t2 reads d 11 a1 I t1 aborts 
We assume each type of access within a transaction is to a unique data object 8 
and also that exactly one terminal for each transaction occurs exactly once'. A 
schedule, s, is the sequence' °  of actions generated by transactions as they execute 
concurrently. We say o[d] -< o[d] if an action o2 [d] is earlier than an action o[d] 
in s. In any schedule no terminal of a transaction precedes an action of that 
transaction. An example of a schedule is w i [d] r2 [d] wi [d'] c1 c2 . A serial schedule 
is one in which all actions of one transaction are completed before any action of 
another transaction is started, for instance w i [d] wi [d'] c1 r2  [d] c2 . 
By slightly abusing notation we write c1 (a1 ) is true over a schedule if action 
c1 (a1 ) happens at some point. We use w[d] -•< c, to denote that t3 commits and 
does so after a write action of t 1 on data object d. We write w 1 [d] -< e, to mean 
that either t 3  aborts or commits but does so after a write action by t, on data 
object d. Similarly, we write r[d] -< (ai A c3 ), to say t1 aborts after a read of d by 
t3 and also t3 commits, note there is no assumed order between a1 and c3 in this 
case. Finally, we write r[d] -< w[d] A (ai A c,), to say t1 aborts and t3 commits 
and that r1 [d] is before wi[d].  It should be noted this allows a1 before or after 
w3 [d]. 
6.4 Extended Conflict Serializability 
To define serializability we must first define an equivalence over schedules. The 
most common and useful definition is that of conflict equivalence [9], which we 
discussed earlier in section 6.2. Unfortunately, this definition fails to capture the 
inequivalence of schedules containing aborting transactions. For example, in this 
8 The results in this chapter do not depend on this but it is a useful notational convenience. 
9 Schedules with this property are often called complete schedules. 
10 A schedule is also sometimes defined as a poset of actions, and sometimes called a history. 
We choose to define it as a sequence in order to keep it consistent with [6]. 
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definition the following two schedules are defined to be equivalent. 
wi [x]r2 [x]ai c2 	wl[xJalr2[x]c2 
The classical definition of conflict equivalence requires the ordering of conflict-
ing accesses from committing transactions to be maintained, but says nothing 
about the ordering of actions of aborting transactions. To capture this behaviour 
we extend the classical definition of conflict equivalence by first extending the 
definition of a conflict. 
Two transactions t i and t3 are said to conflict on a data object, d, if both 
access d and transposing the order of these accesses on d might result in either a 
different value being read by one of the transactions, or a different value resulting 
at d after the transactions terminate. We enumerate all the possible types of 
conflict that can occur in a schedule below. 
I r4d] -< w[d] A (ci A c) 
II w 2 [d] -< r[d] A (ci A c) 
III w4d] -< w[d] A (ci A c) 
IV r[d] -< w[d] A (ci A a) 
V w[d] -< r3 [d] -< (ai A c) 
We can see that we have extended the classical notion of a conflict to in-
clude the context of the outcome of the transactions. If we remove this context 
the five conflict types collapse into the classical three conflict types: read/write, 
write/write and write/read, that we saw in section 6.2. 
At first sight type IV might not look like a conflict. If we reorder the accesses 
w[d] and r[d] we arrive at either 
w3 [d] -< a3 -< r [d] -< c 
or 
w[d] -< r[d] -.< (ci A a3 ). 
depending on whether or not a i happens before or after a 3 . The first reordering 
does not change the values read or written by the transactions but in the second 
re-ordering it does. If recoverability mechanisms are assumed to be in place the 
second type of schedule could not occur because in the case a3 -< c2 ti 's abort 
action would cascade and cause ti to abort and the case c -< a, t2 cannot be 
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allowed to commit until t3  had terminated. Type IV conflicts are included because 
we seek a definition that does not assume recoverability. 
The schedule 
ri [d] W2  [d]  W2  [d'] ri [d'] c1 a2 
has two conflicts, the first between r1 [d] and w 2 [d], an instance of IV above, 
and the second between w 2 [d'] and ri [d'] which is an instance of V above. The 
extended definition of conflict equivalence naturally follows from the extended 
definitions of conflicts. 
Definition 1 Schedules a and a' are conflict equivalent if 
. or and a' have the same actions and 
• for each conflict of type C E {I,. . . , V} involving actions o, o, e, e, in or 
the same conflict of type C appears in a' involving the same actions o, o, 
e, e3 . 
FEW 
Definition 2 Schedule a is conflict serializable if it is conflict equivalent to some 
serial schedule. 
FE 
Our definition of conflict serializability coincides with classical theory [9], in the 
case when the committed projection" of schedules is considered. However we 
can now judge equality between schedules containing aborting transactions. For 
example, under our new definition 
wi  [XI r2 [x]a j c2 	w 1 [x]a i r2 [XI  c2 
because the write-read conflict (type V) on the left hand side does not exist on 
the right hand side. 
Although conflict serializability has been defined only on complete schedules 
(i.e. those where all transactions in the schedule eventually either abort or com-
mit) we can extend the definition to incomplete schedules. Any incomplete sched-
ule can be extended to a complete schedule by aborting all the transactions with-
out a terminal. We call the resulting schedule the aborting-completion. We now 
"The committed projection of a schedule is obtained by removing any action from the sched-
ule that belongs to a transaction that does not commit in that schedule. 
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define an incomplete schedule as serializable if its aborting-completion is serial-
izable. 
In real systems failures can truncate schedules at any point. In many database 
systems, after failure and upon recovery (in the centralised case) active transac-
tions are aborted. For this reason a useful property of any serializability definition 
over schedules is that if a' is a prefix of a serializable schedule a, then a' is seri-
alizable. 
Proposition 4 Any prefix of a complete conflict serializable schedule is conflict 
serializable. 
Proof Let a denote a complete serializable schedule and User denote a serial 
schedule that is conflict equivalent to a. Let a' denote any prefix of a. We 
will construct a serial schedule aer  from User  that is conflict equivalent to the 
aborting-completion of a', which we denote aom.  This shows that any prefix of 
a complete serializable schedule is serializable. We do this in two steps. 
Si For each a 2 e a om  such that c2 E aser, replace c2 in User  with a 2 to form a". 
S2 If any action appears in a" but not in aom  remove the action from a" to 
form a er . 
We will now show that aer  is a serial schedule that is conflict equivalent to 
a om . Clearly a er  is serial and has the same actions as a om  because of the way it 
was constructed from Us'er'  We must now show that if a conflict of type C appears 
in aom  it also appears in a er . 
If U.0M  has a conflict of type I, II or III, then it will also be in User  because it 
was in a. Steps Si and S2 will not remove this conflict so it will also be present 
in a er . 
Suppose a om  has a conflict of type IV or V, then either it was in a', and by a 
similar argument to the one above will be in a er , or a new conflict will have been 
formed when the abort completion of a' was taken to give atom.  If a new conflict 
was formed of type IV (V) in am  then a conflict of type I (II) must have been CO 
present in s so it will also be present in User  and will be changed to a conflict of 
type IV (V) by step Si when constructing User  as required. 
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6.5 Redefining Phenomena 
As pointed out by Berenson et al. the phenomena based definitions of isolation 
levels proposed in the ANSI standard [3] are ambiguous and incomplete. Berenson 
et al. give more precise definitions in response to these deficiencies. We restate 
these improvements in our notation and extend them a little further. Essentially 
we are looking for sufficient conditions, which are as weak as possible, which 
prevent cycles of conflicts, as defined above, occuring in a schedule. 
Berenson et al. considered two possible interpretations of the ANSI Dirty Read 
phenomenon; a strict (P1 below) and a loose interpretation. They argued that 
the strict interpretation was required to prevent the classical inconsistent analysis 
problem exemplified in the history al below. We use the notation r2 [x = 50] to 
denote the action of t 2  reading data object x as having a value 50. Similarly 
w i [y = 901 denotes t 1 writing a value of 90 to data object y. 
a1 : ri [x = 50]wi [x = 10}r 2 [x = 10]r2 [y = 50]c2ri [y = 50]wi [y = 901c1 
P1 	w[d] -< r[d] -< e 
Clearly, the intention is to disallow the situation where t 3 reads the changes made 
by t i  before they are committed. However, it is not always unsafe to do so. In 
fact, it is only unsafe in the case that t i aborts after t 3 read d and also when t3 
commits. For example, consider the serializable schedule w[d] r3 [d] ci a3 which is 
disallowed by P1. 
We propose that the loose interpretation of the phenomenon, below, more 
accurately captures the idea of a Dirty Read. We rename this NP  for consistency 
but it is identical to the loose interpretation called Al in [6]. 
NP1 : w[d] -< r3 [d] -.< (c3 A a) 
Unfortunately, the loose interpretation still admits schedules with the inconsis-
tent analysis problem exemplified by history o. This problem is better captured 
by the introduction of a new phenomenon we call NP2L (see below). Further-
more, we argue that this phenomenon should be disallowed at the higher ANSI 
REPEATABLE READ isolation level but not at the READ COMMITTED level 
c.f. [6]. The inconsistent analysis problem arises from transaction t 2 reading an 
inconsistent view of the data objects x and y. Item x is read after t 1 has up-
dated it and y is read before t 1 has updated it. The problem therefore is better 
described as a Fuzzy or Non-Repeatable read not as a Dirty Read. From a user's 
perspective the value read by t 2 in a1  is not one that is later aborted as it is in 
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the case of a Dirty Read. Rather the values reflect partial changes made by other 
transactions. It should therefore be admitted at the READ COMMITTED level 
but excluded at the REPEATABLE READ level. Another example of the Fuzzy 
read problem appears in a 2 , a history that is symmetric to cr 1 . 
02 : r 2 [x = 50]r1 [x = 50]wi [x = 10]ri [y = 50]wi [y = 90]ci r2 [y = 901c2 
To prevent this problem Berenson et al. defined phenomena P2 which we state 
below. 
P2: r[d] -< w[d] -< e 
Again the intention is to prevent inconsistent reads of data objects by ensuring 
no other transaction t 2  may change the value of a data object once read by t 
until after t i  has terminated. It is not always unsafe to do this. For example the 
schedule, r[d] w[d] ai c, is serializable but not allowed by P2. 
In our definition we replace P2 with two phenomena NP2R and NP2L to 
capture the two symmetric phenomena that lead to Fuzzy reads of data objects. 
NP2L captures the problems of inconsistent analysis found in 01 (thus allowing 
us to use the loose interpretation NP1 admitting more schedules at the lower 
ANSI READ COMMITTED level) and NP2R captures the Fuzzy read problem 
Of cr2 . 	
NP2R : r[d] -< w[d] -< (ci A c) 
NP2L : w[d] - r[d] -< (c2 A c) 
Although excluding phenomena NP2L, and NP2R from schedules allows more 
serializable schedules than disallowing P2, they still disallow some serializable 
schedules. For example, the schedule r[d] w[d] c2 c3 is serializable but disallowed 
by NP2R. This raises the following question. Can we simply characterise using 
our notation a phenomenon that captures only the schedules that read inconsis-
tent views and no more? The answer to this is no. Such a definition would need 
to include reachability in the associated conflict graph of a schedule, but this type 
of property is not expressible in our notation. 
The ANSI standard did not disallow schedules containing so called "dirty 
writes". This was identified and correctly rectified by the addition of the P0 
Phenomenon in [6]. This phenomenon can also be weakened to NPO (below) if 
we are only interested in isolation properties. In practice its stricter form P0 is 
more useful for recoverability and consistency reasons. 
P0: 	w[d] - w3[d] - e 
NPO: w[d] -< w3 [d] -< (Ci A c3 ) 
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Using these phenomena we provide definitions for the lowest three isolations levels; 
see Table 6.1 towards the end of this chapter. 
6.6 Disallowing Phenomena Provides Conflict Se-
rializability 
We now show that if a schedule exhibits none of the phenomena NPO, NP1, 
NP2L or NP2R then it will be conflict serializable' 2 as defined in definition 2 
of section 6.4. We first prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 6 If a conflict exists between two transactions, t i and t3 (t2 	ti), on 
data object d which we can write generically as 
o2[d] -< o3 [d] A e 2 A e 3 
in a schedule s and phenomena NPO, NP1, NP2L, NP2R do not occur over 
the actions of this conflict then either (e 2 -< o3 [d] and e2 = c) or e3 = a3 . 
Proof By case analysis of the types of conflict. 
I rj [d] -< w[d] A (ci Ac 2 ) but NP2R does not occur so c2 - w[d], as required. 
II w4d] -< r[d] A (ci A c 3 ) but NP2L does not occur so c2 -< r[d], as required. 
III w[d] -< w[d] A (ci A c) but NPO does not occur so c2 -< w[d], as required. 
IV r2 [d] -< wj [d] A (c2 A a3 ) but e3 = a, as required. 
V w[d] -< r[d] -< (a2 A c) but NP1 does not occur which rules out this type 
of conflict completely. 
Lemma 7 If transaction t2 aborts in a schedule, s, that contains no NP1 phe-
nomena then no conflict can exist in s between t 2 and some other transaction, say 
t, that would order the accesses of t 3 after t2 . 
Proof The only possible conflict candidate to order t3 after t 2 is a conflict of type 
V but this conflict is excluded by NP1. 
Theorem 4 All schedules, s, which do not exhibit phenomena NPO, NP1, 
NP2L, and NP2R are conflict serializable. 
12 This is equivalent to the ANSI Isolation level REPEATABLE READ. 
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Proof Suppose s is not conflict serializable. Let C = ( 1/ E) be the directed 
conflict graph constructed from s as follows. The vertices of G are the transactions 
in s and an edge (ti , t3 ) is in E if there is a conflict between ti and t, (ti =A t) and 
the accesses of this conflict are ordered o2 [d] -< o3 [d]. Clearly, s is serializable if 
C is acyclic (a proof of this is a special case of proposition 6 in the next chapter). 
Suppose s is not serializable. Without loss of generality let the smallest cycle 
in the conflict graph G be denoted by 
d1 	d2 	dm 	dm 
t1 	,' t2 ,' ... ,
-i 
 t , t1 
	
By Lemma 7 no conflict ordering t -- ti 	1 < i < m in the cycle exists 
where e+i = a+j (so all conflicting transactions in the cycle commit). 
By Lemma 6in each conflict c i -<oi+i [d] 1< 1 <m and also o-<c : 
i < m because all actions must be before their terminals, thus we can order the 
conflicts in the graph as follows. 
0 1 [di ] -< e1 -< 02 [di ] -< e -< 02 [d2 ] 	e3... -< em < oi[dm] 
This leads to a contradiction since e 1 -< Oi[dm] may not occur in s, so s is 
serializable. 
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6.7 Enriching Schedules with Predicate Accesses 
We now extend our model with some new types of accesses. Given a predicate P 
we add a new action, r[P], to denote a read of the set of data objects that fulfill 
P. For example, P might be "all employees that are male", so that r[P] denotes 
transaction t2  reading all those employees that are male. We also add two types 
of write actions w[insert y in P] and w[delete y in P], these denote actions 
that insert or delete a new data object, y, in a way that could change the values 
returned by a r[P] access". We write Wj[y in P] to denote either an insert or 
• delete access. In our example above Wj[y in P] might be inserting or deleting 
• male employee. In this extended model, a phenomenon known as a phantom 
may occur. We restate an example from [6] that exemplifies this. 
Example 2 Transaction ti performs a <search-condition> to find the list of 
active employees. Then transaction t 3 performs an insert of a new active employee 
and then updates z, the count of employees in the company. Following this t 2 reads 
13 Item y does not have to directly satisfy P for this to be true. 
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the count of employees as a check and finds a discrepancy. The schedule can be 
written as:- 
r[P] w3 [insert d in F] r[z] w[z] c3 r[z] c2 
Berenson et al. provide the following definition of a phantom. 
P3: r[P] .-< w3 [d in P] -.< e 
Strictly speaking this does not completely characterise all phantom phenomena. 
Consider Example 3 below. 
Example 3 Transaction ti deletes an active employee. Transaction t3 then reads 
the count of active employees z, this will include the one previously deleted by t. 
Transaction t3  then reads the set of all active employees, this will not include the 
employee deleted by t, and then commits. Finally ti updates the count of new 
employees and commits. The schedules can be written as follows. 
w[delete y in P] r[z] r3 [P] c3 r[z] w[z] c 
The schedule in example 3 contains a phantom not disallowed by P3 there-
fore strictly speaking the characterisation of phantom phenomena, P3, given by 
Berenson et al. appears to permit some kinds of phantoms. Furthermore, it is 
claimed this phenomena based definition is equivalent the locking based defini-
tion of serializable isolation LOCKING SERIALIZABLE they give [6]. In this 
definition predicate write locks are not released until the transaction commits or 
aborts, which would prevent the problem in Example 3. 
It appears that Berenson et al.'s phenomenon based definition of SERIALIZ-
ABLE isolation admits schedules with phantoms, and that it is not equivalent to 
the locking based definition they provide which does not allow phantoms. 
This discrepancy seems to originate from an assumption that a predicate read 
access r[P] will conflict with any previous writes (be they deletes or inserts) to 
data objects satisfying the predicate. Implementations do exist to detect exactly 
this. In some a flag is set in all index entries when a row is deleted, this flag is 
later garbage collected. Similar implementation details could solve the problem 
exemplified in Example 2. Rather than make reference to implementations it 
seems more sensible to define a complete set of phenomena that capture the 
behaviour of both examples. We therefore define phenomena NP3R, and NP3L 
in an analogous way to NP2R and NP2L as alternatives to P3. We also define a 
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predicate form of the dirty read and dirty write phenomena which we call NP2 
and NP2 1 respectively. 
NP3R: r2 [P] -< w3 [d in P] -< (c2 A c3 ) 
NP3L: w[d in P] -< r3 [P] -< (ci A c3 ) 
NP2: w[d in P] -< r3 [P] -< (c3 A a) 
NP2: w[d in P] -< w3 [d in P] -< (c2 A c3 ) 
We are now in a position to define isolation levels in terms of all our new phe-
nomena see Table 6.1. 
P0 NP1 NP2R NP3R 
Isolation Level NP2 1 NP2L NP3L 
N P 2 
READ UNCOMMITTED - + + + 
READ COMMITTED - - + + 
REPEATABLE READ - - - + 
SERIALIZABLE - - - - 
Table 6.1: Definition of isolation levels. [+] denotes a phenomena that is allowable 
at a particular isolation level whereas [-] denotes that the phenomena is not 
allowed in any schedules achieving this isolation level. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In order to discuss the role of commit protocols in providing different transaction 
isolation levels we need to clarify what we mean by a particular transaction iso-
lation level. In this chapter we provided a definition of conflicting actions that 
includes the commit or abort outcome of the transactions involved in the conflict. 
Under this extended definition we need not make any recoverability assumptions 
about schedules. This leads to a definition of conflict serializability that is in-
dependent of recoverability. This definition of conflict serializability does not 
include the phantom phenomenon because it is defined over schedules that do 
not include reads and writes over predicates. It is therefore equivalent to the 
ANSI definition REPEATABLE READ. 
Secondly, we provided a definition of the lowest three ANSI isolation levels 
based on phenomena. Our phenomena are weaker than those proposed in [6] and 
thus admit more serializable schedules. Furthermore, we argued that the NP2L 
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phenomena should be excluded at the higher REPEATABLE READ level of iso-
lation but not at the READ COMMITTED level thus admitting more schedules 
at the READ COMMITTED level. 
Lastly, we enrich schedules to include read and write actions on predicates. 
Within these enriched schedules we discuss Phantom Phenomena and characterise 
them in a way that is independent of predicate concurrency control mechanisms. 
Excluding these phantom phenomena results in a level of isolation termed SERI-
ALIZABLE by the ANSI community. 
Many textbooks state that isolation and serializability are synonymous [10, 
34]. We argued in this chapter that isolation is really a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for serializability. Indeed, the isolation levels defined in the literature 
exclude many serializable schedules. We are now in a position to generalise the 
theory we developed in this chapter to include distributed transactions and to 
discuss the role of commit protocols in transaction isolation. 
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Chapter 7 
Verifying Isolation Levels in 
Distributed Transactions 
7.1 Introduction 
When transactions perform accesses on data objects that are distributed across 
a set of autonomous sites, we call those transactions distributed. Many mid-
dieware systems now support distributed transactions such as CORBA transac-
tion services [61] or Microsoft's DTC [20], as well as more traditional distributed 
database management systems. Distributed transactions must fulfill the following 
additional requirements over centralised transactions: 
• Distributed transactions must be atomic across sites, that is if t2 commits 
(aborts) at one site it must not abort (commit) at another. This statement 
is of course trivially true in the centralised case. 
• A distributed transaction must have the ability to unilaterally abort at a 
site if, for example, an access at that site caused a deadlock or violated 
an integrity constraint. This means that all the accesses required for a 
transaction at a site must be completed before that site can determine if it 
is willing or prepared to commit. If a site were prepared to commit before 
completing its accesses future accesses may require the transaction to be 
aborted, but the site has already announced its willingness to commit. 
We have seen in previous chapters the role a commit protocol plays in pro-
viding distributed transactions with these additional properties. In this chapter 
we will study its role in providing distributed transactions with a particular level 
of isolation. In the previous chapter we defined isolation levels for centralised 
transactions. In this chapter we will generalise these ideas to distributed transac-
tions. We have shown that the exclusion of NP phenomena from a schedule was 
115 
sufficient to ensure serializability in the centralised case. A distributed schedule 
can be modelled as a vector of local schedules with one entry for each site where 
a data objects reside. In the case of distributed schedules, the exclusion of NP 
phenomena at each local schedule alone is not enough to ensure distributed se-
rializability. Another property is required. We define such a property and call 
it synchpoint prepare. As we have seen, a commit protocol is used to ensure the 
atomicity of distributed transactions. We will see how commit protocols play 
another vital role in providing this synchpoint prepare property, and thus a level 
of transaction isolation. 
In order to increase distributed transaction concurrency in a system, some 
transaction processing systems such as Microsoft's DTC [20] support an opti-
misation whereby read locks are released immediately after the read has been 
performed. Under this scheme the synchpoint prepare property is lost. In this 
chapter we will use our views based modelling technique to show the effect this 
optimisation has on the isolation level attained. 
7.2 Modelling Distributed Schedules 
When transactions are distributed, data objects are distributed across a set of 
sites S. We let SITE(d) denote the unique site to which data object d belongs. 
Read and write accesses as before are denoted r[d], w[d] as in the previous 
chapter. Once the accesses of a transaction have completed, at a site, they can 
be terminated at that site, we denote these terminals in distributed schedules 
c[s], a[s] making reference to the site at which they occur. 
The accesses of concurrently executing distributed transactions produce ac-
tions that execute locally at each site s E S. We refer to these local execution, 
at s, as the transactions local schedule at s. 
We discussed at length in chapters 4 to 5 how a commit protocol is used to 
provide atomicity. We have seen that in a commit protocol, before any site can 
commit, that site must acquire (usually by the receipt of messages) knowledge that 
each site involved in the transaction is willing or prepared to commit. We saw in 
chapter 2 that this property is true for all 2PC protocols' and was called the 2PC-
level of knowledge. It follows from these observations that in every distributed 
transaction, each local site must perform a prepare action before committing a 
transaction 2 . We denote transaction t i 's prepare action at site s, pj [S]. At each 
'Unless some special mechanism, such as compensating transactions is in place. 
2 1n the early prepare variant of two phase commit this action is implicit after each access is 
performed. In the read-only optimisation the prepare action is not followed by a final commit, 
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site, all transactions must perform their prepare action before committing, that is 
pi [s] -< c[s], holds for each local schedule. A prepare action is neither a terminal 
nor an access, the table below summarises this. 
Accesses I 	Prepare action I 	Terminals 
I w [d] I t2 writes d I p [s] I ti prepares at s I 	c [s] t commits at s 
r[d] I ti reads d I 	 I a[sj  I t4 aborts at s 
Definition 3 A complete distributed schedule, p is a vector of complete local 
schedules p = (a 31 ,... ,aj, with one entry in the vector for each site, where 
data objects reside, in the distributed system. 
U 
For notational convenience we write distributed schedules as a list of local 
schedules. An example is given below, where s = SITE(d) and s' = SITE(d'). 
a3 	ri [d] 	r2 [d] p[d] w 2 [d] P2[d] ci [s] c2 [8] 
a3' : r2 [d'] w2 [d'] r1 [d'] Pi  [d] P2  [d] C2[8'1 c1 [s'] 
We use the same notational conventions as we did in centralised schedules, that 
if one action is to the right of another in the same row then the rightmost, of 
the two actions, took place later. If however two actions are in different rows we 
can only determine their relative order if we know some information about the 
global order of events. For example, if we know that all accesses across all sites 
are finished before any prepare actions are taken at any sites, then we are often 
able to determine the order of events in the distributed schedule. 
In the example above if we assume that all accesses are finished before any 
prepare actions are taken then we know that ri [d'] in sequence a3 ' is before c2 [8] 
in sequence a 3 by applying transitivity to the facts that ri [d'] must be before Pi  [s] 
and that p1 [s] is before c2 [s] by the local order in the local schedule a 3 . 
Definition 4 A complete distributed schedule is serial if there exists a total order 
of the transactions such that if t i precedes t3 in the order, then all of t i 's accesses 
precede all of t j 's accesses in each local schedule where both appear [8]. 
U 
if no writes have been performed at the site on behalf of the transaction. These variants were 
discussed in chapter 2 
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Definition 5 A prefix of a distributed schedule is the vector of (possibly empty) 
prefixes of the original local schedules. A prefix p' = (o 1 , . .. , o"r) of p = 
(o-81 ,. . . , o) is admissible provided 
if c[s] e a'8 . then VSk e S, if o[d] E °s then o[d] 	Sk 
If a transaction commits in a prefix of a schedule, then all accesses of that trans-
action from the original schedule are present in the prefix. 
U 
In distributed transactions processing systems logging to stable storage en-
sures that the prefix reconstructed on recovery from a failure of any site is always 
admissible. Since we want to concentrate on isolation we will assume that all pre-
fixes are admissible. By modelling failure, and the actions taken upon recovery 
this assumption could be verified. 
Definition 6 The abort-completion of a prefix of a distributed schedule p, is 
formed by extending each local schedule a8  of p in the following way. An a[s] 
is appended to a for each transaction t j with an access but no terminal in a, 
provided t j  has not committed in any other local schedule of p. If it has been 
committed elsewhere and some access o[d] exists in a8 we append c[s] to o. 
Clearly, an abort-completed prefix of a complete distributed schedule is a com-
plete distributed schedule. Furthermore, because any prefixes must be admissible, 
any transaction that commits in the abort-completed prefix must contain all the 
actions that it did in the original schedule. 
7.3 Serializability of Distributed Schedules 
Definition 7 Distributed schedules p and p' are conflict equivalent if 
. p and p' have the same actions and 
• for each conflict of type C E {I,. .. , V} involving accesses r[d] w[d] (w[d] w3 [d]) 
(w[d] r3 [d]) and terminals e[s],  e3 [s], in p, the same conflict of type C ap-
pears in p' involving the same accesses r[d] w3 [d] (w[d] w3 [d]) (w2 [d] r3 [d]) 
and terminals e[s], e3 [s]. 
U 
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Definition 8 A complete distributed schedule p is serializable if it is conflict 
equivalent to some complete distributed serial schedule [8]. 
IN 
Just as in the centralised case of section 6.4 in chapter 6 we define a prefix 
of a complete distributed schedule to be serializable if its abort-completion is 
serializable. 
Proposition 5 All prefixes of complete serializable schedules are serializable. 
Proof Let p = ( U51 	. , ask) be a complete distributed serializable schedule and 
let Ppref  be any admissible prefix of p. Let Pcom  be the abort-completion of Ppref. 
If accesses o  [d] and o [d] exist in ,0com  then they also exist in p and furthermore 
they are in the same order in each of the schedules. The terminals e, e2 in Pcom 
need not be the same (or be in the same order) as e, e3 in p. We do however 
know that if e (e3 ) is c (ci ) in p then it will also be c (ci ) in Pcom,  from the 
way Pcom  is constructed and the atomicity of transactions in p. It thus follows for 
each conflict ordering t j before tj in Pcom,  at some site sk,  involving accesses o[d] 
and o[d], there exists a conflict ordering t j before t3 involving the same accesses 
o[d], o[d] at sk in f. Pcom will therefore have a subset of the conflicts found in p. 
Since p is serializable then so is Pcom 
10 
As in the centralised case a graph theoretic characterisation exists for the 
conflict serializability of a distributed schedule. Let G be a directed graph whose 
nodes are the transactions of a schedule p. If a conflict exists in a schedule we 
add a directed edge between t —+ t 3 to the graph G. 
Proposition 6 If G is acyclic then p is serializable. 
Proof Suppose no cycle exists in C. We will now show p is serializable. If no 
cycle exists then a topological sort of G will provide a total order, such that if 
tj is before t 3 in the total order either no conflict exists between t j and t3 or a 
conflict exists ordering t j before t3 . By definition therefore p is conflict equivalent 
to a serial schedule. 
El 
Proposition 7 If a complete distributed schedule p is serializable then each com-
plete local schedule is also serializable. 
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Proof If p is serializable then it is conflict equivalent to a serial distributed 
schedule p'. This means each local schedule of p is conflict equivalent to the 
corresponding local serial schedule of p' 
U 
We can see in the example below the converse of Proposition 7 does not necessarily 
hold (c.f. [62]). 
ri [d] 	pi[s] 	ci [s] w 2 [d] p2 [8] 	c2 [s] 
w 2 [d'] P2  [s'] c2 [s'] r1 [d'] Pi [9'] Ci [s'] 
In o t 1 —+ t2 because of the conflict ri[d]w2[d] and in o 8', t2 - t 1 because of the 
conflict w2[d']ri[d']. That said, each local schedule, o, o 2 , is serializable. 
7.3.1 Local rules for distributed serializability 
In section 6.6 of the previous chapter we saw that the absence of phenomena PO, 
NP1, NP2L, NP2R gives rise to serializable executions of local schedules. Un-
fortunately, serializability of each local schedule does not imply the serializability 
of a distributed schedule. We require a further condition to achieve this. 
Definition 9 A distributed transaction obeys synchpoint prepare if for all sites 
s e S all accesses of the transaction are before any prepare action. More formally: 
vo i e p, o - pjIs] 
where ---* is the order of events in the distributed system. 
Although it is often impossible for processes in a distributed system to know 
the global order of events, -, this does not mean that the order does not exist. 
Consider an omnipresent observer who samples the global state of the system at 
regular time intervals. Provided the samples are frequent enough that observer 
can determine the order of events. 
We saw in chapter 2 a read-only optimisation for 2PC. In this optimisation 
if a transaction performs only read accesses of data objects at a site then after 
it is asked to prepare it can vote read-only and need no longer be involved 
in the transaction. In a distributed transaction therefore, the point at which a 
site performs a prepare action can mark the end of the transaction at that site. 
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For this reason in a distributed transaction we should change the NP2R rule as 
follows, where SITE(d) = s. 
NP2R' : r2 [d] -< w[d] -< (pi [s] A c3 [s]) 
Whereas the absence of NP2R in a schedule stipulates that c[s] must be before 
w[d], the absence of NP2R' in a schedule stipulates the weaker condition that 
pi[s] must be before w[d]. It is thus possible for c[s] to be after w[d] as long 
as pi[s] is before w3 [d]. If we are using strict two phase locking for concurrency 
control this translates to saying that it is safe to release shared locks at prepare 
time. 
Lemma 8 Let t2 and t3 be two distributed transactions that participate in a con-
flict of type I, II or III on a data object d at site s which we write as 
I 	r4d] -< w[d] A (c2 [s] A c3 [s]) II w4d] -< r3 [d] A (c[s] A c[s]) 
III w[d] -< w[d] A (c[s] A c[s]) 
If phenomena P0, NP1, NP2L, NP2R' do not occur over the actions of the 
particular conflict then in the case of conflict types I and II c[s] - o[d], and for 
conflict type III p i [s] -< o3 [d]. Recall o[d] is shorthand for r[d] or w[d]. 
FEW 
Proof For conflict types I and II see the proof of lemma 6 in the previous chapter. 
For type III note that the absence of NP2R' in any schedule means pi [s] - o[d] 
as required. 
Theorem 5 Any complete distributed schedule which obeys synchpoint prepare 
and contains no local phenomena of the type P0, NP1, NP2L and NP2R' is 
serializable. 
Proof If a schedule p is not serializable then (by proposition 6) a cycle of conflicts 
between transactions must exist. Each conflict must be on a particular data object 
d2 	 dm 
so we can denote this cycle as ti + 
d1 
t2 	+ .. t,11 4 ti. 
No conflict in this cycle can be of type V because type V conflicts w[d] - 
w[d] -< (a[s] A c3 [s]) are disallowed by NP 1. Furthermore, no conflict ti --* tj 1 
can be of type IV because this implies a+i  and so no conflict can order any 
transaction after ti which gives rise to a contradiction because is part of a 
conflict cycle. 
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Using lemma 8 and the fact that pi[s] -< c[s] in any transactions we have 
Pi[s] -.< o3 [d]. We also know that our transactions have the synchpoint prepare 
property and so we can derive the following order on actions in p. The notation 
.J, denotes a vertical version of —+ which was not available to the author. 
oi (di ] 	-< 	pj[sl] 	-< 	02[dj) 	-.< 	e2[di] 
02[d2) 	-< 	p2[s21 	-.< 	03[d2) 	-< 	e3(32) 
03[d3] 	-.< 	P3[S3] 	-.< 	0[d3] 	•.< 	e4[33] 
Om[dm] 	 pm[3m] 	-< 	oi[dm] 	< C[8 m] 
This gives rise to the contradiction that oi[dm] is after p i [s i ] which violates the 
synchpoint prepare property. 
Fol 
We can see if exclusive locks are held until commit time and read locks held 
until prepare time  then P0, NP1, NP2L and NP2R' will be prevented. If in 
addition to this the commit protocol used has the synchpoint prepare property 
then distributed transactions will be serializable. 
7.4 Modelling Distributed Transactions 
In this section we use our views based modelling technique to model a very sim-
ple distributed transaction processing system in which concurrent transactions 
perform read and write accesses to distributed data objects. 
The processes in our system are from two different classes. The data object 
class D and the transaction class T. Let t and d range over the classes T and D 
respectively. 
Each transaction t has the following local state. First there is a set of write 
accesses to be performed denoted t.W. This contains the identities of the data 
objects to be written to. If initially d e t.W then transaction t requests a write 
access on data object d. Similarly if d e t.R, then t requests a read access on d. 
In our simple model each transaction can carry out at most one access at each 
data object which can be either a read or a write access. We also assume only 
one data object per site, however the results in this chapter do not rely on this 
restriction. The set t.A contains the protocol actions that t requests of the data 
objects. For example if Pd  E t.A then t requests data object d to prepare. 
The data objects in our model have an acknowledgement set d.X. If w t E d.X, 
for example then data object d is replying with a yes vote to transaction t. 
'Recall in our simple model each data object undergoes either a read access or a write access 
but not both. In the more complex model when data objects are both read and written to 
exclusive locks are held until the transaction terminates. 
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Similarly if Xt e d.X then d is acknowledging t's request to either read or write. 
In addition to this data objects maintain a set, d.S, to record those transaction 
that hold a shared lock on their data. Data objects also record which transaction 
holds an exclusive lock on their data using the variable d.e. If d.e = I then no 
transaction holds an exclusive lock at d. If t E d.S for example then t holds a 
shared lock on data object d, similarly if d.e = t then t holds an exclusive lock 
on data object d. 
Transaction objects communicate with data objects by viewing sets. For in-
stance, 
©d(d e t.R) 
means d views the set t.R as containing the element d. In this case data object 
d has received a read request from transaction t requesting a read access on data 
object d. Similarly, ©t(x t E d.X) then transaction t has received an acknowl-
edgement for its access at d. Table 7.4 summarises the states of transaction and 
data object processes. 
Name Description Range Initial Value Viewable 
t.R Transaction read requests 2' c D Y 
t.W Transaction write requests 2 D c D Y 
t.A Transaction protocol actions 2{p,w,a} 0 y 
d.X Data object acknowledgements 0 y 
d.S Data object shared locks 2 T 0 N 
d.e Data object exclusive lock T 0 N 
Table 7.1: Local state at transaction and data object processes. 
7.4.1 Protocol Rules 
First we consider four rules that govern how a transaction process and a data 
object communicate when performing either a read or write access. In our very 
simple model a transaction knows at the start exactly what it will want to read 
and write. In practice this is not always the case. 
DR(d) ©d(dEt.R)AtSA(e=tVe=J-) TRt ©t(xEd.X)AdER 
S:= S U {t} A X := X U {Xt} 	 R := R - {d} 
DW(d) ©d(d 
e t.W) A e = I A S = 0 	TW(t) 	
dx) A d E W 
e:=tAX:=XU{x t } W:=W—{d} 
In the rule DR a data object, once it has viewed a read request, will carry out 
that request if no other transaction holds an exclusive lock. Once carried out a 
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shared lock is added and an acknowledgement is sent, by updating d.X. DR is 
matched by rule TR. In TR, if t views an acknowledgement to a read access from 
d it removes d from its read request set t.R. Similarly the rules DW and TW 
allow the communication of a write access. This time an exclusive locking policy 
is employed. In order for data objects to receive requests from transactions for 
reads and writes they must be able to update their views of a transaction's t.R 
and t.W sets. In the following rule let 0 be either set W or set R. 
DUVO(d) d 
e t.0 A ©d(d V t.0) 
©d(t.O := t.0 U {d}) 
Similarly TUV allows a transaction process to update its view of a data object 
when that object acknowledges an action or votes. DUV allows a data object to 
update its view for prepare, commit or abort requests. 
TUV(t) 
Zt e d.X A ©t(z d.X) 
z e {x, w, a} 
©t(d.X := {Zt}) 
Zt E t.A A ©d(z 	t.A) 
z e {p, c, a} 
DUV(d) ©d(t.A := t.A U {Zt}) 
In the next rule a transaction process starts to prepare the transaction. We 
def 
define DATA I t.RUt.W, PREPARE t tef  {pd' I d' e DATA}, COMMIT 
{Cd' d' E t.W} and ABORT 'I {& d' e t.W}, where t.R and t.W are their 




The next three rules model the response a data object makes to a prepare request. 
Either it votes yes to transaction t modelled by rules DSVY and DEVY (DSVY 
for a read-only response) or votes not and releases all locks. 
DSVY(d) 	
t E S A @d(pd e t.A) 
X:=XU{w t }—{xt}AS:S{t} 
DEVY (d) e = t A ©d(p d E t.A) 
X := X U {Wt} - {Xt} 
The next two rules model an abort response from a data object when it views a 
prepare request. Again we model the case where the data object holds a shared 
lock separately, DSVN, to the case where the data object holds an exclusive lock 
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DEVN. 	
E S A ©d(pd E t.A) 
DSVN(d) X X 
U {at} - {Xt} A S := S - {t} 
	
DEVN (d) 	
e = t A ©d(pd E t.A) 
X:=XU{a}—{xt}Ae=I 
Finally we model a transaction process deciding either commit or abort using the 
rules TC and TA, and also, once it has viewed this decision, a data object using 
the rules DC, DA, to decide accordingly. 
TC(t) ©t('1d e DATA, Wt E d.X) 
TA(t) 
 ©t(d (E DATA, at e d.X) 
t.A := COMMIT 	 t.A := ABORT 
DC(d) e = t A ©d(c d E t.A) 	DA(d) e = t A ©d(a d e t.A) 
e:=I 	 e:=I 
7.5 An example execution 
We now give an example execution involving two data objects d 1 , d2 and two 
transaction objects t 1 and t2 . Initially t 1 .R = {d 1 , d2 }, t 1 .W = 0 and t2 .R = {d 1 }, 
t2 .W = {d 2 } modelling an initial configuration where t 1 attempts read operations 
on both d1 and d2 and t2 attempts a read on d1 and a write on d2 . To model 
a configuration we compose the states of t 1 , t2 , d, d2 . The state of a transaction 
object t is represented as a triple, using a superscript for t's view of a data object's 
acknowledgement sets written as t.R t.W t.A 1 ' d2-X. Using this representation 
initially the state of t 1 is {d 1 , d2100.  Similarly we represent the state of a data 
objects d as d.S d.e d.Xt1.R t1.W t1.A t2.R t2.W t2.A and so the initial state of d 1 is 
O_i_ OøxOøøø . 
An execution of a the system can be found in figure 7.5. In this execution 
t 1 and t2 both perform read operations on d1 after which t2 performs a write 
operation on d2 . After this t2 holds an exclusive lock on d2 and so t 1 's read 
operation cannot take place. After receiving acknowledgements, t2 proceeds to 
issue a prepare to d1 and d2 . They respond with yes votes and t2 decides commit. 
On receiving commit d2 can release its exclusive lock allowing t 1 to read d2 . d2 
acknowledges this read and t 1 prepares the transaction. Both d1 and d2 respond 
to this prepare by releasing their locks and finally t 1 commits. 
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{d 1 d2}00 {d1}{d2)0 00 0 








{d1,d2}00 {d1}{d2}0 0° 
J. TUV(t1) I. TUV(t2) 
{d1 	d2}OO{"tl }O {d1 }{d2}O{"tl }{xtj {t1, t2}i{xt j 	x 	
)(dl)O@(dl)00    
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 ,xt2 }{dl }øO{dj}@O 
J, TP(t) 
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}{X2 }{xt2 } {t1, t2}L{xt 1 	x2 
}{dl }Øø{d1 }OO 
DUV(di) 
{d2}øO{"tl 0 0 Pd 1 	Pd} 	
t2 	"2 {t1, t2}J..{xt1 I x 	
} {dl)øø{dl}O{Pd l } 
DSVY(di) 
{d 2 }øØ { "tl 00{pd 1 	Pd} 	
t2 ){} {ti }..L{ Xg1
wt2} {d1 }@O(dj)O{pd 1  } 
{d2 }00 { " tl 
J. TUV(t2) 	TUV(t2) 
OO{Pa 1 
 ,Pd2 }{wt2 ){wt2 } {t1 }..L{xt 1 	w 	
(a j  )OO{d1 }O{pd1) 
{d2} øO"1 )ø 
.L TC(t2) 
{ 
't2 }{wt2} øO{cd2} __t {ti}.L{xt1 	
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Figure 7.1: An execution of a multiple transaction commit protocol. 
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7.6 Verifying Isolation Levels 
In this section we will prove that the NP phenomena defined earlier in chapter 6 
are prevented by our rules. We will then go on to show that the prepare synchpoint 
property holds and thus deduce that any distributed schedule, of our model, is 
indeed serializable. To do this we must first define when a sequence of rules in an 
execution constitutes a phenomenon. Clearly if data object d executes rule DR 
(DW) when ©d(d E t.R) (©d(d E t.W)) holds in the rule's pre-condition then 
a read (write) at d for transaction t has occurred which we previously denoted 
rt[d] (w[d]). Similarly, a data object d acts on the receipt of a prepare, commit 
or abort request in the rules DSVY or DEVY, DC and DA, we say t prepares, 
commits or aborts at t which we previously denoted Pt, Ct and at. 
The execution in figure 7.5 therefore gives rise to the following distributed 
schedule. In our simple model we only allow one object per site and so we do not 
need to distinguish between data objects and the sites where they reside. 
rt1  [d1 ] 	rt2  [d1] pt, pt, 
ad2 : Wt2  [d2 ] Pt2 	Ct 2 rt1  [d2 ] Pt2 
Proposition 8 NPO, NP1, NP2L, NP2R' cannot occur in any schedule pro-
duced by the rules of our model. 
Proof We will consider each phenomenon in turn and show that they are pre-
vented by the rules of our system. 
NPO: w[d] -< w[d] -< (c2 A c3 ). w[d] happens when d applies the DW(d) 
rule. In the post-action of this rule e t. The pre-condition of DW(d) 
contains the clause e = t and therefore while e = t, d cannot apply DW 
for any other transaction t3 . The only other rules that change the value of e 
are DC(d), DA(d) and DEVN(d). We need not consider the cases DA(d) 
and DEVN(d) since ci must occur in NPO. DC corresponds to ci so we 
know w[d] c2 as required. 
NP 1: w[d] -< r[d] - (c3 A a) and NP2L: w[d] -< r3 [d] - (ci A c3 ). A very 
similar argument to the one presented in NPO. This time while e = t, d 
cannot apply rule DR for any other transaction t3 . 
NP2R': rj[d] -< wj[d] -.< (pi A c3 ) r[d] happens when d applies the DR(d) 
rule. In the post-action of this rule S := S U {t2 }. The pre-condition of 
DW(d) contains the clause S = 0 and therefore while ti E 5, d cannot 
apply DW for any other transaction t 3 . The only rules that remove ti from 
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S are DSVY(d) and DSVN(d). DSVN(d) can not happen since t3 must 
commit and DSVY(d) corresponds to p2 so we know w3 [d] p2 as required. 
Proposition 9 Synchpoint prepare is guarenteed in any execution produced by 
the rules of our system. 
Proof We must show for any transaction t all read and write accesses for t are 
before any prepare action. Suppose this is not the case then there exists an 
execution where a prepare rule for t, either DSVY or DEVY, is before a read 
or write rule, either DR or DW, for t. In the pre-condition of both rules DSVY 
and DEVY we have the clause ©d(pd E t.A). For this to happen d must have 
applied the rule DUV to update its view of transaction t's t.A set and before that 
t must have applied the rule TP(t). The pre-condition to TP is R = 0 A W = 0. 
Clearly in order for both these sets to be empty t must have executed TR or 
T'W for each of its read and write accesses, the pre-condition to both these rules 
contains the clause ©t(x t E d.R) and so all read and write rules DR and DW 
for t must have already been applied. 
Theorem 6 All distributed schedules produced by the rules of our system are 
serializable. 
Proof By proposition 8, no NP phenomena are present by proposition 9, synch-
point prepare is guaranteed and so by theorem 5 all distributed schedules are 
serializable. 
FE-1 
7.7 Overlapping Prepare 
To increase transaction throughput, in transaction processing systems, many dif-
ferent strategies have been used. Many rely on increasing transaction concurrency. 
As we have seen before, in the read-only optimisation, an effective strategy to this 
end is for a distributed transaction to release its locks as early as possible. The 
transactions in our model release their read locks as soon as they have received 
acknowledgements for all their accesses (i.e. at prepare time). Another strategy 
is to send a prepare message to any read-only site as soon as the transaction 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 7.2: In (a) a transaction collects acknowledgements for all accesses before 
any prepare messages are sent. In (b) prepare messages are overlapped with 
accesses to increase transaction concurrency. 
has received an acknowledgements from that site only, that all read accesses have 
taken place. In this strategy the transaction process need not wait until it has 
received acknowledgements from every site before sending a prepare message. 
In Microsoft's Distributed transaction manager [20], just such a facility exists. 
Figure 7.2 depicts the two different strategies. 
It is interesting to model this new strategy using our rules, which we do by 
making some small changes. First we add A := A U {pd} to the post-action of 
TR(t) thus. 
E d.X) A d E R 
TR(t) 
This change means a transaction can start to prepare a read-only data object as 
soon as it receives an acknowledgement of its read. The only other change we 
must make is to the definition of PREPARE This now becomes PREPARE 1 
 def
t . 
{Pd' I d' e t.W}. This means that in the post-action of TP, prepare messages 
will only be sent to data objects that have been written to. 
It is interesting to ask, what level of transaction isolation is now attained. The 
level of isolation claimed by Microsoft for this type of strategy in their distributed 
transaction server is READ COMMITTED. Clearly, full or serializable isolation 
R := R - {d} A A := A u {Pd} 
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is not attained; consider the example below. 
Ordi 	Tt 1  [d1 ] pt, Wt 2  [d1 ] Ct2 
0d2 : Wt2  [d2 ] Ct2 rt 1 [d2 ] Ct 1 
If we assume in this example that w2[d1]  and  wt2[d2]  happen at d1 and d2 at the 
same time then the schedule is not serializable. t 1 reads the value of d1 before t 2 
writes to it, whereas t 1 reads the value of d2 after t 2 writes to it. 
Interestingly, the proof of proposition 8 still holds. The problem here is that 
we have lost the synchpoint prepare property. It is no longer the case that all 
accesses for a transaction must take place before any prepare actions. The lack 
of synchpoint prepare results in distributed schedules no longer being serializable 
(each local schedule however does remain serializable). Although it was not per-
formed we could model check this version of our model to automatically verify 
that the synchpoint property does not hold. 
7.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter we studied the way a commit protocol is used within a distributed 
transaction to provide a level of transaction isolation. In chapter 6 we saw how 
to define transaction isolation levels for transaction schedules produced by non-
distributed transactions. In this chapter we extended these definitions for dis-
tributed transaction schedules. In particular we introduced the idea of when a 
transaction prepares within a distributed transaction. 
Using these extensions we formally defined distributed serializability. The 
NP rules of chapter 6 were extended for distributed schedules and NP2R was 
modified to take account of the prepare point in a distributed transaction. In the 
non-distributed case the exclusion of NP phenomena guaranteed serializability, 
but this exclusion alone does not guarantee serializability for distributed trans-
actions. If a further condition, that we defined and named synchpoint prepare, 
holds then distributed schedules are serializable. 
In order to study the role of commit providing a mechanism whereby the NP 
phenomena are excluded and synchpoint prepare property is provided, we con-
structed a very simple views based transaction processing system model. This 
model incorporated centralised 2PC. In this model we showed that the NP phe-
nomena are indeed excluded. We also showed how 2PC helps provide synchpoint 
prepare and concluded that schedules of this model are serializable. 
A commercial optimisation technique to increase transaction concurrency is 
often used, for example in Microsoft's DTC [20]. In this optimisation a trans-
action's accesses and prepare messages are overlapped. By changing our model 
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slightly we capture this situation and show that the synchpoint prepare prop-
erty is lost. Thus the extra transaction concurrency is at the cost of a loss of 
serializability in the resulting schedules. 
The chapter demonstrates how our modelling technique can be used to model 
the more complex situation where many concurrent transaction interact while 
executing a commit protocol. We see how we can formally describe this com-
plex behaviour and analyse properties of this behaviour, for example the level of 
transaction isolation attained within the system. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future Research 
Directions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this last chapter we will summarise the work presented in this dissertation. 
In so doing we will highlight the research contributions made and discuss further 
possible research directions. 
The thesis centres around the views based modelling technique presented. 
During this summary therefore, we will support our claim that the modelling 
technique is suitable for modelling and analysing commit protocols and the envi-
ronments in which they execute. 
In particular we will highlight evidence that, as claimed in the introduction, 
our views based model is formal enough to support rigourous arguments about 
the behavioural properties of commit protocols as well as supporting automated 
techniques such as model checking. Our views based model is flexible enough to 
model a wide variety of commit protocols, and is scalable in the sense that the 
arguments constructed using the model can be applied to arbitrary numbers of 
processes. 
8.2 Commit Literature and Modelling Techniques 
We started the dissertation by reviewing some literature on the problem of atomic 
commit. This review concentrated on the types of environments in which commit 
executes describe some formal models that have been used for commit protocols. 
Bernstein et al. provide an early definition of the problem of commit and in- 
troduce us to 2PC. The subject of blocking has attracted much academic interest 
and it was discussed with the introduction of Skeen and Stonebreaker's formal 
132 
model of a commit protocol. In order to give a flavour of the different environ-
ments and versions of commit protocols we described a whole host of different 
commit protocols and protocol optimisations. We saw as the protocols became 
more complex the models used in their description became richer. For example 
the presumed abort 2PC optimisation reduces the extent to which logging needs 
to be carried out. A model of presumed abort therefore must model a log if we 
are to reason about its behaviour. Paralleling these richer environments we also 
saw richer behavioural properties expressed. For example, if network failure is 
modelled then we can pose questions about blocking. It soon came apparent that 
because of the huge diversity in the different environments, it is difficult to define 
the problem of commit precisely for all environments. Furthermore it is difficult 
to encompass all these models using one modelling technique. 
A key component of the environment in which atomic commit executes is the 
extent to which failure is modelled. Many different models of failure have been 
proposed. The diversity of failure assumptions again adds another dimension to 
the task of modelling the environments in which commit protocols execute. 
Over the years atomic commit protocols have found applications in many 
different areas. In fact, the atomicity property of commit protocols is so useful 
we find commit or commit style protocols in the most unlikely areas. Finding 
new applications for atomic commit protocols, particularly in e-commerce and 
Internet applications, is a whole area of active research. 
Although many different models have been proposed, no one model, or mod-
elling technique, seems to be generally applicable. Furthermore, assumptions 
about the distributed environment in which the atomic commit protocols are 
studied varies widely. This is particularly true of assumptions made about site 
and communication failure. For these reasons it is difficult to mould the various 
models of commit into a hierarchy. 
By way of introducing our views based model we studied three general mod-
elling techniques used to model asynchronous message passing distributed sys-
tems. I/O automata have been widely used to model and specify distributed 
systems. These models support a powerful pre-condition post-action style speci-
fication of the behaviour of processes within a system. Knowledge based models 
were introduced by Hadzilacos. In these models processes communicate by send-
ing messages but a more declarative semantics is given to the processes within the 
system. The knowledge based technique is formal, concise and provides a good 
abstraction to the explicit message passing details that are found in many other 
models. The calculus for communicating systems is a very general technique for 
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modelling distributed systems of agents. Agents communicate by handshaking. A 
formal transition semantics is given for CCS agents which means that properties 
of agents can be easily automatically verified using model checking. Unfortu-
nately it is difficult to specify complex protocols using CCS. Message passing 
details are explicit which often results in very large transition systems. 
Our views based technique draws upon some of the strengths of these models. 
We use the expressive pre-condition post-action methods of I/O automata to 
specify behaviour. The main novelty is the incorporation of message passing 
within a processes state in the form of views. A pre-condition can contain a 
clause of the form: 
©p(q.s = x) 
meaning that p's most up-to-date knowledge of q's state variable s is that its 
value is x. 
In all of these models an execution of a protocol is expressed using a sequence 
of configurations. A configuration captures the global state of the processes in the 
system and the environment in which they execute. By taking steps (applying 
rules) a configuration evolves. A protocol execution therefore is a sequence of 
configurations. 
8.2.1 Future Research Directions 
Although there is a large amount of academic research on atomic commit pro-
tocols, almost all protocols commercially in use are based around centralised 
two-phase commit. The subject of blocking has received much attention from 
academics but in practice it is enough to take steps, such as the help-me messages 
we modelled in chapter 4, to relieve the problem and live with its consequences. 
The family of three-phase commit protocols are unlikely to be of use within tradi-
tional environments where high transaction throughput is very important. This 
may soon change however. Wireless communication systems and Internet com-
munication increases the likelihood of partitioning networks, and highly variable 
message propagation times. In e-commerce style transactions, throughput may 
not be of paramount importance over reliability. 
These new transaction processing environments are likely to give rise to a 
whole new set of requirements. Already we see requirements for commit style 
protocols which involve parties that may not trust one another [44, 54], reaching 
agreement. 
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8.3 Putting our Model to Work 
In order to demonstrate the flexibility of our views based model we used it to 
model the simple centralised 2PC. We achieved this using only six protocol rules. 
Our simple model did not include any types of failure, and so, in order to model 
failure we introduced the partitioning model of communication failure where pro-
cesses become disconnected into groups. We showed in this enriched model that it 
is possible to formally capture properties like blocking and we produced protocol 
executions, in our model, that did indeed block. 
By adding a buffer state to 2PC we arrive at 3PC which is the basis for a 
family of commit protocols called quorum based three phase commit protocols. 
In this more complex class of protocols blocking is avoided in quorate connected 
components. We use our model to describe a quorum version of 3PC, called 
Q3PC, and model the recent extended version of Q3PC called E3PC. 
Our model allows us to reason about the behaviour quite naturally even for 
the more complex protocols such as E3PC. This lead to the innovation of our 
new quorum based 3PC, which we named X3PC. A views based model of X3PC 
is derived from a model of E3PC by enriching the state of a process in the E3PC 
model and adding some protocol rules. We formally prove that X3PC provides a 
solution to the atomic commit problem, demonstrating the model's applicability 
in this arena. The traditional proof technique we use makes reference to the order 
that rules of the protocol obey in any protocol execution. We show that X3PC 
provides an identical level of tolerance to blocking as E3PC but that it commits 
in many of the failure scenarios in which E3PC aborts. 
By deriving quite complex commit protocols, in a non-trivial environment, 
where communication failure is possible, we see that our views based model pro-
vides us with a flexible modelling technique. We also demonstrate that it pro-
vides good support for reasoning about commit protocol properties by proving 
behavioural properties of the most complex protocol presented, X3PC. 
8.3.1 Future Research Directions 
Our modelling technique was tailored to commit protocols but it can be used 
for many other types of protocols involving groups of homogenous agents. It is 
particularly useful in protocols involving agreement amongst these agents. It is an 
interesting research question to define the types of protocols that it is applicable 
to, its strengths and limitations. 
In order to further increase the performance of X3PC one could include, in a 
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process's state, histories of other processes' histories. This would further increase 
a terminations protocol's chances of reaching commit over abort. More analysis 
could be performed to analyse X3PC's performance. One strategy similar to the 
techniques of Peleg and Wool [63] would be to consider the behaviour of X3PC 
under all possible partitioning scenarios. 
It is possible to generate a transition system, as we did in chapter 5 from a 
model of X3PC. The state of a process in X3PC is much larger than the simple 
example we considered in chapter 5 but in theory the same principles apply. Using 
the abstraction techniques we discussed it should be possible to automatically 
verify properties of complex protocols such as X3PC using the same techniques. 
8.4 Automatic Verification Techniques 
It is possible to express the behaviour of a commit protocol by expressing all its 
possible execution paths as a labelled transition system. Using a views based 
model of a simple centralised 2PC protocol as a starting point we showed how a 
transition system can be automatically generated. The size of resulting transition 
system depends on how the global state of the system, the configuration, is rep-
resented. We described how to generate a transition system using two different 
representations. CON, a concrete representation, produces very large transition 
systems, MULTI gives rise to smaller ones. 
Using these representations we describe a simulation technique that allows 
us to reason about the behaviour in the concrete representation, CON using the 
abstract representation MULTI. 
A sub-logic of CTL we name CTL is defined. Using this logic we can formally 
express properties of commit protocols. The logic CTL cannot express counting 
properties. Its inability to express these properties means that the properties 
it does capture are preserved between our representations. This means we can 
show, for our simple 2PC model, that if a CTL property holds (fails) by model 
checking in the MULTI representation then it will also hold (fail) if the CON 
representation was used. 
Using this strategy we verify many properties of the simple views based model 
automatically using a games based model checking algorithm. This demonstrates 
that our model supports model checking techniques for automated verification. 
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8.4.1 Future Research Directions 
The success of the abstraction techniques we discussed depend on the fact that our 
processes communicate using views and also that they are largely homogeneous 
in their behaviour. They all follow the same set of rules. 
Many different protocols can be modelled and model checked using our views 
based models . For example, recently Chkliaev [13] formally prove properties of a 
non-blocking atomic broadcast protocol first proposed by Babaoglu and Toueg [4], 
using a automated proof tool called PVS. Our techniques are highly suitable for 
this protocol and some preliminary research has been carried out in to model check 
CTL -  properties of this protocol. Another avenue to explore involves leadership 
election protocols in partitioning networks. The extent to which our techniques 
are applicable is an open research question. 
Although we only model check a very simple protocol in this thesis it should 
be clear how we can extend our models to allow the model checking of more 
complex systems. In particular we could quite easily add partition failure to our 
simple two-phase commit and model check the resulting system. 
8.5 Commit and Isolation 
Commit protocols help ensure distributed transactions are atomic they also play 
a role in providing transaction isolation. In order to study the role of a com-
mit protocol in this area we must first define what it means for a distributed 
transaction to attain a particular level of isolation. 
Unfortunately, definitions of isolation levels in the literature, for even non-
distributed transactions are not clear. A good starting point is the ANSI 92 
standard, but the definitions found within are too ambiguous for our purposes. A 
critical analysis of the ANSI definitions was given by Berenson et al., where clearer 
definitions were presented. We built on these definitions and further refined them. 
Like Berenson et al. our definitions were based around phenomena. For a specific 
isolation level particular sets of phenomena are disallowed in a schedule. These 
types of definitions are completely independent of assumptions about particular 
concurrency and recoverability mechanisms (e.g. locking) that might be in place. 
Furthermore they are weaker, than those presented by Berenson et al., in the 
sense that at a particular isolation level more concurrency is permitted 
Once we were able to define what it meant for a centralised transaction to 
attain a particular isolation level, we could then proceed to generalise our defi-
nitions to distributed transactions. In so doing, we saw that although excluding 
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phenomena in local schedules provided serializable isolation in each local schedule 
is does not provide a level of serializable isolation for the complete distributed 
schedule. It turns out that, if we supplement this with an extra condition we 
named synchpoint prepare, it is enough to ensure a serializable level of isolation 
for distributed transactions. 
Using our views based model we modelled a very simple transaction processing 
system. The system included a two phase commit protocol. We showed that the 
phenomenon defined in the previous chapter are excluded in any execution of our 
system. Furthermore, we showed that 2PC does provide the synchpoint prepare 
property and thus we can conclude only serializable schedules are produced. 
A common optimisation overlaps the accesses of distributed transactions with 
their commit phase. This increases transaction concurrency and thus perfor -
mance. We made some changes to our model to reflect this situation and then 
showed that the synchpoint prepare property was lost. 
Once again we have demonstrated the power of our modelling technique. By 
defining isolation level as a restriction on the possible ordering of rules within 
a protocol execution we are able to verify that a protocol supports a particular 
level of isolation. We can appeal directly to the rules of our protocol in order 
to verify that certain phenomena are prevented. Furthermore, in the case that 
synchpoint prepare is not provided we can exhibit a counter example in the form 
of a protocol execution. 
8.5.1 Future Research Directions 
Model checking techniques could be applied to these and similar models. The 
same abstraction methods could be used as those found in chapter 5 to provide 
automated checking of properties for arbitrary numbers of concurrently executing 
transactions. Although in the isolation properties counting does count to a certain 
extent processes are still largely anonymous. A possible strategy therefore would 
be to name two transactions and two data objects and then model all others 
generically as a third anonymous transaction and data object. We would then be 
required to show that this abstraction preserves certain properties. In particular 
if an isolation phenomenon exists in the multi—process model it will also exist in 
our abstraction. - 
It is also interesting to consider other levels of transaction isolation and how 
they are defined. As new applications such as Internet transaction processing and 
mobile e-commerce protocols become more prevalent it is likely that these lower 
levels of isolation will become more important. For example, in mobile commerce, 
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hand held mobile devices may perform transactions while periodically connected 
to larger systems guaranteeing only READ UNCOMMITTED levels of isolation 
to ensure large levels of concurrency. 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this dissertation we have seen how the views based modelling tech-
nique can be used to model and analyse the behaviour of commit protocols. The 
process of modelling a commit protocol often provides insight into its behaviour 
which can lead to further improvements. An example of this was the derivation 
of X3PC from E3PC. A novel feature of our technique allows us to incorporate 
message passing details as views within a process's state. This provides a a solid 
and scalable basis on which to generate transition systems that describe protocol 
behaviour, which in turn supports abstraction techniques, that allow automated 
proofs of properties of systems using model checking. In order to study the role 
of commit in providing transaction isolation we first constructed a formal account 
of transaction isolation. Our model then captured a simple transaction process-
ing system and we were able to prove different levels of isolation were supported 
within this system. 
The techniques presented in this thesis are of little direct practical use for 
today's protocol designers and software engineers. They are however a step in 
the right direction. The extent to which these and similar tools are adopted will 
largely depend on how easy they are to use and how useful their output is. It is 
unlikely they will be palatable in their current state but they could form the basis 
of a suite of software tools. Model checking has found commercial applications in 
hardware design and is being used successfully by companies like Intel. The extra 
effort involved with model checking is justified in this case due to the large costs 
associated with making changes to hardware once in production. As protocols 
are embedded as firmware in devices such as smart phones a formal techniques 
such as model checking will likely be justified on a similar basis. 
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